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I.
INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment doctrine no longer reflects how the world
works. Technology has propelled us into a new era. Traits unique to
a digital world are breaking down the distinctions on which the
Court has traditionally relied to protect individual privacy.
What are these characteristics? Digital information is ubiqui-
tous. Individuals cannot go about their daily lives without generat-
ing a footprint of nearly everything they do. The resulting data is
accessible, recordable, and analyzable. And because it is digital, it
can be combined with myriad sources, yielding deeper insight into
our lives. Data is also non-terrestrial and borderless. Bits and bytes
populate an alternative world. They may be held on a server, but
their generation, transfer, and availability are not tied to territory,
undermining doctrines that rely on three-dimensional space. Tech-
nology, moreover, embodies an efficiency drive. Innovation makes
it possible to do more, and to do it better, faster, and cheaper than
before. So more information is being captured, even as the re-
source expenditures required steadily decline. Simultaneously digi-
tal interfaces are rapidly proliferating, replacing traditional modes
of interaction. This means that new types of information are availa-
ble, even as our ability to conduct our daily lives has become heavily
dependent on technology. It has become a non-option to eschew
the digital world, if one wants to live in the modern age.
These characteristics undermine the distinctions that mark
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Consider, for instance, the diremp-
tion between private and public space. The Court has long relied
upon this dichotomy to determine what constitutes a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.1 It draws a line at the walls of the home, citing
the risk assumed by individuals when they go out into public and
expressing a reluctance to disadvantage law enforcement by forcing
them to turn off their natural senses or to ignore what any ordinary
person could ascertain.
The amount and types of information available in the public
sphere, however, have exponentially increased. WiFi and Bluetooth
signals can be collected, global positioning systems and vessel moni-
toring systems operated, and radio frequency identification chips
tracked. Automated license plate readers record the time, date, and
1. See, e.g., Brief of James Otis, Paxton’s Case (Mass. Sup. Ct. 24–26 Feb.
1761); Part II(A), infra. Cf. Raleigh, Opinion, 3 MASSACHUSETTS SPY, Apr. 29, 1773,
at 1, cols. 1–2 (discussing the problems with royal officers seizing traders’ property
without “proper cause”).
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location of cars, while network data reveals where mobile devices
travel day and night. International mobile-subscriber identity-catch-
ers pinpoint the devices located in a given area. Internet protocol
databases, in turn, register users’ locations. Financial transactions
and credit card records place people in certain places at certain
times, while cameras, enhanced with remote biometric identifica-
tion, may be mounted on vehicles, poles, buildings, or unmanned
aerial systems, creating the potential for 24-hour monitoring, seven
days a week, ad infinitum.2
The digitization of this information means that it can be re-
corded and combined with biographic information and subjected
to algorithmic analyses, penetrating further into citizens’ lives. Even
when data is derived from the public sphere, the government’s use
of it may impact free speech, the right to assemble, and religious
freedom, to say nothing of personal privacy.
Technology erodes other Fourth Amendment distinctions. A
series of cases in the 1970s established the contours of what would
be considered “reasonable,” based on who holds the information.
Data held by the individual generating it is afforded a higher level
of protection, while data held by third parties, such as companies
with whom one contracts for goods or services, is granted a lower
level of protection. But technology has created an imbalance. Digi-
tal dependence—i.e., the degree to which we rely on digitization to
live our daily lives—has radically changed the world in which we
live.3 School, work, social interactions, hobbies, and other pursuits
are now online by nature of how society functions. This has two
implications. First, new kinds of information are now generated
and, therefore, accessible. Second, our reliance on industry and
third-party providers to service the needs of daily life has made
much more of our personal information, as well as new kinds of
personal data, vulnerable to government collection.4
2. For discussion of facial recognition technologies and remote biometric
identification, see Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitu-
tional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–15–621, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOL-
OGY: COMMERCIAL USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW (2015); Mark
Pomerleau, A Closer Look at Facial Recognition, GCN (Aug. 7, 2015), https://
gcn.com/articles/2015/08/07/facial-recognition.aspx.
3. For a thoughtful, early discussion about the increasing centrality of digitiza-
tion, see generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004).
4. Amazon Echo, for instance, can hear what one is saying from across a
crowded room. Alyssa Newcomb, How Amazon Echo Can Hear What You’re Saying
from Across the Room, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/amazon-echo-hear-room/story?id=26740479. Samsung’s own privacy
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Another distinction centered on the type of information under
consideration—content versus non-content—similarly collapses in
the contemporary world. For years, envelope information has been
considered non-content, and thus less protected than content, on
the grounds that the latter, and not the former, reveals an individ-
ual’s private communications, thoughts, and beliefs. But what hap-
pens when a search engine reveals what it is that is being examined
in the uniform resource locator (URL) itself?5 Metadata of all sorts
can reveal much about an individual6—indeed, law enforcement
regularly uses search terms to bring criminal charges against indi-
viduals. The reason is simple: patterns in phone calls, text messages,
instant messaging, emails, or even URL visits demonstrate beliefs,
relationships, and social networks—yet the form of that data
(metadata) has not historically been considered content. The same
is true of consumer metadata and financial records. Sophisticated
pattern analytics mean that non-content morphs into content, mak-
ing any formal distinction meaningless.7
policy for its smart televisions warns consumers that anything discussed in the
proximity can be “captured and transmitted to a third party.” Alyssa Newcomb,
Samsung Privacy Policy: Watch What You Say Around Your Smart TV, ABC NEWS (Feb.
9, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/samsung-privacy-policy-
watch-smart-tv/story?id=28829387. Their televisions use facial recognition and bio-
metric identification technologies to track family members’ actions, expressions,
and utterances. See id.; Samsung Privacy Policy – SmartTV Supplement, http://
www.samsung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). Toys
inside the home similarly record private conversations. Although Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine draws a line at the curtilage of the home, extending higher protec-
tions to what happens indoors, it simultaneously divests third party data of any
privacy interest. Fourth Amendment doctrine has yet to address the tension.
5. If I were, for instance, to search for “Molotov cocktail” on Amazon.com,
the URL that comes up is https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=NB_sb_noss_1?url=
search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=Molotov_cocktail. Subject-specific sites simi-
larly indicate the content, with Wikipedia’s URL reading https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov_cocktail.
6. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Consti-
tutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014) [hereinafter Dono-
hue, Bulk Metadata] (discussing privacy issues regarding the NSA’s bulk collection
of telephony metadata); LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE 39–53 (2016) [hereinafter DONOHUE, FUTURE]. A helpful definition of
“metadata” offered by Anne J. Gilliland is “the sum total of what one can say about
any information object at any level of aggregation.” An “information object,” in
turn, “is a digital item or group of items, regardless of type or format, that can be
addressed or manipulated as a single object by a computer.” Anne J. Gilliland,
Setting the Stage, in INTRODUCTION TO METADATA 1, p.2 (Murtha Baca ed., 2d ed.
2008).
7. See, e.g., Swati Agarwal et al., Open Source Social Media Analytics for Intelligence
and Security Informatics Applications, in BIG DATA ANALYTICS: 4TH INTERNATIONAL
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Differentiating between domestic and international communi-
cations similarly proves inapposite to the contemporary world.
Communications are now global. If I email a friend from a restau-
rant in Boston and she reads the email while sitting at a restaurant
in New York, the message may well have gone internationally, plac-
ing it under weaker Fourth Amendment standards.8 It is not that
the privacy interest in the communication is any different than that
of a traditional letter. It is simply that digitization and the advent of
worldwide communications networks have narrowed my right to pri-
vacy for the same information. Or how about cloud computing, or the
use of Drop Box, or Google Docs? Is all of this information fair
game, so to speak, just because Google happens to hold the docu-
ment in Singapore as opposed to San Francisco? The problem, as
with the distinctions between private and public space, or content
and non-content, has nothing to do with the interests implicated
and everything to do with new technologies.
This Article explores how digitization is challenging formal dis-
tinctions in Fourth Amendment doctrine that previously have
played a role in protecting the right to privacy.9 The purpose, con-
sistent with the aim of the NYU Annual Survey of American Law, is to
CONFERENCE, BDA 2015, at 21, 28–30 (Naveen Kumar & Vasudha Bhatnager eds.,
2015) (using YouTube metadata to identify extremists); id. at 30–32 (using Twitter
metadata to detect hate-promoting content and predict civil unrest); Carson Kai-
Sang Leung & Fan Jiang, Big Data Analytics of Social Networks for the Discovery of “Fol-
lowing” Patterns, in BIG DATA ANALYTICS AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY, 17TH INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE, DAWAK 2015, at 123, 126–134 (Sanjay Madria & Takahiro
Hara eds., 2015) (using metadata to determine relationships between individuals
in social networks).
8. For further discussion of the conditions under which the e-mail could be
read for foreign intelligence purposes, see generally DONOHUE, FUTURE, supra note
6. R
9. There are other distinctions and aspects of Fourth Amendment doctrine
that this article does not consider. For instance, searches of personal devices give
rise to a range of questions about the limits of plain view doctrine and ways in
which such searches can be narrowed to avoid a descent into a general warrant.
For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005). The argument recurs in
Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 300 (2005). Another distinction made in the statutory realm is between stored
communications and communications in transit, with the latter given more protec-
tions. Some commentators have argued that law enforcement has exploited this
distinction to afford the type of digital information held by ISPs (photographs, e-
mail, bank records, and medical records) a lower level of protection. See, e.g.,
James M. O’Neil, Note, The Impact of VoIP Technology on Fourth Amendment Protections
Against Electronic Surveillance, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 35, 42–43 (2008). I do not
address this directly in the Article as it is primarily a statutory concern.
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provide an overview of where the doctrine has been and where it is
now, with some thoughts about what direction it could go to take
account of the privacy interests implicated by the digital world.10
This Article postulates that four Fourth Amendment dichoto-
mies (private vs. public space; personal vs. third party data; content
vs. non-content; and domestic vs. international) are breaking down
in light of new and emerging technologies. The distinctions are be-
coming blurred. Information previously protected is no longer
guarded. The categories themselves are failing to capture impor-
tant privacy interests, so fewer protections are being granted at the
outset. Simultaneously, the absence of use restrictions in Fourth
Amendment doctrine blinds the law to the deeper privacy interests
at stake. Legal doctrines that fail to recognize any privacy interest in
the collection of information at the outset prove inadequate to ac-
knowledge interests that later arise apparently ex nihilo,11 despite
the fact that more serious inroads into privacy occur with the re-
cording of data, extended collection, and further analysis of the in-
formation. In addition, as the collection and analysis of information
requires fewer and fewer resources, constraints that previously
played a key role in protecting privacy are dropping away. The way
in which the digital era interacts with the doctrine is steadily con-
stricting the right to privacy. If no steps are taken to stem the tide,
privacy interests will continue to narrow with significant long-term
implications.
Part II of this Article begins the survey by focusing on the terri-
torial grounding of Fourth Amendment doctrine at the founding.
It describes the Court’s literal, textual reading of “houses” as mat-
ters within the home, while explaining that “papers” meant that let-
ters sent through the post received the same protections as items
10. The journal, which was founded in 1942, aims to provide a comprehen-
sive summary of developments in American law. See Mission, N.Y.U. Annual Survey
of American Law, https://annualsurveyofamericanlaw.org/aboutus/ (last visited
Nov. 2, 2016).
11. See, e.g., In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted Text], BR 13-
109, at 9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013),  https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/br13-09-pri-
mary-order.pdf (“[W]here one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment in-
terest, grouping together a large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot
result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”). Some
commentators have argued for a continued adherence to this approach, despite
the privacy interests implicated by long-term surveillance. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 353–54 (2012) (re-
jecting the concerns of the shadow majority in United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945
(2012)).
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inside the home.12 The doctrine hewed to a three-dimensional
worldview. But with the advent of the telephone, the question of
how to protect similar interests with regard to voice communica-
tions created difficulties.
Part III begins with Katz v. United States,13 which aspired to
rather more than it delivered. Even as it (ostensibly) wrenched rea-
sonableness from a territorial tie, the Court entrenched the pri-
vate/public distinction.14 The persistence of the open fields
doctrine, the establishment of aerial surveillance, and the Court’s
failure to acknowledge the impact of tracking technologies on per-
sonal liberty reinforced the dichotomy. Thermal scanning under-
scored the reliance on line-drawing in three-dimensional space.
This Article focuses on location tracking to illustrate gaps in the
Court’s jurisprudence that result from new technologies.
Part IV turns to the distinction between personal information
and third party data, noting that the constellation of cases from the
1970s similarly fails to acknowledge the ever-deepening privacy in-
terests of a digital age. Increasing dependence on technology
means that the amount of private information at stake is
considerable.
Part V considers the content versus non-content dichotomy,
noting that technology is blurring the distinction. Electronic com-
munications that convey content are not currently protected, even
as areas traditionally considered to fall on the non-content side of
the line, such as data from pen register (or trap and trace devices)
or envelope information, provide insight into individuals’ private
affairs.
Part VI focuses on the domestic versus international distinc-
tion. It begins by recognizing that the Fourth Amendment did not
initially extend beyond the United States. In 1967, the Court
changed course for U.S. persons overseas, granting limited protec-
12. Besides Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), discussed infra,
this Article does not explore the complexity of Fourth Amendment doctrine with
regard to businesses. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). For addi-
tional discussion, see, for example, Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Pri-
vacy and Advancing Technology, 80 MISS. L. J. 1131, 1162–63, 1174–77, 1202–05
(2011).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. See Weaver, supra note 12, at 1222 (suggesting that the post-Katz cases R
actually digressed with regard to standing doctrine, while “the Court’s post-Katz
technology decisions are a bit more of a mixed bag. However, in a number of those
cases, the Court has restrictively construed the [reasonable expectation of privacy]
test;” nevertheless, the author finds some “heartening trends for privacy in some
recent decisions.”).
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tions. In 1990, it determined that non-U.S. persons located abroad
and lacking a substantial connection to the U.S. hold no constitu-
tional rights under the Fourth Amendment. This section contrasts
the law enforcement approach with that adopted in the foreign in-
telligence realm, which similarly draws a line at the border. The
problem comes in the form of new technologies, which doggedly
refuse to recognize terrestrial boundaries. Domestic communica-
tions may now travel outside the country, simply by nature of how
the Internet works. In so doing, they lose protections that they oth-
erwise would have had, had they stayed within the country.
Part VII concludes by highlighting the importance of re-think-
ing the theoretical framing for the Fourth Amendment. While
some commentators have suggested that legislation is the most ap-
propriate vehicle to address Fourth Amendment concerns, it is to
the Courts we must look to for relief. The questions posed by the
digital age are profound. Failure to address them in a meaningful
way will lead to continually narrower constitutional protections, at
great cost to liberty in the United States.
II.
LITERAL READING OF THE TEXT
Fourth Amendment doctrine has long recognized the impor-
tance of protecting individuals within their homes from govern-
mental intrusion. Prior to the 1970s, it afforded what people did in
public, or made visible to others, considerably less protection. The
doctrine reflected a literal reading of the text. The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their homes meant precisely that, just as the
right to be secure in one’s papers afforded special protections to
correspondence. Letters inside an envelope and sent through the
post obtained the same protections as papers held inside the home.
Once the letters were sealed and blocked from the sight of prying
eyes, the fact that they were being transmitted in the mail did not
alter the underlying privacy interests. Any effort to intercept and to
read such documents amounted to a search, making warrantless ac-
cess presumptively unreasonable.
The rationale made sense. One knew when one entered into
public space that what was said and done could be seen and heard
by others. If any citizen could witness others’ behavior, why should
government officials, who also happened to be present, not be al-
lowed to do the same? Similarly, one could hardly expect postal
employees sorting the mail, or a postman delivering a letter, to
avert their gazes from the writing on the back of a post card situ-
ated adjacent to the address. If they could see it, why shouldn’t law
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enforcement? A different rule applied to correspondence hidden
from public view. Taking the step to open the letter altered the
behavior in question and the privacy rights entailed.
The concepts on which the distinction rested (the risk assumed
by individuals doing things in public, in front of other people, and
the absurdity of directing people to close their eyes, avert their
gazes, or otherwise ignore their senses) became intertwined. What
was visible in public to others did not fall within the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, where the government wanted
to intrude on the sanctity of the home, outside of exigent circum-
stances, it was forced to approach a judge, to present evidence,
under oath, of criminal activity, and to obtain a warrant that de-
tailed precisely what was to be searched, or who or what would be
seized, from where. Similarly, if officers wanted to read a letter lo-
cated in a sealed envelope, they had to first obtain a warrant.
The line was drawn in the physical world, at the border of the
home, or the parchment that made up the envelope. What was in-
side a home or an envelope, was de facto private, while what oc-
curred outside the physical bounds of the home or the envelope
was, with some exceptions, generally public.
A. Houses
For centuries prior to the founding of the United States, En-
glish common law afforded individuals’ homes special protec-
tions.15 Legal treatises detailed limits that prevented officers of the
Crown from entering domiciles absent sufficient cause and/or ap-
plication to a magistrate, demonstrating, under oath, probable
cause of criminal activity.16 English jurists, lawyers, and Parliamen-
15. For discussion on the origins of the Fourth Amendment and its ties to
English legal treatises and cases, see generally Laura K. Donohue, The Original
Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181 (2016) [hereinafter Donohue, Original].
Chapter Four of LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE:  PRI-
VACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016) provides a broad overview of the
founding generation’s aim in enacting the Fourth Amendment, while Chapter Five
focuses on general warrants.  For purposes of this Article, citations related to the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment are to the Chicago Law Review article,
which goes into greater detail than the book.  For individuals interested in a
broader overview, see generally DONOHUE, FUTURE, chs. 4, 5.
16. Id. at 1235. In 1604, Sir Edward Coke famously proclaimed in Semayne’s
Case “[t]hat the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.” Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77
Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.), 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 93 b. In 1628 Coke reiterated this view
in his Institutes of the Laws of England: “[F]or a mans [sic] house is his castle, et
domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium [and each man’s home is his safest ref-
uge].” SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF
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tarians similarly extolled the importance of protecting the home
from undue government interference.17
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND
CRIMINALL CASES 162 (London, M. Flesher 1648). In 1736, Sir Matthew Hale un-
derscored the protections afforded under common law, detailing the conditions
under which justices of the peace, sheriffs, constables, or watchmen could breach
one’s walls. See 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85–95
(1736); see also Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1235–36 (detailing the condi- R
tions under which the home could be breached). William Blackstone in his Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, expounded on Coke, tying the right to be secure in
one’s abode back to Ancient Rome:
[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity
of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated
with impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of ancient Rome, as ex-
pressed in the words of Tully; ‘quid enim sanctius, quid omni religione munitius,
quam domus uniuscujusque civium?’ [‘For what is more sacred, what more invio-
lable, than the house of every citizen’]
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Clarendon
1769) 223 (footnote omitted). William Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown reinforced the
point, citing to Hale’s conditions of entry to emphasize the special place accorded
to dwellings. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 139 (London, Whieldon
6th ed. 1787), https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=2qYDAAAAQAAJ
&rdid=book-2qYDAAAAQAAJ&rdot=1; see also Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at R
1215–17 (discussing the writings of Hale and Hawkins).
17. In Wilkes v. Wood, an action in trespass, John Glynn argued that the case
“touched the liberty of every subject of this country, and if found to be legal, would
shake that most precious inheritance of Englishmen.” (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489,
490 (C.P.); see also Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1199–1204 (discussing R
Wilkes v. Wood). Glynn protested: “In vain has our house been declared, by the law,
our asylum and defence, if it is capable of being entered, upon any frivolous or no
pretence at all, by a Secretary of State.” Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490. Commenting
on the award of £1000 in damages, the The London Chronicle observed, “By this
important decision, every Englishman has the satisfaction of seeing that his home
is his castle.” 14 THE LONDON CHRONICLE, 550 (Dec. 8, 1763). In Entick v. Car-
rington, another case brought in trespass, Charles Pratt, Chief Justice of the Com-
mon Pleas (and, from July 1765, Lord Camden), rejected the potential for a
general warrant to overcome the protections otherwise afforded to dwellings. John
Entick’s home had been “rifled; [and] his most valuable secrets [ ] taken out of his
possession,” before he had been convicted of any crime. (1765) 19 Howell’s State
Trials 1029, 1064 (C.P.). “This power so claimed by the secretary of state,” Pratt
observed, “is not supported by one single citation from any law book extant. It is
claimed by no other magistrate in this kingdom but himself.” Id.; see also Donohue,
Original, supra note 15, at 1196–99 (discussing Entick). The reason for an absence R
of such authority was apparent: “The great end, for which men entered into soci-
ety, was to secure their property.” Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials, at 1066. The
Chief Justice continued:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so min-
ute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license,
but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved
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Upon crossing the Atlantic, the American colonists expected
the same protections that they held in England. When the Crown
failed to respect the common law limits, the seeds of revolution
were sown. In his celebrated oration in Paxton’s Case in 1761, James
Otis declared, “[O]ne of the most essential branches of English lib-
erty is the freedom of one’s house. A man’s house is his castle; and
whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.”18
The following year, John Dickinson, author of Letters from a Farmer
in Pennsylvania, invoked the same ancient liberty. He attacked the
Townshend Acts, which allowed the Crown to enter into “any
HOUSE, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place.”19 John Adams ob-
served in 1774,
An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle. The Law had er-
ected a Fortification round it—and as every Man is Party to the
Law, i.e., the Law is a Covenant of every Member of society with
every other Member, therefore every Member of Society has
entered into a solemn Covenant with every other that he shall
enjoy in his own dwelling House as compleat a security, safety
and Peace and Tranquility as if it was surrounded with Walls of
by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to answer
for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil.
Id. The sanctity of the home so permeated legal culture that the political elite
spoke of it in Westminster. William Pitt (the Elder), 1st Earl of Chatham and Lord
Privy Seal, declared:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter;
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 425 n.1 (7th
ed. 1903) (quoting Chatham). See also Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1238 R
(quoting and discussing Chatham’s statement in Parliament).
18. Brief of James Otis, Paxton’s Case (Mass. Sup. Ct. 24–26 Feb. 1761). Cf.
Raleigh, Opinion, 3 MASSACHUSETTS SPY, Apr. 29, 1773, at 1, cols. 1–2 (discussing
the problems with royal officers seizing traders’ property without “proper cause”).
See also Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1251. R
19. John Dickinson, Letter IX, in EMPIRE AND NATION: LETTERS FROM A FARMER
IN PENNSYLVANIA 51, 54 (Forrest McDonald ed., Liberty Fund Indianapolis 2d ed.
1999), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/690. For Dickinson, “[T]he greatest as-
serters of the rights of Englishmen have always strenuously contended, that such a
power was dangerous to freedom, and expressly contrary to the common law, which
ever regarded a man’s house as his castle, or a place of perfect security.” Id.; see also
Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1261 (discussing Dickinson’s letter). R
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Brass, with Ramparts and Palisadoes and defended with a Gar-
rison and Artillery.20
The Fourth Amendment cemented the home as a protected sphere
into the U.S. Constitution.21 It prohibited entry outside of limited
circumstances absent a warrant supported by oath or affirmation
relating to a named offense and particularly describing the place or
persons to be searched and persons or things to be seized.22
The common law legacy persisted in American legal thought.23
In 1833 Justice Joseph Story noted in his Commentaries on the Consti-
tution that the Fourth Amendment amounted to “little more than
the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common
law.”24 Thirty-five years later Thomas Cooley wrote in his treatise:
“The maxim that ‘every man’s house is his castle,’ is made part of
our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high
value to the citizen.”25 In 1886, Justice Bradley recalled Chief Jus-
tice Pratt’s judgment in Entick: “The principles laid down in this
opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and secur-
ity.”26 Bradley continued:
[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty, and private property.27
20. John Adams, Adams’ Minutes of the Review, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN AD-
AMS 128, 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
21. See Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1188. R
22. See id. at 1193.
23. It also continued to be reflected in English law and legal treatises. See, e.g.,
FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 60 (Theodore D. Woolsey
ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 3d ed. 1883) (“[N]o man’s house can be forcibly
opened, or he or his goods be carried away after it has thus been forced, except in
cases of felony, and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take
great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is jealously insisted upon.”).
24. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1895 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
25. COOLEY, supra note 17, at 425–26; see also Donohue, Original, supra note R
15, at 1307 (discussing Cooley’s writings on the Fourth Amendment). R
26. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see also Donohue, Origi-
nal, supra note 15, at 1308–13 (discussing the historical and legal background of R
Boyd).
27. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544
(1897) (commenting in relation to Boyd, “[I]t was in that case demonstrated that
[the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] contemplated perpetuating, in their full effi-
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To provide a remedy for a violation of the right, in 1914 the
Court adopted the exclusionary rule, prohibiting the government
from using evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or
seizure.28 The case, Weeks v. United States, arose from the arrest of a
resident of Kansas City, Missouri.29 While the suspect was being
held in custody, law enforcement went to his home, found a hidden
key, entered the house, and conducted a search.30 The Court
balked at the officers’ actions, as well as those of a U.S. marshal,
who similarly searched the home.31 Neither search had been sup-
ported by a warrant.32 Absent a remedy, the right could not be se-
cured. The Court explained, “[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . put
the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise
of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints [and]
. . . forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law.”33
Whatever position one may have on the exclusionary rule as an
effective, or even a constitutional, remedy, the fact that the Court
considered it necessary underscored the distinction between the
cacy, by means of a constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil lib-
erty, which had been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle, so
as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their integrity, free from
the possibilities of future legislative change.”).
28. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
29. Id. at 387.
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id. at 386.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 391–92. A few years after Weeks, the Court considered a parallel fact
pattern in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Frederick
Silverthorne had been indicted and arrested, and, while detained, a U.S. marshal
had gone to his business and seized his books and papers. Id. at 390. Using the
material already in its possession, the government had then drafted a new warrant
to justify its actions. Id. at 391. The Court found that it was not permissible to allow
the government to benefit from the illegal act. Id. at 391–92. Justice Holmes, writ-
ing for the Court, explained that allowing such actions would “reduce[ ] the
Fourth Amendment to a form of words. The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Id. at 392
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court did not apply the exclusionary rule to the
states until 1961. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1961). In 1995, the Court
recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 14 (1995). This includes when police employees err in maintaining a
database. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). The exclusionary rule
similarly does not apply where law enforcement relies on binding appellate prece-
dent or on statutes invalidated subsequent to the search. Davis v. United States,
564 U.S. 229, 232, 239 (2011).
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protections afforded to the private sphere, marked by the home,
and public space.34
For just as the home was sacred, what happened outside the
home was rather less so.35 A decade after Weeks, the Supreme Court
34. For a comprehensive article on the exclusionary rule, see generally Chris-
topher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2013). But note that over the past century, the rule has proven
highly contentious both in its form and its implementation.
A number of scholars support the exclusionary rule. See generally, e.g., Craig M.
Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 211 (2010); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357 (2013); Lawrence
Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule Be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310
(1993); Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exorcising the Exclusionary Demons: An Essay on
Rhetoric, Principle, and the Exclusionary Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 49 (1984); Timothy
Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 711 (2000);
Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10
OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 523 (2013); Scott E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The
Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclu-
sionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 393 (2013); Lane V. Sunderland, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
141 (1978); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusion-
ary Rule: The Historical Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881
(1975).
Other scholars have been sharply critical of the exclusionary rule or the so-
called “good faith” exception to the rule. See generally, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Judicial
Review and the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 835 (1999) (criticizing the Su-
preme Court’s focus on deterring police misconduct underlying good faith excep-
tion); David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1 (2013); Kit
Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 821 (2013) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s focus on deterring police miscon-
duct underlying good faith exception); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009) (criticizing a recent “good faith” decision); Eugene
Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 755 (2008); Eugene
Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 747 (2010);
Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment Exclusion-
ary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REV. 211 (2012); Richard E. Myers II, Fourth Amendment Small
Claims Court, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 571 (2013); Gregory D. Totten, Peter D. Kos-
soris, & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Exclusionary Rule: Fix It, but Fix It Right, 26 PEPP. L.
REV. 887 (1999); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on
the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984) (criticizing the
good faith exception); Michael T. Kafka, The Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Per-
spective, Note, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1895 (2001).
35. Orin Kerr, in his postulation of the equilibrium theory of the Fourth
Amendment, lists as his first rule of the status quo in rule zero: “[T]he police are
always free to watch suspects in public. They can walk up to suspects and monitor
them at close range and ask them questions.” Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjust-
ment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 484 (2011) (footnote
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declared in Hester v. United States that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of “persons, houses, papers and effects” did not extend to
“open fields.”36 Citing Blackstone’s Commentaries, Justice Holmes
added, “The distinction between the latter and the house is as old
as the common law.”37 While the home held a special place in the
law, what happened outside of it obtained fewer protections.
As the administrative state expanded, whenever the Court con-
fronted potential exceptions, such as those that arose with regard to
health inspections, the bench was closely divided.38 It was only
when the medical concern was sufficiently acute, and the purpose
and object of the inspection sufficiently targeted, that such intru-
sions could be tolerated. A suspected infestation of rats would suf-
fice; general inspection of the home’s structure would not.39
Outside of any emergency situation, the unwarranted search of a
omitted). He takes it as given that police “can walk the beat and observe whatever
they see in public.” Id. The reason that this could even be considered a given stems
from the common law protections of the home.
36. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). The case evolved in the
shadow of the Eighteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI. Revenue officers, hiding outside Hester’s home, saw him give
a bottle of what appeared to be moonshine to another person. 265 U.S. at 58.
37. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223,
*225–*26).
38. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding over four
dissenters a Baltimore City health inspector’s search for the source of a rat infesta-
tion without a warrant). In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), the Court
split evenly, leaving in place the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court upholding a
housing inspector’s decision to enter a plumber’s residence without a warrant. The
opinion, split four to four, is without force of precedent. But in this case, the four
Justices that did not join the opinion in Ohio had already publicly expressed their
opinion that Frank controlled, id. at 264, leading the other four Justices to write an
opinion declaring Frank “the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court”
and calling for reversal, id. at 269.
39. In the 1967 case Camara v. Mun. Court, the Court stated that the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, was to protect citizens against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Outside of carefully defined contours, an unconsented,
warrantless search is per se unreasonable. Id. at 528–29. In Camara, the appellant
had refused to allow housing inspectors access to his property in order to deter-
mine whether he was in violation of the occupancy permit. Id. at 525. Delivering
the opinion of the Court, Justice White distinguished the case from Frank v. Mary-
land, in which the intrusion “touch[ed] at most on the periphery” of the Fourth
Amendment given the importance of the municipal fire, health, and housing in-
spection programs designed to ensure the habitability of the structure. Id. at 530
(citing Frank, 359 U.S. at 367). In Camara, a general inspection was too attenuated
a connection to necessity to warrant overriding the protections otherwise extended
to the home. Id. at 533. White noted that warrantless powers of entry could be
used for great mischief. Quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
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private home was per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Papers
At the founding, papers in the home were subject to protec-
tions similar to those afforded to other items (and activities) within
the dwelling house.40 Government officials could not simply cross
the threshold at will to read or to seize them. Beyond this, consis-
tent with common law, judges did not have the authority to issue search
warrants to seize papers as evidence of criminal activity.41 This point is
worth emphasizing in the contemporary environment, not least be-
cause the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
context of the encryption debate, has taken to repeating a false-
hood: that, with the appropriate process, the government has al-
ways had access to what people think, say, and write.42 It has not.
For nearly two hundred years, the government could not obtain pri-
vate papers—even with a warrant—when they were to be used as
evidence of criminal activity.
(finding officers’ warrantless entry into a hotel room from which the odor of burn-
ing opium emanated unconstitutional), he wrote,
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern,
not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent. Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
40. The history of this protection duplicates that which is detailed in Part
II(A), supra. For further discussion of the special place afforded to papers, see
generally Donohue, Original, supra note 15. R
41. See Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1308–14 and infra for discussion R
of the mere evidence rule and its roots in common law.
42. See, e.g., James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Expectations
of Privacy: Balancing Liberty, Security, and Public Safety, Remarks to the Center
for the Study of American Democracy Biennial Conference at Kenyon College, at
2–3 (Apr. 6, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/ex-
pectations-of-privacy-balancing-liberty-security-and-public-safety); James B. Comey,
Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks to the Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting,
Finding the Balance We Need in Law and Life, at 2 (Aug. 5, 2016) (transcript
available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/finding-the-balance-we-need-in-
law-and-life); The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 52–53 (2016) (statement of
James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (“[F]rom the founding of this
country, it was contemplated that law enforcement could go into your house with
appropriate predication and oversight. So, to me, the logic of that tells me they
wouldn’t have imagined any box or storage area or device that could never be
entered.”).
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In the nineteenth century, the Court extended the protection
of documents to papers traveling through the post. In the 1878 case
Ex parte Jackson, the Court considered whether a lottery circular,
sent in a closed envelope, deserved Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.43 Justice Field, writing for the Court, noted that Congress’s
authority “to establish post offices and post roads” extended beyond
merely designating the appropriate routes, to include carriage of
the mail, its safe and swift transit, and its prompt delivery.44 But
while the right to carry the mail might mean that Congress could
determine what could be carried en route, it did not give Congress
the ability to open materials in transit.45 To read the Constitution in
such a manner would give Congress the authority to override rights
retained by the people.
“Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail,” Field wrote, “are
as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to
their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding them in their own domiciles.”46 He underscored the impor-
tance of the text: “The constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches
and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection,
wherever they may be.”47 Field explained,
Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined
under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required
when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.
No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials con-
nected with the postal service any authority to invade the se-
crecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all
regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in
subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth
amendment of the Constitution.48
Field recognized the close relationship between the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment and those protected by the
First Amendment.49 Any restrictions on the transfer of mail also vio-
lated the freedom of the press: “[l]iberty of circulating,” Field
pointed out, “is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publish-
43. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728, 733 (1877).
44. Id. at 732.
45. Id. at 733.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
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ing.”50 It meant nothing to claim that the press was free if Congress
could then interfere with delivery of the newspapers, or pass laws
limiting the circulation of written material.51
Even as the Court allowed for private correspondence to be
subject to the same protections as papers held within the home, a
terrestrial test applied: documents became protected as if they still
resided inside one’s domicile. Delivering the letter did not divorce it
of the protections it otherwise enjoyed. In a three-dimensional
world, where the government itself carried the letter, a clear line
could be drawn. Absent good cause, officials could neither break
into a study nor tear open an envelope en route to gain access.
Ex parte Jackson dealt with a lottery circular sent through the
post. Other efforts to flesh out the contours of protections applied
to papers followed. Just three years prior to the Court’s ruling in
Jackson, Congress had passed a statute to prevent smuggling.52 The
law authorized judges to direct the production of private books, in-
voices, and papers in revenue cases.53 Fourteen years later, in Boyd
v. United States, the Supreme Court declared the provision to be
unconstitutional and void.54 In doing so, the Court recognized the
close relationship between the Fourth and Fifth amendments, not-
ing that:
[A] compulsory production of a man’s private papers to estab-
lish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
in all cases in which a search and seizure would be, because it is
a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose
of search and seizure.55
The Court dismissed Congress’s effort to gain control over private
papers as being almost arrogant, noting the absence of any similar
effort in history, despite the egregious nature of measures imple-
mented by the British government. “Even the act under which the
obnoxious writs of assistance were issued,” the Court wrote, “did
not go as far as this.”56 The effort to recover stolen goods, moreo-
ver, for which a warrant historically had been required, fell short of
50. Id.
51. Id. at 734.
52. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186.
53. Sec. 5, 18 Stat. at 187 (requiring surrender of books, invoices, and papers
required in civil suits under revenue laws).
54. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
55. Id. at 622.
56. Id. at 623.
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the level of intrusion now contemplated by the legislature.57 The
Court explained:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods . . . are
totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man’s
private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion therein contained, or of using them as evidence against
him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the gov-
ernment is entitled to the possession of the property; in the
other it is not.58
Justice Bradley, writing for the Court in Boyd, cited back to
Coke and noted Otis’s oration in Paxton’s Case.59 The government
could not break into an individual’s home to obtain the docu-
ments; neither could it force an individual to produce the same
information, as such an action would trigger the protection against
self-incrimination.60
Boyd evolved into the “mere evidence” rule, which established
that only criminal instrumentalities and stolen goods could be re-
covered by warrants consistent with the Fourth Amendment.61 In
1917, when Congress introduced the first law giving federal law en-
forcement the formal authority to issue search warrants, the legisla-
ture was careful to hew to the doctrinal line.62 It limited warrants
for search and seizure to property “stolen or embezzled in violation
of a law of the United States,” “used as the means of committing a
felony,” or used to aid a foreign government in violating “any penal
statute[,] . . . treaty or the law of nations”.63 These reflected the rule
that only the fruits or instrumentalities of crime could be obtained
via warrant.
57. Donohue, Original, supra note 15. R
58. Boyd, supra note 54, at 623. R
59. Id. at 625, 629 (quoting Paxton’s Case). See also supra Part II(A).
60. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630–35.
61. See Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1308–14 (discussing Boyd and the R
origins of the mere evidence rule, and suggesting that instead of inventing it out of
whole cloth, the Court’s adherence to it reflected a long practice of rejecting the
use of search and seizure to obtain evidence against individuals.).
62. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, § 2, 40 Stat. 217, 228; William T.
Rintala, The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 54
CAL. L. REV. 2099, 2103 (1966) (recognizing the statute as “the first general statute
authorizing the issuance of search warrants to federal officers”); see generally
Thomas H. Davis, The “Mere Evidence” Rule in Search and Seizure, 35 Mil. L. Rev. 101
(1967) (analyzing the history and legal background of the mere evidence rule).
63. § 2, 40 Stat. at 228, 230.
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In 1921, the mere evidence rule reached what one commenta-
tor has referred to as its “zenith.”64 In Gouled v. United States the
Court considered whether the warrantless removal of a paper from
a defendant’s office violated the Fourth Amendment.65 Justice
Clarke, on behalf of the Court, observed that making a search by
stealth did not make it more reasonable than if the same were ac-
complished “by force or illegal coercion.”66 He continued,
The security and privacy of the home or office and of the pa-
pers of the owner would be as much invaded and the search
and seizure would be as much against his will in the one case as
in the other, and it must therefore be regarded as equally in
violation of his constitutional rights.67
Based on Boyd, the admission of the papers as evidence violated the
Fifth Amendment.68
The difficulty of differentiating the instrumentalities of crime
from mere evidence ultimately led to the demise of the mere evi-
dence rule.69 But even as it fell from use, courts agonized over the
implications of giving the government access to private papers.70
According to one commentator, the reasons for this appear to be
twofold.71
First was the risk that the government would engage in
searches beyond what was required.72 As Judge Learned Hand ex-
plained in 1926, “It is seldom that one finds a document containing
evidence of crime which was not at one time used in its commis-
sion.”73 But to find such evidence often required “a thorough
64. Rintala, supra note 62, at 2105–13 (analyzing, inter alia, Marron v. United R
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Foley
v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933)).
65. 255 U.S. 298, 303 (1921).
66. Id. at 305.
67. Id. at 305–06.
68. Id. at 306.
69. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967). Warden was decided on
May 29, 1967; in October of the same year, the Court heard oral argument in Katz,
issuing its opinion that December. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). No-
tably, in Warden, the circumstances of the search under consideration, which in-
volved a fleeing felon, Warden, 387 U.S. at 297–98, overlapped with a long-standing
exception to the warrant requirement, making the question of the mere evidence
rule rather beside the point, see Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1228–35 (dis- R
cussing the history of the fleeing felon exception).
70. See Rintala, supra note 62, at 2115. R
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1926); see also
Rintala, supra note 62, at 2115 (citing and discussing Kirschenblatt). R
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search of all that the offender has.”74 Should the courts allow this,
however, they would be endorsing “exactly what [the Fourth
Amendment] was designed to prevent.”75 “Therefore,” Hand con-
tinued, “we cannot agree that the power extends beyond those
which are a part of the forbidden act itself.”76
Second, private papers can reveal the most intimate details of
an individual’s life. As William Rintala observed,
Private papers, be they diary or political tract, are felt to stand
on a different footing from other kinds of personal property.
This difference can be attributed at least in part to the fact that
they are products of the mind; to invade this realm is to strip
the individual of the last vestige of privacy.77
C. Voice Communications
As new technologies extended interpersonal communications
beyond dwellings and channels of written correspondence, novel
questions regarding the extent of Fourth Amendment protections
emerged.78 Initially, the Court came down on the side of the tradi-
tional distinction between private and public space, drawing the
line at the walls of the home.79 Trespass impinged upon individual
74. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d at 204.
75. Id.; see also Rintala, supra note 62, at 2115. R
76. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d at 204.
77. Rintala, supra note 62, at 2115–16 (footnote omitted). R
78. For an interesting discussion of telegraphy and why it did not give rise to
similar issues, see Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous
Technology, 75 MISS. L. J. 1, 12–16 (2005). For detail on the evolution of the tele-
phone and its place in communications, see id. at 17–21.
79. I depart here from the account offered by Professor Thomas Clancy in his
excellent treatise on the Fourth Amendment. In that work, he suggests that
“[b]eginning with Olmstead v. United States, the Court limited Fourth Amendment
rights in two important ways. First, the only things protected were tangible objects,
such as houses, papers, and physical possessions. Second, those objects were only
protected against physical invasions.” THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 3.2.2 (2d ed. 2014) (footnote omitted)
(describing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). Reflecting its com-
mon law origins, the Fourth Amendment had always been treated in this manner,
suggesting that Fourth Amendment rights were not narrowed or newly-limited, but
merely continued. Olmstead continued the traditional interpretation, until the
Court eventually moved to recognize that the same privacy interests in the tradi-
tional purview of the Fourth Amendment were implicated by voice communication
technologies. See generally Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (finding
eavesdropping with a listening device by means of unauthorized physical penetra-
tion a violation of the Fourth Amendment). The “property-based theories of Boyd
and Olmstead,” as Clancy characterizes the concept, supra, at § 3.2.3, actually ex-
tended beyond these cases to the founding generation’s initial understanding of
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privacy. Conversely, the absence of physical entry meant that no pri-
vacy interest had been disturbed.
In Olmstead v. United States, the first case dealing with new com-
munications technology, the Supreme Court held that the wiretap-
ping of an individual’s private telephone line did not fall within
constitutional protections, as the government had not engaged in a
physical trespass.80 Chief Justice Taft, delivering the opinion of the
Court, wrote, “[U]nless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible
material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curti-
lage’ for the purpose of making a seizure,” neither wiretapping nor
electronic eavesdropping absent a warrant violated an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights.81
A few observations about Taft’s language deserve note. First,
this is the first time that the Supreme Court used the word “curti-
lage” in relation to the validity of a search under the Fourth
Amendment.82 State courts, in contrast, for more than a century
had considered the validity of search and seizure under state consti-
tutional law to turn on whether the action took place within the
curtilage.83
the Fourth Amendment. See Donohue, Original, supra note 15, at 1192–93 (argu- R
ing that the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment limited general searches
and seizures and required specific warrants, and emphasizing the importance of
the common law in interpreting reasonableness). Numerous secondary sources
discuss Olmstead, Goldman, and Silverman as precursors to Katz. See, e.g., Weaver,
supra note 12, at 1150. R
80. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Search using Westlaw’s All Federal and All State Cases database (curtilage
OR curtelage OR curtailage) AND (seizure or warrant or warrantless) 1750 to 1921;
Search using Lexis Advance in the All Federal Cases and State Cases database with
exact phrase “curtilage” and any of these terms “search or seizure or warrant or
warrantless” 1750 to 1921; Id., using exact phrases curtilage, curtelege, and
curtailage.
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors, 110 Mass. 182, 186
(1872) (considering whether the outbuildings contained within the curtilage were
covered by a warrant); Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150, 181 (1860) (finding in the
context of the search and seizure of a person that a fence is not necessary for a net
house to be considered within the curtilage if the space is no larger than that
which is usually occupied for the purposes of dwelling and outbuildings); Haggerty
& Nobles v. Wilber & Barnet, 16 Johns. 287, 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (holding that
a sheriff has the authority to break open and seize goods, but if they are located
within the curtilage, the sheriff is precluded from entering unless the outer door is
open); Douglass v. State, 14 Tenn. 525, 529 (1834) (the validity of seizure and
arrest of rioters located in a smoke-house depends upon whether the building is
considered within the curtilage); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 1, 4 (1884)
(requiring a warrant for the search of corn in a tobacco house within the curti-
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 16 Side A      04/17/2017   15:12:38
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 16 Side A      04/17/2017   15:12:38
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\71-4\NYS401.txt unknown Seq: 23 17-APR-17 14:27
2017] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN A DIGITAL WORLD 575
Second, Taft borrowed the term from criminal law, where it
derived from the common law of burglary, which increased crimi-
nal penalties for illegal activity within the curtilage.84 Disagreement
marked what, precisely, counted as the curtilage.85 In the early 19th
century, for instance, Jacob’s Law Dictionary defined it as “[a] court-
yard, back-side, or piece of ground lying near and belonging to a
dwelling-house.”86 It incorporated buildings like out houses and
store-houses occasionally used for sleeping.87 The way in which Taft
lage), overruled in part on other grounds by Fortune v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 861,
867 (Va. 1922); Pettus v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E. 161, 162–63 (Va. 1918) (search
of a room over a grocery store not considered within the curtilage).
84. Four years prior to Olmstead, Justice Holmes had cited back to Black-
stone’s Commentaries and the common law of burglary in support of establishing
the open fields doctrine. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225) (“For no distant barn, warehouse, or
the like, are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man’s castle of de-
fence: nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no man resides, and which there-
fore for the time being are not mansion-houses, attended with the same
circumstances of midnight terror.”). Later cases attributed Taft’s reference to cur-
tilage to stem from the common law of burglary. E.g. United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
85. State v. Langford, 12 N.C. 253, 254 (1827) (“[W]riters do not precisely
agree as to what constitutes the curtilage.”); People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250, 252
(1851) (“The definitions of [curtilage in] Bouviere and Chitty do not strictly agree
with [other law dictionaries].”).
86. Curtilage, 2 JACOB’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (New York, Riley 1811); see also
State v. Twitty, 2 N.C. 102, 102 (1794) (defining it as “a piece of ground either
inclosed or not, that is commonly used with the dwelling house.”); State v. Shaw,
31 Me. 523, 527 (1850) (“The curtilage of a dwellinghouse is a space, necessary
and convenient and habitually used, for the family purposes, the carrying on of
domestic employments. It includes the garden, if there be one.”).
87. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446, 448–49 (1823) (“The mansion not
only includes the dwelling-house, but also the out-houses, such as barns, stables,
cow-houses, dairy-houses and the like, if they be parcel of the messuage, though
they be not under the same roof or joining continuous to it.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (considering a barn to be an out-house and thus protected under
statutory provisions); People v. Parker, 4 Johns 424, 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (plac-
ing store house specifically not used for sleeping, and not enclosed with the house,
outside the curtilage); State v. Wilson, 2 N.C. 242, 242 (1795) (“All out houses
standing in the same yard with the dwelling-house, and used by the owner of the
dwelling-house as appurtenant thereto, whether the yard be open or enclosed, are
in the eye of the law parts of the dwelling-house; and will satisfy that word used in
an indictment of burglary.”) (placing storehouses used occasionally for sleeping
within the curtilage); Gage v. Shelton, 3 Rich 242, 249–50 (S.C. App. L. & Eq.
1832) (noting that any out house contributory to the mansion, if placed close
enough that burning it would put the dwelling in danger, was protected against
arson); Douglass v. State, 14 Tenn. 525, 529–30 (1834) (finding a smokehouse to
be within the curtilage of the mansion house); see also Twitty, 2 N.C. at 103 (consid-
ering the out house to be within the curtilage of the home); cf. Langford,  12 N.C.
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used the term in Olmstead, though, allowed for a later reading that
considered the curtilage coterminous with the home itself. The
Court’s holding in Hester, the year before Olmstead, which distin-
guished between open fields and the home, reinforced this
reading.88
Third, beyond sowing the seeds for a narrower protected
sphere, Taft gave the mistaken impression that the term carried
weight in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In sup-
port of his framing, he quoted the 1921 case of Amos v. United States,
which dealt with a violation of revenue laws.89 In Amos, law enforce-
ment had arrived at the defendant’s home and asked his wife for
entry.90 Performing a warrantless search, they found a bottle of illic-
itly distilled whisky in a barrel of peas.91 After the jury was sworn in,
but before evidence had been presented, the defendant in the
criminal case presented a sworn petition to the court, requesting
that his private property be returned to him.92 According to the
Amos Court, the petition stated that the whiskey had been seized by
“officers of the Government in a search of defendant’s house and
store ‘within his curtilage,’ made unlawfully and without warrant of
any kind, in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”93 The lan-
at 254 (tying the extent of the curtilage to the span of the dwelling house “and
such houses as are used as part or parcel thereof”); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 32
Va. 751, 753 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1835) (storehouse not within the curtilage of a tavern).
The term was also used in other areas of the law, further obscuring the meaning.
In cases involving land lotteries and ownership, for instance, it included yards and
other parcels of land convenient to indwellers. Southall v. M’Keand, Wythe 95,
102, 1794 WL 327, at *5 (Va. High Ch. Nov. 6, 1794). Private actions involving
matters within the curtilage of others’ homes were restricted. See, e.g., Morgan v.
Banta, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 579, 580 (1809); Coleman v. Moody, 14 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 1,
2 (1809); Home v. Richards, 8 Va. (4 Call) 441, 441–42 (Va. Ct. App. 1798)
([both] cases dealing with writ of ad quod damnum in mill-dam situations). In Vir-
ginia, statutes restricted public takings of private property within the curtilage.
Commonwealth v. Beeson, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 821, 826 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1832) (noting
that the statute imposed as a limit on the right of public takings “that in no case,
without the consent of the owner, shall the mansion house, curtilage &c. [sic] be
invaded for public purposes, whether with or without compensation.”). Liens also
turned on the concept of what fell within the curtilage. See Derrickson v. Edwards,
29 N.J.L. 468, 474 (N.J. 1861).
88. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
89. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 461 (citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315
(1921).).
90. Amos, 255 U.S. at 315.
91. Id. at 314–15.
92. Id. at 314.
93. Id.
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guage of the criminal defendant’s petition to the lower court was
the only reference in Amos to the curtilage of the home.94
In Olmstead, Taft picked up on the language in the criminal de-
fendant’s petition, quoting it directly and then misquoting it later in
the opinion as an alternative to, or potentially a synonym for, the
home (“‘or curtilage’”).95 Taft went on to rely on the absence of
any physical penetration of the curtilage as grounds to consider wire-
tapping outside the contours of the Fourth Amendment.96
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Stone, presented a forceful
dissent that objected to the emphasis on physical penetration,
pointing to the interests at stake.97 He argued that the interception
of the conversation constituted an “unjustifiable intrusion . . . upon
the privacy of the individual,” and thus violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.98 Brandeis underscored what the “makers of our Constitu-
tion” had tried to accomplish: “They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions.”99 He continued, “They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.”100 Brandeis warned
that the Court had to look not just at the current context, but also
what was coming down the pike. He cautioned,
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home.101
Brandeis was ahead of his time in identifying the privacy inter-
ests involved. The Court had yet to appreciate how technology had
altered the impact of the traditional distinction between private
94. See generally id. The Court ruled for the defendant, saying that Gouled, and
the mere evidence rule, controlled. Id. at 316.
95. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
96. Id.
97. See generally id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Id. at 488 (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
98. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only what has been but of what may
be. . . . Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been
recognized.”).
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space and the public domain. A series of cases began hammering
on the door.
In 1942, the Court considered federal agents’ access to the of-
fice of an individual suspected of conspiring to violate criminal pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act.102 Agents went into an adjoining
office, where they placed a listening device in a small aperture in
the wall.103 When the device failed, officers used a detectaphone to
listen to conversations next door, which they recorded and tran-
scribed using a stenographer.104 Consistent with Olmstead, the
Court found in Goldman v. United States that use of the detecta-
phone did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.105
In his dissent, Justice Murphy blasted the Court for not taking
account of new technologies.106 Referencing the acclaimed 1890
Harvard Law Review article written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren, Murphy argued for a broader reading of the Fourth
Amendment to protect individuals “against unwarranted intrusions
by others” into their private affairs.107 Although the language of the
Fourth Amendment intimated protection against physical trespass,
Murphy averred, “[I]t has not been the rule or practice of this
Court to permit the scope and operation of broad principles or-
dained by the Constitution to be restricted, by a literal reading of its
provisions, to those evils and phenomena that were contemporary
with its framing.”108 Of greater importance were the privacy inter-
ests that the amendment was meant to protect.
Like Brandeis in Olmstead, Murphy recognized that the “condi-
tions of modern life have greatly expanded the range and character
of those activities which require protection from intrusive action by
Government officials if men and women are to enjoy the full bene-
fit of that privacy which the Fourth Amendment was intended to
provide.”109 It was therefore the Supreme Court’s “duty to see that
this historic provision receives a construction sufficiently liberal and
elastic to make it serve the needs and manners of each succeeding
generation.”110 Murphy gave little countenance to whether or not a
physical entry had occurred since “science has brought forth far
102. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 130–31 (1942).
103. Id. at 131.
104. Id. at 131–32.
105. Id. at 135.
106. Id. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 136 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Louis Brandeis & Samuel War-
ren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)).
108. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy than
the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested
by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.”111
To the extent that electronic surveillance made it possible to do
what had hitherto been considered within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment, so, too, ought new technologies to be considered
within the reach of the Constitution.
By the time Silverman v. United States was decided in 1961, the
intrusiveness of new technologies on interests previously guarded
by the walls of the home had become apparent.112 The petitioner’s
brief in Silverman underscored the impact of recent advances, draw-
ing attention to parabolic microphones “which can pick up a con-
versation three hundred yards away,” experimental sound wave
technology “whereby a room is flooded with a certain type of sonic
wave . . . mak[ing] it possible to overhear everything said in a room
without ever entering it or even going near it,” and devices that
could “pick up a conversation through an open office window on
the opposite side of a busy street.”113 But the physical characteristics
of a spike mike allowed the Court to distinguish the facts from Olm-
stead: in Silverman, since law enforcement had made physical con-
tact with a heating duct, “an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises occupied by the petitioners” had occurred.114
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized the extent to
which emerging technologies had proven contentious: “Eavesdrop-
ping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond
the pale of even those decisions in which a closely divided Court
has held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic
means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment
rights.”115 At the same time, the Court doubled down on the impor-
tance of the home.116 Trespass ruled the day.117 The importance of
111. Id. at 139.
112. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508–09 (1961) (discussing
petitioner’s description of technology enabling recording of distant
conversations).
113. Id. at 508–09 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Weaver, supra
note 12, at 1148 (discussing Silverman). R
114. Id. at 509.
115. Id. at 509–10.
116. Id. at 511 (“The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it
secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.”).
117. The parallels between Silverman and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
954  (2012), also decided on grounds of trespass, are of note, as Jones also signaled
a growing concern for how new technologies may affect rights otherwise protected
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drawing a distinction between the private and public realms under-
lay the Court’s approach. Behavior in the former realm was pro-
tected. But in public, individuals assumed the risk that what they
said and did would be witnessed, and potentially recalled, by others.
Silverman proved pivotal, foreshadowing the coming confronta-
tion between new technologies and the protections guaranteed in
the Fourth Amendment. While hewing to the traditional trespass
doctrine, it noted the potential for “frightening paraphernalia
which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon
human society.”118
In summary, the Court’s initial take when confronted by tech-
nology had been to construe the Fourth Amendment “in the light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted.”119 As Taft explained in Olmstead, “Congress may of
course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them,
when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence. . . . But the courts may
not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning to the Fourth Amendment.”120 Where the public realm
ended and private life began, a higher standard applied. Accord-
ingly, in its June 1967 Camara v. Municipal Court decision, the Court
came out strongly on the side of drawing a border at the walls of the
home.121 But the tension between new technologies and the ex-
isting doctrine had reached a boiling point. Just four months later,
the Court in Katz v. United States extended the protection of the
Fourth Amendment beyond physical property to include areas that
individuals considered private.122 In doing so, the Court raised new
questions as to whether the shift to protect “people,” not “places,”
under the Fourth Amendment, but relied on traditional trespass theory for its
holding. See discussion infra Part III(D).
118. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509; see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 177–78 (1969); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1967).
119. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft wrote on
behalf of the Court, “The well known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment
. . . was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his
person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.” Id.
at 463. It was the home itself that was a constitutionally protected area. “The lan-
guage of the Amendment,” Taft suggested, “can not be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s house
or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office any more than
are the highways along which they are stretched.” Id. at 465.
120. Id. at 465–66.
121. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967).
122. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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created a new safeguard for activities that took place outside the
curtilage of the home.
III.
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC SPACE
In 1967, the Supreme Court finally solidified around the argu-
ments articulated in the dissents in Olmstead and Goldman and in
dicta in Silverman, which recognized the impact of new technolo-
gies on privacy.123 The Court overruled Olmstead, rejecting the idea
that the reach of the Fourth Amendment “turn[ed] upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”124
More critical was whether individuals had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
In Katz, a gambler entered a public telephone booth, closed
the door, and placed a call.125 The privacy interests at stake could
not be ignored. Justice Stewart explained on behalf of the Court,
“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which
[Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”126 The central issue was not whether physical pene-
tration of a constitutionally-protected area had occurred.127 As
Stewart famously articulated, “The Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”128
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan spelled out the two-part test
that would henceforward be applied. First, whether an individual,
by his or her conduct, had “exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy”129 (or, as the majority articulated, whether he had
demonstrated that “he seeks to preserve [something] as pri-
vate.”)130 And, second, whether the subjective expectation was “one
123. Compare id., with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), and
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508–10 (1961).
124. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
125. Id. at 348, 352.
126. Id. at 353.
127. Id. (“The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end
did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional
significance.”).
128. Id. at 351.
129. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”131 The Court
would look at the circumstances to ascertain whether an individ-
ual’s expectation of privacy was justified.132
In Katz, the Court attempted to wrench Fourth Amendment
doctrine from its tie to property rights, but it failed to deliver on its
promise. The case left open myriad questions. Over the ensuing
decade, the Court systematically worked its way through related ar-
eas, in the process modifying and carving out exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.133 Simultaneously, the rules that evolved in the
1970s and ‘80s relied in significant measure on the physical
world.134 It was thus not Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
his communication, per se, but his reasonable expectation of privacy
when he entered the phone booth that proved central. The private/pub-
lic distinction held. Current technologies, however, blur the distinc-
tion between private space and the public domain on which the
court has relied as a way of understanding the interests at stake.
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in regard to location
tracking.
A. Open Fields, Naked Eye
One of the earliest cases to reinforce the open fields doctrine
came in 1974, when the Supreme Court determined that a Colo-
rado inspector entering an individual’s yard during the daytime to
test the plumes of smoke being emitted from the homeowner’s
chimneys did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.135 In Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., the Court went into
great detail as to what had happened, concluding that the invasion
of privacy, “if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.”136
131. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J, concurring); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 n.12 (1978); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979).
132. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. For application of the legitimate expectation of privacy test over the dec-
ade that followed Katz, see, for example, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14
(1973); United States v. United States Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972); White, 401 U.S. at 752; Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1968);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
134. See discussion, infra, Part III(A).
135. 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
136. Id. (“The EPA regulation for conducting an opacity test requires the in-
spector to stand at a distance equivalent to approximately two stack heights away
but not more than a quarter of a mile from the base of the stack with the sun to his
back from a vantage point perpendicular to the plume; and he must take at least
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A decade later, the Court reaffirmed its position in Oliver v.
United States.137 Hearkening back to Hester’s (pre-Katz) reliance on
the text of the Fourth Amendment, the Court established that “ef-
fects” did not include “open fields.”138 In Oliver, the Kentucky State
Police had received reports that a farmer was growing marijuana.139
They searched Oliver’s property, which was surrounded by a gate
marked “No Trespassing,” without first obtaining a warrant.140 In a
6-3 decision, Justice Powell explained that the open fields doctrine
applied.141 Even where police officers might be engaged in a com-
mon law trespass, the act of entering a privately owned field did not
automatically trigger Fourth Amendment protections.142 Justice
White’s concurrence noted that fields, by definition, were neither a
“house” nor an “effect.”143
The Court recognized multiple factors for determining
whether a place should be free from government intrusion absent a
warrant.144 It noted the importance of “the intention of the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has
put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas
deserve the most scrupulous protection from government inva-
sion.”145 The factors were “equally relevant to determining whether
the government’s intrusion upon open fields without a warrant or
probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy.”146
The open fields doctrine applied even when the land in ques-
tion was fenced and posted: “[A]n individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, ex-
cept in the area immediately surrounding the home.”147 The Court
emphasized “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
25 readings, recording the data at 15- to 30-second intervals. Depending upon the
layout of the plant, the inspector may operate within or without the premises but,
in either case, he is well within the ‘open fields’ exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment approved in Hester.”).
137. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
138. Id. at 177.
139. Id. at 173.
140. Id. at 173–74.
141. Id. at 183–84.
142. Id. at 183–84.
143. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184 (White, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 177–78.
145. Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. By adopting this position, the court departed from the traditional
understanding of curtilage, as the term had been used in criminal statutes and
property disputes. See generally 1 CHITTY’S GENERAL PRACTICE 175 (London, But-
terworth 1833).
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that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic.”148 Open fields, in contrast, did not provide a setting “for
those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference or surveillance.”149
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dis-
sented.150 Marshall could not agree “that ‘an individual may not
legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.’”151
The plain language of the amendment protected neither telephone
booths nor businesses—yet both had fallen within its contours.152
The reason was clear: the Fourth Amendment was not designed to
specify with “precision” which activities were permissible or not, but
rather “to identify a fundamental human liberty that should be
shielded forever from government intrusion.”153 Unlike statutes,
constitutional provisions must be understood in a way that “effectu-
ate[s] their purposes—to lend them meanings that ensure that the
liberties the Framers sought to protect are not undermined by the
changing activities of government officials.”154 Marshall cited to
Chief Justice Marshall’s famous words in McCulloch v. Maryland,
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding.”155 Katz had manifested this principle.156
Marshall argued that under a Katz analysis, the Court should
look to positive law, the nature of the uses to which the space could
be put, and whether the individual claiming the privacy interest
made it clear to the public in a way that others “would understand
and respect.”157 While privacy interests may not be coterminous
with property rights, they reflected explicit recognition of a domain
over which an individual held authority.158 Marshall, nevertheless,
fell back upon the traditional private/public distinction: “Privately
owned woods and fields that are not exposed to public view regu-
148. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 179.
150. Id. at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 178 (majority
opinion)).
152. Id. at 185–86.
153. Id. at 186.
154. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187.
155. Id. at 187 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
156. Id. at 187–88.
157. Id. at 189.
158. Id. at 189–90.
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larly are employed in a variety of ways that society acknowledges
deserve privacy.”159
Oliver made it clear that Katz had not changed the basic tenets
of the open fields doctrine. For the majority, it was not that Katz did
not expand what might be included within a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. It simply did not incorporate open fields. For Mar-
shall, the private/public distinction similarly controlled. He merely
reached a different answer for privately owned land.160
Questions remained about the precise limits of the curtilage.
In 1987, the Court went on to determine that the space immedi-
ately outside a barn—some half a mile from any road and only
reachable after crossing a number of fences—constituted “open
fields.”161 In United States v. Dunn, Robert Carpenter, and his co-
defendant, Ronald Dunn, were convicted of conspiring to manufac-
ture phenylacetone and amphetamine, as well as possessing am-
phetamine with an intent to distribute it.162 Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents discovered that Carpenter had pur-
chased significant amounts of chemicals and equipment used in the
manufacture of the controlled substances.163 The agents obtained
warrants from a Texas state judge, allowing them to install radio
frequency-enabled transmitters in the material and equipment.164
They tracked Carpenter’s truck until it arrived at Dunn’s ranch.165
Aerial photographs captured images of the truck parked next to a
barn.166
The property, some 198 acres, was encircled by a fence and
contained several interior fences, mostly constructed of posts and
barbed wire.167 The nearest public road was a half-mile away.168 A
fence surrounded the house and a nearby greenhouse, with two
barns another fifty feet away.169 The front of one of the barns had a
wooden fence around it, along with locked, waist-high gates and
netting material stretched between the barn and the gates.170 A
DEA agent and an officer from the Houston Police Department
159. Id. at 192.
160. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 192.
161. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303 (1987).
162. Id. at 296.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 297.
166. Id.
167. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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crossed the outside fence and one interior fence.171 Part way be-
tween the residence and the barns, the agent smelled phenylacetic
acid coming from the barns.172 The officers crossed another
barbed-wire fence and a wooden fence, walked under the barn’s
overhang to the locked wooden gates, and, using a flashlight,
looked into the barn.173 Seeing a laboratory, they did not enter the
barn, although the following day they returned twice to confirm
their initial sighting.174 That evening, they obtained a warrant au-
thorizing them to search the ranch.175 Two days later, they exe-
cuted the warrant, seizing chemicals, laboratory equipment, and
amphetamines.176
The Supreme Court reiterated the special place of the home in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “The curtilage concept,” the
Court wrote, “originated at common law to extend to the area im-
mediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under
the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself.”177
The Court was right insofar as the curtilage had historically
been considered relevant to the penalties associated with criminal
activity. But it was not until 1928, with Taft’s decision in Olmstead,
that the term became drawn into the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. And prior to that time, curtilage had a
much broader meaning.
According to Cunningham’s law dictionary from 1764, for in-
stance, curtilage meant precisely what the Court rejected in Oliver:
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297–98.
174. Id. at 298.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 298–99. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion to sup-
press evidence seized pursuant to the warrant—a decision later reversed by the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). The Supreme
Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded it for further considera-
tion in light of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Dunn, 480 U.S. at 299.
The Fifth Circuit again suppressed the evidence found in the course of the agents’
first entry onto the premises—this time, not on the grounds that the barn was
within the curtilage of the house but, rather, that by peering into the structure, the
officers had violated Dunn’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in his barn and its
contents.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Before the Supreme Court en-
tertained the petition for certiorari, the Fifth Circuit recalled and vacated its judg-
ment and reinstated its original opinion, stating, “[u]pon studied reflection, we
now conclude and hold that the barn was inside the protected curtilage.” Id. (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and re-
versed the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 300.
177. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300.
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“a yard, backside, or piece of ground lying near a dwelling house,
where they sow hemp, beans, and such like.”178 In 1820, Sheppard’s
Touchstone of Common Assurances described it as “a little garden, yard,
field, or piece of void ground, lying near and belonging to the mes-
suage, and houses adjoining the dwelling house, and the close
upon which the dwelling-house is built.”179 In 1828, Johnson &
Walker simply defined it as “a garden, yard, or field lying near to a
messuage.”180
Oliver narrowed the meaning of the term, and the Court in
Dunn highlighted four factors to be taken into account:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home, whether the area is included within an enclosure sur-
rounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is
put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
from observation by people passing by.181
It eschewed a rigid adherence to the categories, arguing that
they were “useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any
given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—
whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself
that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth
Amendment protection.”182 Applied to the barn, the Court con-
cluded that it did not.
Curtilage considerations thus dismissed, naked eye doctrine
prevailed. “Under Oliver and Hester,” the Court wrote, “there is no
constitutional difference between police observations conducted
while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.”183
178. Curtilage, 1 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTION-
ARY (London, Law-Printers to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty 1764), https://
archive.org/stream/newcompletelawdi01cunn#page/n613/mode/2up; see also
Curtilage, 2 GILES JACOB & T.E. TOMLINS, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE
RISE, PROFESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW 171 (New York, I. Riley
1811) (“CURTILAGE, curtilagrium, from the Fr. cour, court and Sax. leagh, locus.] A
court-yard, back-side, or piece of ground lying near and belonging to a dwelling
house. And though it is said to be a yard or garden, belonging to a house, it seems
to differ from a garden, for we find cum quodam gardino et curtilagio.”) (citations
omitted).
179. WILLIAM SHEPPARD & EDWARD HILLIARD, SHEPPARD’S TOUCHSTONE OF
COMMON ASSURANCES 94 (London, 7th ed. 1820).
180. Curtilage, 1 Samuel Johnson & John Walker, A Dictionary of the English
Language 176 (London, William Pickering 1827), https://books.google.com/
books/about/A_Dictionary_of_the_English_Language.html?id=WBYwAAAAYAAJ.
181. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 (discussing Oliver and deriving factors from
lower courts).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 304.
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Just as the observation from a plane in California v. Ciraolo (dis-
cussed infra in Section IIIB) did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, neither did peering into the barn.184 Despite Katz’s move to a
reasonable expectation of privacy as centered on persons, and not
property, the curtilage of the home continued to serve as a proxy.
In Dunn, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dis-
sented.185 The reasoning paralleled their position in Oliver: the in-
trusion violated the Fourth Amendment because the barnyard “lay
within the protected curtilage of Dunn’s farmhouse,” and the
agents’ inspection violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. Like the majority, the dissent’s logic reflected the private-
space/public domain distinction that had long marked Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Brennan did note, though, the underlying
purpose of the constitutional text: prohibiting “police activity which,
if left unrestricted, would jeopardize individuals’ sense of security
or would too heavily burden those who wished to guard their pri-
vacy.”186 DEA agents had gone “one-half mile off a public road over
respondent’s fenced-in property, crossed over three additional
wooden and barbed wire fences, stepped under the eaves of the
barn, and then used a flashlight to peer through otherwise opaque
fishnetting.”187 He concluded, “For the police habitually to engage
in such surveillance—without a warrant—is constitutionally
intolerable.”188
Just a few months after Dunn, the Court beat the proverbial
horse. In California v. Greenwood,189 local police suspected Billy
Greenwood of dealing drugs out of his home. Lacking sufficient
evidence for a warrant, they searched his garbage and found incul-
pating material. In a 6-2 vote, the Court held that the garbage left
out on the curb, “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
184. In Ciraolo, the Court had observed that the Fourth Amendment “has
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213 (1986). Also note that in 1983 the court settled that simply using a flashlight to
illuminate the interior of a car, without probable cause to search the automobile,
did not transgress any rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983); see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)
(use of searchlight by Coast Guard on high seas is not a search).
185. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 306.
187. Id. at 319.
188. Id.
189. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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snoops, and other members of the public,” lay outside the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment.190
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, em-
phasized that Greenwood had placed the garbage in opaque bags,
blocking their view from casual passers-by.191 Garbage could reveal
a considerable amount about Greenwood’s private life: “A single
bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recrea-
tional habits of the person who produced it,” he wrote.192 Search of
the material could reveal “intimate details about sexual practices,
health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or
intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the
target’s financial and professional status, political affiliations and
inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic
interests.”193 It reflected the type of “intimate knowledge associated
with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’” that
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.194 The majority’s
private space/public domain distinction, premised on lesser expec-
tations outside the physical borders of the home, had failed to cap-
ture the privacy interests at stake.
B. Aerial Surveillance
With the line still drawn post-Katz at the curtilage of the home,
to the extent that new means of aerial surveillance raised privacy
concerns, the Court dismissed them under the private/public dis-
tinction. The underlying rationale, that government officials should
not be prevented from accessing what any citizen could see or hear,
persisted.
In California v. Ciraolo, the police received an anonymous tele-
phone tip that a resident of Santa Clara, California, was growing
marijuana in his backyard.195 A six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot
inner fence blocked the view from the street, so the police hired a
private plane to fly overhead.196 They spotted marijuana plants,
eight to ten feet tall, growing in a fifteen by twenty-five foot plot in
the back yard.197
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 50.
193. Id.
194. 486 U.S. 50–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Chief Justice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court,
quickly dismissed the importance of the fence, noting that even the
ten-foot-high structure “might not shield these plants from the eyes
of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-
level bus.”198
Burger’s statement was extraordinary, not least because it was
illegal under California law for citizens to sit atop vehicles.199 Nor
were there, in 1982, any double-decker buses to be found in the
largely rural and residential community.200 Nevertheless, Burger
suggested that any citizen could look over the fence from the top of
a moving vehicle. It was therefore unclear whether the respondent
had a subjective expectation of privacy or “merely a hope that no
one would observe [the respondent’s] unlawful gardening
pursuits.”201
Turning his attention to the curtilage, the Chief Justice noted
that the common-law understanding was the area within which ac-
tivities associated with the “sanctity of a man’s home and the priva-
cies of life” occurred.202 “The protection afforded the curtilage,” he
wrote, “is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in
an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psycho-
logically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.”203 The
yard, and its crops, could be understood as inside the curtilage.204
But the burden was on the homeowner to ensure that the view was
blocked.205 The “naked-eye observation of the curtilage by police
from an aircraft lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet”
meant that the owner had not taken the requisite steps.206 Any citi-
zen, flying over the home within navigable airspace, could have
seen the same thing.207 The Fourth Amendment does not “require
law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a
198. Id. at 211.
199. See, e.g., 1981 Cal. Stat. 3, 155 (adding Subsection (b), stating that “No
person shall ride on any vehicle or upon any portion thereof not designed or in-
tended for the use of passengers,” to Cal. Veh. Code §21712); 1982 Cal. Stat. 4, 709
(passed Sept. 22, 1982 making it illegal for a minor to be in the back of a flatbed
truck, codified at Cal. Veh. Code §23116).
200. Author Note, having grown up in Santa Clara, California in the 1980s.
201. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
202. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
203. Id. at 212–13.
204. Id. at 213.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
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home on public thoroughfares.”208 What was accessible to any per-
son, had to be accessible to law enforcement.209
The decision was a 5-4 vote, with Justice Powell, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting. Powell cited to
Justice Harlan’s warning in Katz, that tying the Fourth Amendment
only to physical intrusion “is, in the present day, bad physics as well
as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated
by electronic as well as physical invasion.”210 For the dissent, the
airplane was “a product of modern technology” visually intruding
into the respondent’s yard.211 While “[c]omings and goings on
public streets are public matters,” flying a plane over a home to
conduct surveillance intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of
privacy.212
Powell underscored the importance of the Fourth Amendment
adapting to new and emerging technologies. “Rapidly advancing
technology now permits police to conduct surveillance in the home
itself,” he explained, “an area where privacy interests are most cher-
ished in our society, without any physical trespass.”213 Flexibility
mattered. The Court had “repeatedly refused to freeze ‘into consti-
tutional law those enforcement practices that existed at the time of
the Fourth Amendment’s passage.’”214 Instead, it had “construed
the Amendment ‘in light of contemporary norms and conditions,’
. . . in order to prevent ‘any stealthy encroachments’ on our citi-
zens’ right to be free of arbitrary official intrusion.”215 By the time
of Ciraolo, Powell noted, technological advances had “enabled po-
lice to see people’s activities and associations, and to hear their con-
versations, without being in physical proximity.”216 The doctrine
had to evolve to protect the privacy interests at stake.
The same day that the Court handed down Ciraolo, it issued an
opinion in Dow Chemical v. United States, reinforcing the idea that
what was visible in public was fair game.217 Dow Chemical denied a
208. Id. at 213.
209. Id. at 213–14.
210. Id. at 215–16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
211. Id. at 222.
212. Id. at 224–25.
213. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981)).
215. Id. (quoting Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886)).
216. Id. at 218.
217. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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request by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct
an on-site inspection of a 2000-acre facility.218 The EPA responded
by hiring a commercial aerial photographer to take pictures of the
facility from the air.219
Chief Justice Burger again wrote for the Court. He began the
Fourth Amendment analysis by drawing a line between private and
public space.220 Activities undertaken potentially in the view of
others did not deserve the same protections as those that transpired
within the home.221 While Dow Chemical held a “reasonable, legiti-
mate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its
covered buildings” (one that society was prepared to recognize), it
did not have an equally high expectation for areas exposed to aerial
view.222
The Court emphasized the importance of not unduly hamper-
ing law enforcement. The photographs were “essentially like those
commonly used in mapmaking. Any person with an airplane and an
aerial camera could readily duplicate them.”223 It made no sense to
force the government agency to close its eyes, to prevent it from
seeing what anyone else could see and from memorializing the im-
age with a photograph—as any citizen could do.224
In 1989, the Court went on to consider whether aerial surveil-
lance from a helicopter just 400 feet above the ground similarly was
exempt from Fourth Amendment protections.225 The concept of
the naked eye—and what other citizens would be able to do in the
public realm—again figured largely in the decision.
Like the Santa Clara police in Ciraolo, a Florida county sheriff’s
office received an anonymous tip that Riley was growing marijuana
in a greenhouse behind his home.226 Located on five acres of prop-
erty, his mobile home was surrounded by a fence, on which a sign
218. Id. at 229.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 235 (“The curtilage area immediately surrounding a private house
has long been given protection as a place where the occupants have a reasonable
and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.”) (citing
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207). Open fields, in contrast, “do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from
governmental interference or surveillance.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)).
221. Id. at 239.
222. Id. at 236, 239.
223. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 231.
224. See id.
225. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1989).
226. Id. at 448.
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was posted saying, “DO NOT ENTER.”227 Unable to see behind the
house from the street, an officer flew over the property in a helicop-
ter.228 The greenhouse had two sides enclosed and was covered
with corrugated panels, some translucent and some opaque.229 Two
of the panels were missing.230 The officer looked through the open-
ings in the roof and the open sides of the greenhouse and saw the
plants growing.231 He used this information to obtain a search war-
rant, which yielded the plants.232
Justice White announced the judgment and wrote an opinion
in which only three other justices joined.233 Because Riley had left
two sides of the greenhouse open, and had failed to cover the
greenhouse entirely, he “could not reasonably have expected the
contents of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an
officer seated in a fixed-wing aircraft flying in navigable airspace at
an altitude of 1000 feet or . . . at an altitude of 500 feet, the lower
limit of the navigable airspace for such aircraft.”234 It made no dif-
ference that the helicopter was at a height of 400 feet, as helicop-
ters were not bound by the lower limits of navigable airspace as
required for other aircraft. “Any member of the public could legally
have been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude
of 400 feet.”235 Why force law enforcement to undertake a form of
willful blindness?
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dis-
sented. Brennan disputed the plurality’s focus on whether any
member of the public could have conducted the activity under-
taken by law enforcement, without also considering the difficulty of
such activity and the frequency with which it was done by members
of the public. “Is the theoretical possibility that any member of the
public (with sufficient means) could also have hired a helicopter
and looked over Riley’s fence of any relevance at all in determining
whether Riley suffered a serious loss of privacy . . . ?”236 Law en-
forcement had not been standing on a public road.237 “The vantage
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
232. Id. at 448–49.
233. Id. at 447 (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy).
234. Id. at 450.
235. Id. at 451.
236. Id. at 457–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. Riley, 488 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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point he enjoyed,” Brennan pointed out, “was not one any citizen
could readily share.”238 To see over the fence, the officer had to use
“a very expensive and sophisticated piece of machinery to which few
ordinary citizens have access.”239 It made as much sense to rely on
whether the officer was legally in the air, as it would have been to
ascertain whether the police officers in Katz were legally standing
outside the telephone booth.240 “The question before us,” Brennan
explained, “must be not whether the police were where they had a
right to be, but whether public observation of Riley’s curtilage was
so commonplace that Riley’s expectation of privacy in his backyard
could not be considered reasonable.”241
Brennan’s argument underscored the importance of focusing
on the privacy interests implicated by new technologies. Yet largely
because of the persistence of the private/public distinction, his ar-
guments did not win the day. Warrantless searches and seizures in-
side a home may be presumptively unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances.242 But visual examination, even of areas inside the
curtilage of the home, when conducted from a public sphere, lies
outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment.243
C. Radio-frequency Enabled Transmitters
As technology progressed and questions relating to the reason-
able expectation of privacy standard adopted in Katz arose, the Su-
preme Court held fast to its private/public distinction. Just as
people had a lesser expectation of privacy in garbage placed curb-
side—indeed, no expectation whatsoever—so, too, did they outside
of automobiles, as well as in their movements along public
thoroughfares.244
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1984); Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–13 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
243. Precisely what constitutes the curtilage of the home continues to be a
contentious issue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See CLANCY, supra note 79, R
at § 4.4.1.1; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT §2.3 (5th ed. 2016).
244. The seizure of a car travelling on a public highway, absent either proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion, did violate the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse, a patrol officer stopped a car and smelled
marijuana. Id. at 650. When the officer looked into the car, he saw the marijuana
inside the vehicle. Id. Justice White, writing for the Court, stated, “An individual
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of
privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regu-
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Thus it was in 1983, in United States v. Knotts, the Court con-
fronted a case where Minnesota law-enforcement officers suspected
Tristan Armstrong of stealing chemicals that could be used in man-
ufacturing illicit drugs.245 Visual surveillance revealed that he pur-
chased chemicals from Hawkins Chemical Co. in Minnesota.246
With the consent of company officials, when Armstrong next
bought a container of chloroform (one of the precursor chemicals
used to make drugs), the police placed a radio-frequency-enabled
transmitter on the container.247 The police followed the container,
using the tracking device and visual surveillance, to a cabin in Wis-
consin.248 They obtained a search warrant and found a fully opera-
ble drug laboratory inside the cabin, replete with formulas for
amphetamine and methamphetamine, $10,000 worth of equip-
lation.” Id. at 662. He reasoned, “Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often
necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and leisure
activities.” Id. Since many people spent more time driving than walking, a higher
degree of security might be felt in the car. Id. White continued, “Were the individ-
ual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an auto-
mobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously
circumscribed.” 440 U.S. 662–63.
Professor Clancy points to this case to suggest that the case served as an early
indication that, following Katz, “privacy might be a vital source of protection of
individual interests.” CLANCY, supra note 79, at § 3.3.3. He argues, “as the composi- R
tion of the Court changed,” however, “those early indications gave way to a view
that used privacy analysis not to expand protected individual interests but to limit
the scope of the Amendment’s protections.” Id. What emerged was a “hierarchy of
privacy interests.” Id. Amongst the lowest level of protection is an individual’s
voice, face, or handwriting, as well as travel and open fields. Id.
The hierarchy that Clancy identifies, though, relies on the private/public dis-
tinction as the defining feature. Lowered protections accompanied what could be
seen and observed by others in public space. Clancy treats whether something is
observable as only one of several potential methods adopted by the Court to distin-
guish between privacy interests, noting also the degree to which technological ad-
vances, empirical evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy, and degree of
government regulation. Id. at § 3.3.4. This Article takes the stronger position,
which is that the private/public distinction is a central feature of the doctrine,
which remains rooted in a terrestrial understanding of a three-dimensional world,
making it ill-suited to confront the challenges of a digital age.
245. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983); cf. United States v.
Michael, 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that installation of a beeper, absent
probable cause and exigent circumstances, required prior judicial authorization),
reh’g granted, 628 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1980), rev’d, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing the installation of the beeper permissible under the Fourth Amendment using
a reasonable suspicion standard).
246. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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ment, and enough chemicals to produce 14 pounds of pure
amphetamine.249
The Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction on the grounds
that monitoring the radio-frequency-enabled transmitter violated
the cabin owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.250 The Su-
preme Court disagreed and reversed.251 In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court analyzed the question in terms
of the open fields/naked eye doctrine. The transmitter was merely
a battery-operated device, emitting periodic signals that could be
picked up by a receiver. It allowed law enforcement to do electroni-
cally what it could do in person “on public streets and highways.”252
Rehnquist picked up on the 1974 language in Cardwell v. Lewis,
which stated: “A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.
It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its con-
tents are in plain view.”253 In Knotts, Rehnquist argued, “A person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to an-
other.”254 The direction they took, stops they made, and their final
destination could be observed.255 Just because the police relied on
a radio-frequency-enabled transmitter, and not their own eyes, did
not alter the situation. Rehnquist explained, “Nothing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhance-
ment as science and technology afforded them in this case.”256
The respondent argued that if the Court were to adopt this
rule, then there would be no limiting condition on the eventual use
of 24-hour surveillance.257 The Court disagreed, suggesting that
technology, in reality, was nowhere near that point. “[I]f such drag-
249. Id. at 279.
250. Id. (discussing the case below, United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
251. Id. at 279–80.
252. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
253. Id. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
opinion) (holding the warrantless search of the outside of a car to be outside the
contours of the Fourth Amendment)) (also citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
153–54 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
368 (1976)).
254. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
255. Id. at 281–82.
256. Id. at 282; see also id. at 282–83 (discussing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927) (finding that the use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a
marine glass or field glass and thus does not change the analysis of the reasonable-
ness of a search on the high seas)).
257. Id. at 283.
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net-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”258
Radio-frequency-enabled transmitters, also known as “beepers,”
were merely “a more effective means of observing what is already
public.”259
The following year the Court confronted a similar fact pattern
in United States v. Karo.260 The DEA had learned that James Karo
and two others had ordered 50 gallons of ether to be used to ex-
tract cocaine from clothing that had been imported to the United
States.261 Agents traced the container inside a number of homes,
before tracking it to a commercial storage facility.262
Unlike Knotts, where the transmitter conveyed the location of a
car on public roads, in Karo the beeper informed the agent where a
container was located, at a particular time and, consequently, in
whose possession it was held: i.e., the person(s) whose residence
was under surveillance. “Even if visual surveillance has revealed that
the article to which the beeper is attached has entered the house,
the later monitoring not only verifies the officers’ observations but
also establishes that the article remains on the premises.”263 The
search was less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it was still a
search of the interior of the home. It therefore fell within the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment.264 The private/public distinc-
tion, and the importance of maintaining access for acquiring visual
information, held. Where law-enforcement collection techniques
crossed the curtilage, constitutional protections arose.
The ordinary operation of the senses continued to loom large
in the Court’s jurisprudence.265 What individuals could observe in
258. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
259. Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1983));
see also id. at 285.
260. 468 U.S. 705, 707–10 (1984).
261. Id. at 708.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 715.
264. Id. at 716.
265. The importance of the naked eye, for instance, extends to the plain view
doctrine. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court explained that under
certain circumstances seizure of an item in plain view during a lawful search may
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). Three
elements must be met: (1) the officer must be lawfully in the Fourth Amendment-
protected area; (2) the item observed must be in plain view; and (3) the officer
must immediately recognize the item as illegal materials, evidence, or contraband
without otherwise interfering with the item. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
136–37 (1990). In Arizona v. Hicks, the Court further elaborated on what consti-
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public fell outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Law
enforcement officers should not be forced to avert their gaze to
block out what the rest of the world could see.
The functional-senses test included not just what individuals
could see but also what they could hear without technological assis-
tance. A 1984 case  from the Second Circuit, United States v.
Mankani, reflected this approach.266 Canadian law enforcement un-
covered a drug-running operation that yielded nearly two tons of
hashish in a barn in a rural area of Vermont.267 Having been tipped
off by Canadian authorities that two of the men involved in the
shipment were in a hotel room in Burlington, a DEA agent booked
the adjoining room and listened through a hole in the wall to the
conversation next door.268 The Court concluded that eavesdrop-
ping did not violate the Fourth Amendment: “[D]efendants’ con-
versations were overheard by the naked human ear, unaided by any
. . . sensory enhancing devices. This distinction is significant be-
cause the Fourth Amendment protects conversations that cannot
be heard except by means of artificial enhancement.”269 Every time
individuals spoke, they assumed the risk that someone might be
privy to what they say.270 On the other hand, once technology en-
hanced the senses, then the risk altered. As Justice Brennan had
expressed in his dissent in Lopez v. United States, “There is no secur-
ity from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk,
and so not even a residuum of true privacy.”271
Passive observation proved central to the functional senses ap-
proach. What one could see or hear, just standing there, was not
tuted an interference under condition (c). In that case, moving and then record-
ing the serial numbers on the bottom of a stolen stereo did not amount to a
seizure, but it was a search under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, explained that “taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by
the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.” 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). Be-
cause the officer lacked “probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen,”
the action fell outside plain-view doctrine. Id. at 326.
266. 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984).
267. Id. at 541; see also United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir 1980)
(listening by placing one’s ear against an adjoining door does not violate the
Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980).
268. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 541.
269. Id. at 543; see also 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2, at 270–72 (1st ed. 1978).
270. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
271. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); see also discussion infra Part III(F)(2).
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protected. But if a search involved physical manipulation, such as
opening a bag, squeezing it, or feeling its contours, then the ordi-
nary senses test did not apply.272
D. Global Positioning System Technology
GPS technology is similar to the radio frequency beepers used
in Knotts and Karo in that it allows law enforcement to monitor the
movements of one or more persons or objects, from a remote loca-
tion, for some amount of time.273 But it differs in terms of accuracy,
reliability, the verification required (impacting resources required
for monitoring the device, the likelihood of detection, and the de-
gree of intrusion), the level of detail obtained, and the potential
analytical yield.274 A brief discussion of these five characteristics
provides context for the types of privacy concerns raised the 2012
case of United States v. Jones.275
First, GPS devices are more accurate than beepers. GPS can
pinpoint where a tracked device is located to within a few centime-
ters.276 In contrast, radio-frequency transmitters appear to provide
272. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (responding to
the government’s claim “that by exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a
reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically manipulated,” by not-
ing that Ciraolo and Riley “involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation.”).
273. See Renee´ McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knots? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 415 (2007).
274. See generally April A. Otterburg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case
for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 681–82 (2005) (discussing State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003)); Hutchins, supra note 273, at 418–19; Brief of Appel- R
lants at 57, United States v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08–3030),
2009 WL 3155141 [hereinafter: Appellants’ Brief]; Ian Herbert, Note, Where We Are
with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and the Implications on Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442 (2011).
275. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
276. Derek Major, Another Great Leap for GPS?, GCN (Feb. 17, 2016), https://
gcn.com/articles/2016/02/17/improved-gps.aspx?s=gcntech_180216. In 1978,
the Department of Defense launched its first GPS satellite. Darren Griffin, How
Does the Global Positioning System Work?, POCKETGPSWORLD.COM, http://
www.pocketgpsworld.com/howgpsworks.php (last updated June 26, 2011). By
1994, the system had expanded to include 24 satellites, collectively called NAV-
STAR. SCOTT PACE ET AL., RAND CORP., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESS-
ING NATIONAL POLICIES 246 (1995). The system now includes approximately 30
satellites that orbit the Earth at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers. How Does GPS
Work?, PHYSICS.ORG, http://www.physics.org/article-questions.asp?id=55 (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2016). Although it initially reserved the system for the military, in
May 2000, the U.S. government opened it to civilian use. Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary of the White House, Statement by the President Regarding the
United States’ Decision to Stop Degrading Global Positioning System Accuracy
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only a general location.277 The distinction means that more accu-
(May 1, 2000), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/html/0053_2.html.
The decision proved essential to private sector innovation. By 2003, the technology
had exploded to support a $4.7 billion market. NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE,
ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING IN THE WORKPLACE 5 (2004). Uses ranged from
employers wanting to track their workers by installing GPS chips on vehicles, in
badges, and on phones, to law enforcement using the information as part of crimi-
nal investigations. Id. at 10–15.
NAVSTAR continues to evolve. On February 5, 2016, the Air Force successfully
launched the final GPS IIF satellite. Space Segment, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/
systems/gps/space/#IIF (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). The solicitation process for
GPS III space vehicles, moving NAVSTAR to its third iteration, has already begun.
Space and Missile Systems Center, SMC Releases RFP for GPS III Space Vehicles 11+
Phase 1 Production Readiness Feasibility Assessment, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND (Jan. 8,
2016), http://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/730920/smc-releas
es-rfp-for-gps-iii-space-vehicles-11-phase-1-production-readiness-fea.
NAVSTAR has proven important not just within the United States but world-
wide. The only current global alternative is the Russian-Operated Global Naviga-
tion Satellite System (GLONASS). Chris Bergin & William Graham, Soyuz 2-1B
Launches Latest GLONASS-M Spacecraft, NASASPACEFLIGHT.COM (Feb. 6, 2016),
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/02/soyuz-2-1b-latest-glonass-m-spacecraft/.
The European Union recently initiated a navigation satellite system for Europe,
entitled Galileo, which is interoperable with NAVSTAR and GLONASS. What Is
Galileo?, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Navigation/
Galileo/What_is_Galileo (last updated Dec.18, 2015). The EU launched the first
two satellites in October 2012 to validate the concept. Two more followed nearly a
year later. Four pairs of fully operational capability satellites have since been
launched, through December 17, 2015. When fully deployed, the system will have
24 operational satellites positioned in three circular medium earth orbit planes,
approximately 23,000 kilometers above the surface. They are expected to be availa-
ble by the end of 2016, with completion slotted for 2020. Id. The People’s Repub-
lic of China, which currently operates the regional Beidou Navigation Satellite
System, plans to expand it into a global system by 2020. El Borromeo, China to
Unveil 40 Beidou Navigation Satellites in Five Years: Spokesperson, YIBADA (Feb. 6,
2016), http://en.yibada.com/articles/102630/20160206/china-unveil-40-beidou-
navigation-satellites-five-years-spokesperson.htm. India, Japan, and France all run
or are developing regional systems. Deepu Madhavan, Say Goodbye to GPS! India’s
All Set to Switch to the Desi Navigation System, IRNSS, INDIA TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/say-goodbye-to-gps-india-s-all-set-to-switch
-to-the-desi-navigation-system-called-indian-regional-navigation-satellite-system-
irnss-248186.html; What is the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System?, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
SECRETARIAT OF JAPAN,  http://qzss.go.jp/en/overview/services/sv02_why.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016); HONBO ZHOU, THE INTERNET OF THINGS IN THE CLOUD:
A MIDDLEWARE PERSPECTIVE 130 (2013) (noting that France is developing a re-
gional system).
277. In its reply brief in Karo, the government stated that law enforcement
officers standing on a sidewalk 25-50 feet from a home could tell whether the
beeper was located in the front or back of the home, or on the right or left side.
Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts,
Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1985) (citing
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rate data can be obtained from GPS, providing deeper insight into
the individual or object under surveillance.
Second, GPS data is more reliable: beepers cannot be used in
inclement weather, whereas GPS operates regardless of whether it is
sunny, raining, or the middle of a blizzard.278 Thus for GPS, the
amount (and quality) of data is not limited by natural conditions.
Third, the two systems depart in what must be done to verify
the information. GPS allows for law enforcement to be located vir-
tually anywhere.279 For a radio-frequency transmitter, the police
have to be relatively nearby.280 This has several implications.
For one, it takes a considerable amount of manpower, equip-
ment, and resources to conduct surveillance using a beeper,
whereas the costs for using GPS are lower.281 From a resource per-
spective, therefore, law enforcement officers could entertain a
lower level of individual suspicion before placing an individual
under surveillance using GPS than might otherwise be the case for
their decision to employ radio-frequency chips. Similarly, using
GPS, they could choose to put multiple people under surveillance
simultaneously, resulting in greater inroads into privacy because of
the lowered resource commitment entailed.
For another, since police need to be nearby, drivers are more
likely to be able to detect police tracking a beeper than police fol-
lowing GPS data.282 The absence of any observable government
presence may have implications for the relationship of citizens to
the government, as the surreptitious nature of the surveillance
raises question about the extent of government activity.283 To the
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9 n.6, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (No.
83–850)).
278. Hutchins, supra note 273, at 418; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 57. R
279. Scott W. Turner, GPS Surveillance, the Right to Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 40 COLO. LAW. 55, 57 (2011) (“Much like [radio beepers] . . . a GPS
unit can be placed on an object and observed as it is being moved. The observation
can be continuous. However, because of the technology, a person does not have to
be nearby to obtain its signal. The movement of an individual being tracked
through a GPS device can be observed by someone sitting at a computer from
essentially anywhere.”).
280. In Karo, the government stated that under ordinary conditions on the
open road, the signal could be monitored 2-4 miles away, and up to 20 miles in the
air. Once a beeper went inside premises, however, it was not always possible to
identify its location. Fishman, supra note 277, at 282 (citing Reply Brief, supra note R
277, at 8 n.6). R
281. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 57. R
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 274, at 458–60 (discussing a number of inci- R
dents where individuals discovered FBI GPS surveillance devices on their cars).
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extent that law enforcement agencies state that any information
about GPS devices or tracking technologies is “law enforcement
sensitive” (and thus refuse to release any information publicly
about their use of the technologies), the concern increases.284
In addition, because radio-frequency enabled transmitters re-
quire the police to be in close proximity, officers cannot easily fol-
low the person or object onto private land, within gated
communities, or across borders.285 In contrast, a GPS device may be
carried virtually anywhere, including the most intimate spheres of
personal and family life, without the target knowing that the infor-
mation is being collected and monitored by the government. GPS
data obtained on multiple people also can be correlated, showing
others with whom the individual is sharing those spaces, generating
insight into intimate relationships.
Fourth, GPS chips provide more detailed information than can
be obtained from beepers.286 GPS generates location data on a sec-
ond-by-second basis. And it is automated, so the government can
turn it on and then more or less ignore it. It can record informa-
tion indefinitely, until law enforcement officials (or anyone else
with access to the system) would like to look at the data, or to find
(in real time) the person or object being tracked.287 In contrast, in
addition to being less accurate than GPS chips, beepers only send
out periodic signals, generating smaller amounts of information.
Someone has to be present to pick up the information, so less of it
is captured. And beepers are only good for as long as their battery
has power.
Fifth, because GPS data is detailed and digital, law enforce-
ment can more easily combine it with other data, and synthesize
and analyze an individual’s movement over lengthy periods,288 even
predicting, based on pattern analytics, the individual’s future move-
ments. This is more than just ordinary sensory perception, to which
Fourth Amendment doctrine clings. It introduces a different form
of knowledge acquisition than is at stake in radio-frequency ena-
bled transmitter tracking.289
284. Id. at 459–61.
285. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 57. R
286. Id.
287. See Hutchins, supra note 273, at 458; see also Appellants’ Brief, supra note R
274, at 57, 64. R
288. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 57. R
289. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (“We perceive a
difference between the kind of uninterrupted, 24-hour a day surveillance possible
through use of a GPS device, which does not depend upon whether an officer
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 30 Side A      04/17/2017   15:12:38
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 30 Side A      04/17/2017   15:12:38
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\71-4\NYS401.txt unknown Seq: 51 17-APR-17 14:27
2017] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN A DIGITAL WORLD 603
In sum, compared to beepers, GPS technology is more accu-
rate and more reliable. It requires fewer resources and is harder to
detect. It provides enormous detail and can be analyzed and com-
bined with other information to generate further insight into sus-
pects’ lives. Law enforcement has therefore become increasingly
reliant on GPS data for investigations.290 An increasing number of
cases are therefore coming before the courts, challenging the war-
rantless use of GPS technology.
Much like the Court in Olmstead, when confronted by tele-
phone communications, a number of lower courts initially treated
the placement of GPS chips on vehicles consistent with the Knotts
framework, finding that it did not constitute a search.291 Satellite-
based tracking fell on the same side of the line as surveillance cam-
eras and satellite imaging.292
A few courts, however, disagreed.293 In 2003, the state of Wash-
ington determined that, unlike binoculars or a flashlight, GPS sys-
tems did not merely enhance the natural senses.294 They provided a
substitute for visual tracking, resulting in significant intrusions into
individuals’ private affairs.295 The text of the Washington state con-
stitution mattered: “no person shall be disturbed in his private af-
could in fact have maintained visual contact over the tracking period, and an of-
ficer’s use of binoculars or a flashlight to augment his or her senses.”).
290. See ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41663, LAW ENFORCEMENT
USE OF GLOBAL POSITION (GPS) DEVICES TO MONITOR MOTOR VEHICLES: FOURTH
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 1–3 (2011).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 273, 275–76 (7th
Cir. 2011) (finding 60-hour GPS surveillance outside the protections of the Fourth
Amendment), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted and judg-
ment vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604,
609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that GPS simply uses technology to substitute for trailing a car on a pub-
lic street, which does not amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1177 (2000); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding use of a GPS device to be within the automobile excep-
tion); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523 (Nev. 2002) (applying State constitution).
292. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997.
293. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(tracking movements for twenty-four hours a day for four weeks by GPS is a
search); People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8
(Nassau Cty. Ct. N.Y. May 6, 2004) (unpublished table opinion), aff’d, 787 N.Y.S.2d
680 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988) (applying
State constitution and finding that use of radio transmitter to locate automobile
was a search); Jackson, 76 P.3d 217.
294. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
295. Id.
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fairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”296 The
Washington Supreme Court noted that the insight into individuals’
private lives that can be gleaned by GPS data is substantial:
For example, the device can provide a detailed record of travel
to doctors’ offices, banks, gambling casinos, tanning salons,
places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery stores,
exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off for
school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the
fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball
game, the “wrong” side of town, the family planning clinic, the
labor rally.297
Such information could provide details on citizens’ preferences, as-
sociations, and predilections, drawing a “detailed picture of one’s
life.”298
The Washington court was not alone. In People v. Lacey, a New
York court similarly determined that law enforcement use of a GPS
device required a warrant.299 In that case, a woman returned home
to find two men at her back door.300 She chased them and took
down the license plate of the black 1996 Mitsubishi Eclipse they
were driving.301 Another incident in the same county occurred in-
volving a black Mitsubishi, (along with a series of other local burgla-
ries), prompting the detective in charge of the investigation to
request permission from his lieutenant to place a GPS device on the
car.302 The police then tracked the vehicle, correlated its location
with a number of burglaries, and arrested the owner in the middle
of a heist.303
296. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7, construed in Jackson, 76 P.3d at 222 (“The in-
quiry under article 1, section 7 is broader than under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.”).
297. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
298. Id.
299. People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680, 2004 WL 1040676, at
*8 (Nassau Cty. Ct. N.Y. May 6, 2004) (unpublished table opinion), aff’d, 787
N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
300. Id. at *1.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *1–*2.
303. Id. at *3. As the question of whether the Fourth Amendment applied to
GPS devices was a case of first impression for New York, the court looked to other
state cases for guidance. Id. at *5–*6, (citing, among others, State v. Jackson, 76
P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988); Johnson v.
State, 492 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a beeper on a
plane was “tantamount to an illegal entry and beyond the scope of the warrant”)).
However, the court in Lacey mentioned, although it did not discuss in detail, a
number of cases that went the other way. 2004 WL 1040676, at *6–*7 (citing,
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The court balked at the possibility that the police could place
GPS devices on vehicles and follow them around indefinitely with-
out probable cause. “The citizens of New York,” Judge Joseph
Calabrese stated, “have the right to be free in their property, espe-
cially in light of technological advances which have and continue to
diminish this privacy.”304 If it were a telephone communication, the
police would have to obtain a warrant: “While the telegraph has
become a relic of the past, cellular technology has become the fu-
ture.”305 The judge was concerned about what the future might
hold:
At this time, more than ever, individuals must be given the con-
stitutional protections necessary to their continued unfettered
freedom from a “big brother” society. Other than in the most
exigent circumstances, a person must feel secure that his or
her every movement will not be tracked except upon a warrant
based on probable cause establishing that such person has
been or is about to commit a crime. Technology cannot abro-
gate our constitutional protections.306
In Lacey, Judge Calabrese boldly addressed the key question—an
opportunity the Supreme Court failed to take, more than a decade
later.307
In United States v. Jones, the Court considered a GPS chip that
the police placed on the car of a suspected drug dealer’s wife and
monitored for 28 days.308 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated
that the placement of the chip on the car, which occurred outside
the period allowed by the warrant, amounted to a trespass.309 Scalia
distinguished Karo, noting that what made the placement of the
among others, State v. Clifton, 580 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of law enforcement use of a manufacturer-installed GPS); White-
head v. State, 574 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming conviction where po-
lice placed a GPS device on an informer’s car, with the informer’s consent)).
304. Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). In addition to a
number of state court decisions, a number of state legislatures have taken steps to
prohibit the warrantless use of electronic tracking devices; see also Herbert, supra
note 274, at 445 nn.12–14  (citing laws passed in Utah, Florida, South Carolina, R
Oklahoma, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and California).
308. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
309. Id. at 352; see also Johnson v. State, 492 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that installation of a beeper inside a plane amounted to an
illegal entry and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment); People v. Oates, 698
P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (applying State constitution and finding that
placement of a beeper inside a container of chemicals after the defendant had
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transmitter in the container of ether legal was that it was placed
into the device before the target of the surveillance had possession.
In contrast, the car was already in Antoine Jones’s wife’s possession
when law enforcement attached the device.310 He reasoned that the
case was entirely consistent with Knotts; the holding in Knotts merely
recognized that the target had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, per Katz, in the location of the automobile carrying the
container of chloroform.311 Katz, however, had to be understood as
adding to, not substituting for, the common law trespassory test. As
in Karo, “The beeper had been placed in the container before it
came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-
owner.”312
Scalia reiterated that naked eye doctrine controls public space.
“This Court has to date not deviated from the understanding that
mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”313 What one
could ascertain from ordinary senses, in public, lay beyond the
reach of the Fourth Amendment. He went on to reject any privacy
interest in the length of the surveillance. “[E]ven assuming that the
concurrence is correct to say that ‘[t]raditional surveillance’ of
Jones for a 4-week period ‘would have required a large team of
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,’ . . . our
cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permis-
sible.”314 At the same time, he admitted that the Court might have
to grapple with the implications of lengthy surveillance in the fu-
ture: “It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional in-
vasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer
that question.”315
While Scalia sidestepped the hard questions presented by per-
sistent monitoring, Justice Alito, joined in his concurrence by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan, did not.316 Alito
began by drawing a parallel between the majority in Jones and the
Court in Silverman, which (consistent with Olmstead) had required
“unauthorized physical penetration” for Fourth Amendment inter-
partially purchased and taken possession of the materials amounted to a warrant-
less search).
310. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
311. Id. at 951–52.
312. Id. at 952.
313. Id. at 953.
314. Id. at 953–54 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 963 (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
315. Id. at 954.
316. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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ests to arise.317 The Jones majority similarly focused on physical in-
trusion, despite the fact that, post-Katz, the trespass rule no longer
applied.318 For Alito, the key question was whether the long-term
monitoring of the car violated the respondent’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.319 He concluded that it did.320 Technology, Alito
averred, can change expectations.
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices
that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some
locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming
ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems cre-
ate a precise record of the movements of motorists who choose
to make use of that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to
ascertain the car’s location at any time . . . . Perhaps most sig-
nificant, cell phones and other wireless devices now permit
wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.321
Limited resources previously played a role in restricting incursions
into privacy. “In the pre-computer age,” Alito explained, “the great-
est protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”322
Only an important investigation would have used such means.323
GPS devices, however, have made “long-term monitoring relatively
easy and cheap.”324 Short-term monitoring using the chips might
be one thing, “But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in inves-
tigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”325
For those offenses, society did not reasonably expect that law en-
forcement would “secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”326 Four
weeks was too long.
317. Id. at 959 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)).
318. Id. at 959–60 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding the trespass theory “no longer
controlling”)).
319. Id. at 958.
320. Id. at 964.
321. Id. at 963.
322. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 963–64.
324. Id. at 964.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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Justice Sotomayor, in a separate concurrence, agreed.327 As
technology advances, the government will have greater access to ge-
olocational data.328 In contrast to Scalia, Sotomayor argued that
longer-term monitoring impinges on expectations of privacy.329 Lo-
cation tracking implicates other rights as well, chilling associational
and expressive freedoms.330 “[T]he Government’s unrestrained
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity,”
moreover, “is susceptible to abuse.”331 The privacy interests at stake
were considerable. People did not “reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that en-
ables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their politi-
cal and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”332 Such a tool, in
the hands of the Executive and without any oversight, would be ripe
for abuse.333
While the majority decided the case on grounds of trespass,
what has come to be understood as the shadow majority in Jones
(the five Justices joining the Alito and Sotomayor concurrences),
like the dissents in Olmstead and Goldman, and the Court in
Silverman, signaled a growing concern about the impact of new
technology on privacy interests protected under the Fourth
Amendment.334
327. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
328. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
329. Id. at 955.
330. Id. at 955–56.
331. Id. at 956.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. The Court has not limited the private/public distinction to land. In 1927
United States v. Lee considered the use of a searchlight that uncovered cases of li-
quor on a boat. 274 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1927). The Supreme Court determined:
[N]o search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain shows
that he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there was any exploration be-
low decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were
on deck and, like the defendants, were discovered before the motorboat was
boarded. Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass
or field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution.
Id. at 563. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, was careful to note that the cases
of liquor were simply sitting on the deck and not located below, so no actual entry
had to occur for the officers to ascertain that the vessel was carrying contraband.
Id. Following Katz, the private/public distinction persisted for searches conducted
on the high seas. Like the location of the buildings on the Dow Chemical’s cam-
pus, the location of a vessel in the ocean did not “provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from gov-
ernment interference or surveillance.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179
(1984); see also Jason R. Crance & Mike Mastry, Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights at
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E. Enhanced Detection
Starting in the early 1990s, new technologies and techniques
that enhanced the human senses, such as thermal imaging, or the
use of narcotics dogs, began to make their way onto the Court’s
docket. Despite the movement in Katz to determining privacy from
the perspective of the individual (rather than the specific places
being protected), the Court continued to rely upon the territorial
private/public distinction, with the line drawn at the curtilage of
the home.
In 1991, for instance, an agent from the U.S. Department of
the Interior suspected that an Oregon resident, Danny Kyllo, was
growing marijuana in his home.335 Knowing that successfully grow-
ing the plant indoors required the use of high intensity lamps, the
Sea and Governmental Use of Vessel Monitoring Systems: There’s Something Fishy About
This, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 231, 246 (2007). Arguments regarding the navigation
of a vessel paralleled the doctrinal approach to observing a car as it traversed pub-
lic thoroughfares. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (quoting
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (Cars have “little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny” when traveling on “public thoroughfares where both its occupants
and its contents are in plain view.”)). Just as the public could observe a car, so, too,
could citizens see boats and ships on the open water. Combined with the nature of
commercial fishing, a lower expectation of privacy held. Why should government
regulators or law enforcement officers be subject to different standards?
Like radio-frequency-enabled transmitters, vessel monitoring systems (VMS)
do not provide information located within the vessel, or below deck—making a
Fourth Amendment search claim, under the current doctrine, somewhat question-
able. Lower courts are divided on whether, and under what circumstances, a cap-
tain of a vessel has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what occurs on different
parts of the vessel. Crance & Mastry, supra, at 247–48. The Fifth Circuit has
adopted an approach that mirrors the distinction between open fields and matters
located within the curtilage of the home. Since the Coast Guard can conduct ad-
ministrative inspections of public areas without probable cause and a warrant, the
captain of a vessel has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public areas of
the vessel. See id. at 247. In United States v. Freeman, the Coast Guard located the
vessel by means of radar, after which it found more than 41,000 pounds of mari-
juana on board. 660 F.2d 1030, 1031–34 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed in Crance &
Mastry, supra, at 247. In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the First Circuit considers that
the captain has a reasonable expectation of privacy to the extent that it “derives
from his custodial responsibility for the ship, his associated legal power to exclude
interlopers from unauthorized entry . . . and the doctrines of admiralty, which
grant the captain (as well as the owner) a legal identity of interest with the vessel.”
United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1993), quoted in Crance
& Mastry, supra, at 247–48. For non-public areas of the vessel, the circuits agree
that those on board do have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United
States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980), cited in Crance & Mastry, supra, at
248.
335. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
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agent directed a thermal scanner at Kyllo’s triplex to detect the
level of infrared radiation emanating from the structure.336 The
scan showed a hot spot along the roof over the garage.337 Based on
the results of the test, tips from informants, and Kyllo’s utility bills,
a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant for a search that yielded
100 marijuana plants.338
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, relied on the walls of the
home and the degree to which the observer’s senses had been en-
hanced beyond normal human abilities, to extend Fourth Amend-
ment protections to thermal searches. “The present case,” he wrote,
“involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye
surveillance of a home.”339 Scalia acknowledged, “It would be foolish
to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”340 Aircraft had exposed the top of peoples’ homes to
public view—including portions of the curtilage once considered
private. Thermal imaging raised the question of whether limits ex-
isted on the “power of technology to shrink the realm of guaran-
teed privacy.”341 Detecting activity inside the home intruded upon a
rule in operation since the founding of the country. “Where, as
here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”342
In 2013, the Court considered another sensory enhancement:
this time, whether the use of canines outside of a home, to detect
narcotics inside the structure, amounted to a search.343 The Court
had previously determined that the use of dogs outside of cars, to
detect narcotics inside the vehicle, was not a search.344 In Florida v.
Jardines, the Miami-Dade Police Department received a tip that Joe-
336. Id.
337. Id. at 30.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 33–34.
341. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
342. Id. at 40.
343. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
344. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); see also United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (police exposing luggage at airport to drug-sniffing
dog was not a search); Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment Forty
Years Later: Toward the Realization of an Inclusive Regulatory Model, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1885, 1906–07 (2016) (discussing Caballes and Jardines).
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lis Jardines was growing marijuana in his home.345 Two police of-
ficers, accompanied by a drug-sniffing dog, went up onto Jardines’s
front porch.346 On the basis of the dog’s positive response, as well
as the tip, the police obtained a warrant to search the home and
found cannabis.347
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, repeatedly emphasized the
territorial nature of the Fourth Amendment. “The officers were
gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and imme-
diately surrounding his house—in the curtilage of the house,” he
wrote.348 “[T]hey gathered that information by physically entering
and occupying the area.”349 For Scalia, the physical property proved
central: “the home is first among equals.”350
Once establishing the home as “a constitutionally protected
area,” Scalia turned to whether an “unlicensed physical intrusion”
had occurred.351 The naked eye, again, figured largely: “While law
enforcement officers need not ‘shield their eyes’ when passing by
the home ‘on public thoroughfares,’ an officer’s leave to gather in-
formation is sharply circumscribed when he steps off those thor-
oughfares.”352 In Ciraolo, there had been no physical intrusion of
the property.353 The fact that the police in Jardines had used a
trained animal appears to have mattered little, as the effect was the
same: it altered law enforcement’s ability to detect information
about a protected area that was not evident from the use of ordi-
nary senses.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, emphasized the extent to which
the canine unit had augmented natural human abilities. “Here,”
she wrote, “police officers came to Joelis Jardines’ door with a
super-sensitive instrument, which they deployed to detect things in-
side that they could not perceive unassisted.”354 Not only was the
use of a highly-trained dog without a warrant a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, but if the officer had used “super-high-pow-
ered binoculars” to look through a window, that, too, could fall
345. 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id at 1414.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
352. Id. (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)) (citation
omitted).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 34 Side B      04/17/2017   15:12:38
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 34 Side B      04/17/2017   15:12:38
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\71-4\NYS401.txt unknown Seq: 60 17-APR-17 14:27
612 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 71:553
outside constitutional requirements.355 Kagan noted the “firm” and
“bright line” that marked “the entrance to the house,” emphasizing
the private/public distinction.356
Even the dissent turned to some extent upon whether the of-
ficer’s ordinary senses, outside the curtilage of the home, would
suffice. Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ken-
nedy, and Justice Breyer, criticized the Court for “fail[ing] to men-
tion that, while [one detective] apparently did not personally smell
the odor of marijuana coming from the house, another officer who
subsequently stood on the front porch . . . did notice that smell and
was able to identify it.”357
F. Technological Challenges to the Private/Public Distinction
Fourth Amendment doctrine has long struggled with how to
integrate new technologies into the private/public distinction. Per-
haps nowhere are its failings clearer than in the realm of location
tracking.358
Two elements are now coming together that undermine the
traditional divide. First, the proliferation of tracking technologies
means that enormous amounts of locational data are being gener-
ated, providing detailed pictures of citizens’ lives. Second, the pri-
vate/public distinction in Fourth Amendment doctrine ignores the
possibility that the length of observation, the recording of the information,
or the analysis of data obtained from the public domain could trig-
ger a new privacy interests.
The basic argument is that if privacy is not implicated at the
front end—i.e., the moment an individual sees or hears what a per-
son says or does in public, or reads an individual’s documents or
papers that are in the public domain—then the length of time that
the person is placed under observation, whether the government
records the information that is being generated, and whether the
government later analyzes the data (potentially in combination with
other information) does not give rise to any new privacy right. Zero
355. Id. (distinguishing the scenario from delivering the mail or distributing
campaign flyers).
356. Id. at 1419.
357. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting).
358. Various commentators directly challenge the private/public distinction.
See, e.g., Sean K. Driscoll, “The Lady of the House” vs. a Man with a Gun: Applying
Kyllo to Gun-Scanning Technology, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 601, 604–05 (2013) (discuss-
ing the Fourth Amendment implications of firearms scanners using Terahertz
Imaging Detection).
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plus zero is still zero. Actions in public simply are unprotected by
the Fourth Amendment.
This approach is deeply problematic. Locational data, col-
lected in bulk, yields deep insight into individuals’ lives. Continued
reliance on the private/public distinction fails to capture the inter-
ests at stake in public monitoring, and in the collection and analysis
of locational data.
1. Digital Tracking
The number of ways that new technologies give others the abil-
ity to follow individuals is staggering. WiFi and Bluetooth signals;
GPS chips; vessel monitoring systems; RFID tags; automated license
plate readers; network connection data; international mobile sub-
scriber identity catchers; Internet protocol databases; financial
transactions; consumer purchases; closed circuit televisions; remote
biometric identification; and unmanned aerial systems provide just
some examples.359 Tracking has become such an intrinsic feature of
modern life that many people do not even realize who is tracing
their footsteps. Even a brief discussion illustrates the depth of pri-
vate information that is available.
Special sensors detect WiFi and Bluetooth-enabled devices,
such as mobile telephones, electronic tablets, and computers, as in-
dividuals move through public space. Industry is capitalizing on this
rich source of data. Companies such as LocationGenius, for in-
stance, guarantee “crowd-sourced scoring and analytics for any loca-
tion”—including retail analytics, audience profiles and impressions,
on-demand real estate data, and data related to entire cities or
counties for use in urban planning, migration, security, and local
law enforcement.360
LocationGenius generates customer profiles based on data col-
lected by mobile carriers. The company guarantees that the retailer
will instantly know where the customer just was, as well as where
their next stop is likely to be.361  It uses cellular network and device
data, sensors, beacons, as well as social media data, to populate a
359. Mobile devices, Internet-connected products, and online activity con-
stantly create data, which can be collected not just by the government, but by pri-
vate companies that can then trace where people go, how long they spend in each
location, and who they are with when they do so. See Armina Ligaya, You’re Being
Followed: New Digital Tracking Technologies Keep Tabs on Your Every Move, FINANCIAL
POST MAGAZINE, May 7, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/financial-post-
magazine/digital-tracking-privacy?__lsa=0f20-ef2c.
360. LOCATIONGENIUS, http://locationgenius.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
361. Id.
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profiling engine that “plugs into postal code data, behavioural
streams, census data, and . . . other in-house and third party
sources,” providing retailers with customers’ household income,
ethnicity, gender, educational level, employment, consumer spend-
ing, and brand preferences.362
LocationGenius is just one example of a burgeoning industry.
The 2016 global market in consumer location information is esti-
mated to be worth more than $16 billion.363 Mobile marketing (the
provision of personalized, time- and location-sensitive information
to individuals’ mobile devices to promote goods and services) has
become standard business practice.364 The number of applications
on a smart phone that collect—and sell—data about the user’s
movements is extraordinary.365 Facebook, Google, Foursquare, and
Twitter are well known for this. But even seemingly innocuous ap-
plications, like Android’s popular Brightest Flashlight Free, have
tracked and sold users’ location information without their
knowledge.366
362. Id.; see also Ivor Tossell, Using ‘Remarkable’ Source of Data, Startup Builds
Rich Customer Profiles, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.theglobeand
mail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-growth/how-a-startup-is-using-lo-
cation-data-to-build-rich-customer-profiles-for-retailers/article16187925/.
363. See Ligaya, supra note 359. R
364. See, e.g., Lisa Lacy, Mobile Marketing Trends 2016: 50 Experts on the Future of
Apps, Ads & Search, LINKDEX (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.momentology.com/9031-
mobile-marketing-trends-2016/; William Comcowich, Geolocation: The Newest Move-
ment in Mobile Marketing and Measurement, CYBERALERT (Mar. 15, 2014), http://
www.cyberalert.com/blog/index.php/geolocation-the-newest-movement-in-mo-
bile-marketing-and-measurement/; Alan Meyer, Mobile Marketing and Geolocation:
Up Your Effectiveness with Location Targeting, CARNIVAL.IO, http://insights.carni
val.io/mobile-marketing-and-geolocation-up-your-effectiveness-with-location-
targeting/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); Scott Gerber, 14 Mobile Marketing Trends
That Will Dominate in 2016, MASHABLE (Dec. 23, 2015), http://mashable.com/
2015/12/23/mobile-marketing-2016/#boz70c3lZiqp.
365. See, e.g., About Privacy and Location Services for iOS 8 and iOS 9, APPLE,
https://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT203033 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting
that iOS devices allow maps, camera, weather, traffic, and other apps to use infor-
mation from cellular, WiFi, GPS networks, and Bluetooth, to determine users’ loca-
tion; also explaining that Location Services triggers location-based system services
such as Location-Based Apple Ads, Location Based Alerts, and Share My Location);
see also Sig Ueland, 10 Geolocation Apps for Business, PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE (May 13,
2011), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/2780-10-Geolocation-Apps-
for-Business (describing Google Latitude; Google Maps; Google Buzz; Double
Dutch; Neer; Plancast; Glympse; Foursquare; GroupMe; Hashable; Geoloqi;
LiquidSpace).
366. Kristin Burnham, Location Tracking: 6 Social App Settings to Check, INFORMA-
TIONWEEK (Aug. 26, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
software/social/location-tracking-6-social-app-settings-to-check/d/d-id/1306643.
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GPS chips that record locational data also have become inte-
grated into our daily lives. In 1996, the FCC adopted rules (imple-
mented by 2001) that required all mobile telephones to be GPS-
enabled to facilitate emergency services.367 By 2004, even small car-
riers had to comply.368 In 2015, the FCC expanded the rule to re-
quire mobile telephone providers to build in the capability to
locate cell phones indoors, including the height above ground, ena-
bling law enforcement to pinpoint the precise location of a mobile
phone inside a home, office building, or other structure.369 Wire-
less carriers do not inform users of any way to disable this func-
tion.370 As long as the phone is turned on, service providers can
locate the telephone either through hardware built into the device,
or through examining where it connects to the cell site network.
When NAVSTAR opened to commercial interests in 2000, the
use of GPS expanded beyond mobile telephones to enable such va-
ried services as access to local resources, time synchronization, and
air and ground navigation.371 The technology is now used by air-
lines, farming, mining, prisons, security companies, hobbyists, and
others to program and track people and objects, and to create vir-
tual borders to monitor people, animals, or objects that enter or
leave pre-set boundaries.372
367. Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced
911 Emergency Calling Sys., 11 FCC Rcd. 18676, 18683–84 (1996).
368. 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (1999); Revision of the Comm’n’s Rules to
Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, CC No.
94–102, FCC 02–210, at ¶ 32 (July 26, 2002) (order to stay).
369. Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements, PS No. 07–114, FCC
15–9,  at ¶¶ 3, 6 (Jan. 29, 2015) (fourth report and order).
370. See E911 Compliance FAQs, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://
www.verizonwireless.com/support/e911-compliance-faqs.
371. See Bradford W. Parkinson, GPS Eyewitness: The Early Years, GPS World 5,
Sept. 9, 1994, pp. 32–45; MICHAEL RUSSELL RIP & JAMES M. HASIK, THE PRECISION
REVOLUTION: GPS AND THE FUTURE OF AERIAL WARFARE, 429–41 (2002); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM—A SHARED NATIONAL ASSET:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ENHANCEMENTS (1995); Eva
Marie Dowdell, Note, You Are Here! – Mapping the Boundaries of the Fourth Amendment
with GPS Technology, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 109, 109–10 (2005–2006)
(noting the use of GPS for cellular telephony, access to local resources, time syn-
chronization, emergency services, and navigation); KPMG, Self-driving Cars: The
Next Revolution 34, https://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-
Publications/Documents/self-driving-cars-next-revolution.pdf.
372. HTG Explains: What Geofencing Is (and Why You Should be Using It), HOW-
TO-GEEK, http://www.howtogeek.com/221077/htg-explains-what-geofencing-is-
and-why-you-should-be-using-it/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016); Lauren Brousell, 5
Things You Need to Know About Geofencing, CIO (Aug. 28, 2013), http://
www.cio.com/article/2383123/mobile/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-geofenc-
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Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) consist of electronic devices
that transmit the location of vessels via satellite link to a land-based
receiver.373 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Reauthorization Act of 2006 required that the government
increase VMS data sharing among state and federal agencies.374 On
August 9, 2006, the National Marine Fisheries Service published a
regulation requiring that all vessel owners operating in the Gulf of
Mexico outfit their vessels with a VMS unit.375 The devices must
remain on and able to transmit twenty-four hours a day, regardless
of where the vessel is located and irrespective of whether the vessel
is engaged in commercial fishing. Although supported by environ-
mentalists, the constitutional implications of increased use of VMS
mostly have gone unnoticed.376
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags have become more
ubiquitous and sophisticated than the beepers used in the investiga-
ing.html; Creating and Monitoring Geofences, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://devel-
oper.android.com/training/location/geofencing.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2016);
Geo-fencing, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/geofencing
(last visited Oct. 17, 2016); Geofencing, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/14937/geofencing (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). Because of the detail that
GPS provides, from its inception, it has been accompanied by significant privacy
concerns. See, e.g., David Uris, Big Brother and a Little Black Box: The Effect of Scientific
Evidence on Privacy Rights, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 995, 1006 (2002) (“[S]keptics
can only hope that these devices do not turn out to be Pandora’s boxes, for ‘the
loss of personal civil liberties always begins with the best intentions of the govern-
ment.’”) (citing Bob Van Voris, Black Box Car Idea Opens Can of Worms, NAT’L L. J.,
June 14, 1999, at A1); Simon Romero, Location Devices’ Use Rises, Prompting Privacy
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/busi-
ness/location-devices-use-rises-prompting-privacy-concerns.html; Petition of the
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association for a Rulemaking to Establish
Fair Location Information Practices at 4–5, In re Petition for Rulemaking, Nov. 22,
2000; Aaron Reneger, Note, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.
J. 549 (2002). See also Megha Rjagopalan, Cellphone Companies Will Share Your Loca-
tion Data – Just Not with You, PRO PUBLICA (June 26, 2012), https://
www.propublica.org/article/cellphone-companies-will-share-your-location-data-
just-not-with-you.
373. Vessel Monitoring System Program—Gulf of Mexico Commercial Reef Fish Fre-
quently Asked Questions, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., (Apr. 2007), http://
sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/faqs/documents/pdfs/gulf_of_mexico/
reef_fish/2012/vms_faqs_041707.pdf; see also Crance & Mastry, supra note 334, at R
233.
374. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883).
375. Fisheries Amendment 18A, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,428 (Aug. 9, 2006) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. §§ 622, 635).
376. But see Crance & Mastry, supra note 334, at 233–34. R
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tions in Knotts and Karo.377 As small as a grain of rice, they can be
used to track goods,378 persons,379 or animals;380 to collect tolls;381
to read travel documents;382 to verify the authenticity of items;383 to
time sporting events;384 or to regulate entry into buildings.385 Enti-
377. A two-way radio with a microprocessor, the device sends out data that is
picked up by electronic readers or antennas, to identify the location of people,
cars, or objects. Battery-powered RFID chips can typically be read from a range of
300 feet (100 meters) away. RFID Frequently Asked Questions, RFID JOURNAL, https://
www.rfidjournal.com/faq/show?139.
378. See, e.g., Jill Gambon, How to Select the Right RFID Tag, RFID JOURNAL
(Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.rfidjournal.com/purchase-access?type=Article
&id=3622&r=%2Farticles%2Fview%3F3622; Claire Swedberg, Meggitt Polymers &
Composites Uses RFID to Track  Airline Components, Materials, RFID JOURNAL (Sept. 16,
2016), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?14984 (reporting that MPC’s
manufacturing plant is using RFID to track its materials during manufacturing).
379. See, e.g., Sam Witt, Is Human Chip Implant Wave of the Future?, CNN, Jan.
14, 1999, available at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9901/14/chip-
man.idg/; Rory Cellan-Jones, Office Puts Chips Under Staff’s Skin, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31042477; John Brandon, Is There a
Microchip Implant in Your Future?, FOX NEWS (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.fox
news.com/tech/2014/08/30/is-there-microchip-implant-in-your-future.html. The
FDA has issued guidance for the implantation of RFID chips in humans. Guidance
for Industry and FDA Staff—Class II Special Controls Guidance Document: Implantable
Radiofrequency Transponder System for Patient Identification and Health Information, U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm072141.htm. Companies sell RFID chips to be embed-
ded in human beings for a range of purposes. See Dangerous things, RFID & NFC
Transponder Implants, available at https://dangerousthings.com/transponders/.
When placed under the skin, they can be used to hack phones or to spread com-
puter viruses. See, e.g., Rose Eveleth, The Man Who Hacks Phones with an Implant
Under his Skin, BBC, May 15, 2017, available at  http://www.bbc.com/future/story/
20150515-i-hack-phones-with-touch-alone; Mark Gasson, Human Enhancement:
Could you become infected with a computer virus?, 2010 IEEE International Symposium
on Technology and Society, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
5514651/.
380. Claire Swedberg, RFID Goes to the Dogs, RFID JOURNAL (Aug. 6, 2009)
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?5108.
381. Laurie Wiegler, Taking a Toll: How RFID is Directing Traffic, RFID INSIDER
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://blog.atlasrfidstore.com/taking-toll-rfid; Claire Swedberg,
RFID Drives Highway Traffic Reports, RFID JOURNAL (Nov. 16, 2004), http://
www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?1243.
382. Paul Prince, United States Sets Date for E-Passports, RFID JOURNAL (Oct. 25,
2006), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?1951.
383. Claire Swedberg, RFID Gives Sports Memorabilia Stamp of Authenticity, RFID
JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?3828.
384. Fred O’Connor, RFID Helps the Boston Marathon Run, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/
AR2007040901011.html; Claire Swedberg, New York City Marathon Offers Enhanced
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ties as disparate as Wal-Mart386 and the Department of Defense387
require that vendors use RFID tags to ensure more efficient supply
chain management. In 2015, the global RFID market was worth just
over $10 billion.388 By 2020, the market is expected to exceed $13
billion.389
Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) pair fixed, portable,
and mobile cameras with searchable databases.390 The small, high-
speed cameras, which can capture thousands of car license plates
per minute, can be mounted on police cars or city vehicles, as well
as stationary objects, such as signs, tollbooths, or bridges. They re-
cord the license plate, as well as the date, time, and location of each
car. The information is then fed into a local, state, or regional
database, with differing levels of retention, depending upon the
state.391
Network-based data also yields locational data. Service provid-
ers record where users’ mobile devices connect to local towers—
and not just when a telephone call is made or a text message is
RFID-enabled Apps, RFID J., July 25, 2011, http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/
view?8626.
385. Smart Card Technology FAQ, SMART CARD ALLIANCE, http://www.smart-
cardalliance.org/smart-cards-faq/.
386. University Alliance, RFID Technology Boosts Walmart’s Supply Chain Manage-
ment, UNIV. OF S.F., http://www.usanfranonline.com/resources/supply-chain-man
agement/rfid-technology-boosts-walmarts-supply-chain-management/#.Vs3L-VKqd
fQ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
387. See Samuel Greengard, Re-Evaluating Supply Chain Relationships (Sept. 15,
2014), https://www.rfidjournal.com/purchase-access?type=Article&id=12175&r=
%2Farticles%2Fview%3F12175.
388. Raghu Das and Peter Harrop, RFID Forecasts, Players and Opportunities
2016-2026, IDTECHEX (Oct. 2015), http://www.idtechex.com/research/reports/
rfid-forecasts-players-and-opportunities-2016-2026-000451.asp.
389. Id.
390. KIETH GIERLACK, ET AL., LICENSE PLATE READERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 2
(2014), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR467.html.
391. Automated License Plate Recognition, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
http://www.iacp.org/ALPR-FAQs; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOU ARE BEING
TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’
MOVEMENTS 18 (July 2013), https://www.aclu.org/feature/you-are-being-tracked.
For differing lengths of retention compare Ark. Code (2013) §12-12-1801 to 12-12-
1805 (prohibiting data retention beyond 150 days), Cal. Veh. Code (2011) §2413
(prohibiting the California Highway Patrol from retaining data from a license
plate reader more than 60 days, unless the information is to be used as evidence in
a felony case), Maine (2009), 29-AMRSA §2117-A(2) (setting a 21-day limit on the
retention of data obtained via ALPRs), and Tenn. Code (2014) §55-10-302 (put-
ting a 90 day limit on data retention unless the information is part of an ongoing
investigation).
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received, but constantly, as the user moves through space.392 The
information provides a picture of where individuals go.393 The
courts that have confronted the question of historical cell site loca-
tion information (CSLI) have struggled with—and split over—
whether or not such information is protected.394 In 2015, the
Fourth Circuit held that “the government conducts a search . . .
when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical CSLI for
an extended period of time.”395 When the case went en banc, how-
ever, the court reversed its decision.396 Smith controlled. The Elev-
enth Circuit similarly argued that by using a telephone, mobile
users voluntarily provide “location information to telephone com-
392. Patrick DiJusto, What the N.S.A. Wants to Know About Your Phone Calls, THE
NEW YORKER, June 7, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-the-
n-s-a-wants-to-know-about-your-phone-calls.
393. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: To-
ward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 126-27, 168 (2012).
394. Law enforcement has tried to use the Stored Communications Act, as
well as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, to obtain this information. Ap-
pellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 65. A number of courts, looking to the private R
nature of the information, the ex parte nature of the proceedings, and the re-
duced resources required, have required that law enforcement first demonstrate
probable cause of a particular crime. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 274, at 66 R
(citing In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv.
To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586–87 (W.D. Pa. 2008)); In
re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Instal-
lation and Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geo-
graphic Location Information, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 302 (D.P.R. 2007); In re the
Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Disclo-
sure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324, at 18, 22
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Application of the United States for an Order Au-
thorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or
Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking,  441 F.
Supp. 2d 816, 818–19 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re United States for an Order for Pro-
spective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., No. 06 CRIM. MISC.01,
2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); In re United States for Orders Authoriz-
ing Installation & Use of Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel.
Nos., 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (D. Md. 2006); In re the Applications of the United
States of America for Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Site Information,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43736 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); In re the Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Infor-
mation, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005).
395. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en
banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015).
396. United States v. Graham, No. 12-4659 at *5, (4th Cir. May 31, 2016)
(Hein Online).
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panies,” removing collection of that data by law enforcement from
Fourth Amendment protections.397
Myriad other ways of obtaining locational data exist. Cell-site
simulators, known as “IMSI catchers,” can be used to locate mobile
telephones within a particular area.398 The devices essentially pre-
tend to be local cell towers used by mobile service providers, forc-
ing all telephones in a given area that subscribe to the service to
issue signals that can be used to locate all phones in the area.399
The location of an aircard—i.e., a cellular modem that attaches to a
computer through the USB port to provide Internet access via a
cellular network—can be obtained through similar means.400 Law
enforcement is increasingly turning to IMSI catchers to search for
individuals both inside buildings (including homes), as well as in
public.401
Individuals also can be tracked through databases that map IP
addresses to geographic locations.402 Financial transactions and
credit card information can be used to place individuals at a partic-
ular location at a particular time.403 Video cameras, enabled with
remote biometric identification, can track individuals as they move
through public space.404 Not only are there more of them, but the
397. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 n. 12 (11th Cir. 2015).
398. See Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 345 (2016) (holding that the
police violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the 4th
Amendment by using real-time cell phone information  to find the precise location
of an individual within a home); see also Dan Goodhin, Low-cost IMSI Catcher for 4G/
LTE Networks Tracks Phones’ Precise Locations, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 28, 2015), http://
arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/low-cost-imsi-catcher-for-4glte-networks-track-
phones-precise-locations/; Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited
Oct. 16, 2016). Note that “Stingray,” made by Harris Corporation, is one of the
most well-known IMSI catchers, but there are various other models on the market.
399. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Defendant-Appellant at 19, United States v. Patrick, No. 15-2443 (7th Cir. Jan.
22, 2016).
400. See, e.g., 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (D. Ariz. 2013).
401. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, No. 13-CR-234, 2015 WL 106158, at
*2–*3 (data from carrier used to identify general location of a telephone, with an
IMSI catcher, then employed to pinpoint the precise location of the telephone
within an apartment), argued, No. 15-02443 (7th Cir. May 24, 2016).
402. See, e.g., What Is Geolocation of an IP Address?, IP LOCATION FINDER,
www.iplocation.net.
403. See, e.g., Privacy & Credit Card Records: What Does Your Online & Credit
History Reveal?, CYBER TREND (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.cybertrend.com/article/
17089/privacy-and-credit-card-records.
404. See, e.g., ISACA, GEOLOCATION: RISK, ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 5, 8 (2011),
http://www.isaca.org/groups/professional-english/wireless/groupdocuments/ge-
olocation_wp.pdf; Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Cen-
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technologies involved in storing, analyzing, and combining the data
with other sources is steadily “growing exponentially more power-
ful.”405 Even kinetic photos taken by a smart phone include loca-
tion data and time and date stamps (when these functions are not
disabled). Images can be read using facial recognition technology,
placing particular individuals in particular places at particular
times.
When cameras are mounted on unmanned aerial systems
(UAS), mobile monitoring may be enabled.406 Drones open new
ways to conduct surveillance.407 They can fly virtually undetected at
higher altitudes, remain stationary outside buildings at lower alti-
tudes, and follow individuals in real time.408 They can be program-
med to track GPS chips and can be fitted with video and audio
surveillance equipment, with the information continuously re-
corded either on the device or at a remote location.409 Drones can
incorporate technologies ranging from remote biometric identifica-
tion and heat sensors, to radar, infrared cameras, and “sniffers,”
enabling them to detect particles suspended in the air.410 Although
tury: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 125,
127 (2002) (discussing Tampa, Florida law enforcement pairing of CCTV and fa-
cial recognition technology to find criminals in crowds).
405. David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1085–86 (2014).
406. Andrew Conte, Drones with Facial Recognition Technology Will End Anonym-
ity, Everywhere, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 27, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/
facial-recognition-technology-and-drones-2013-5.
407. Over the past five years, there has been an upsurge in the number of law
review notes, comments, and articles looking at the impact of drones on Fourth
Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 29, 32 (2011); Matthew R. Koerner, Note, Drones and the Fourth
Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE L. J. 1129 (2015); Timothy T.
Takehashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 72 (2013); An-
drew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discre-
tion in the Digital Age, 102 CAL. L. REV. 729, 731–32 (2014); John Villasenor,
Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 457, 459 (2013); Philip J. Hiltner, Comment, The Drones Are Coming: Use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Police Surveillance and Its Fourth Amendment Implications, 3
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 397, 397 (2013).
408. See also Koerner, supra note 407, at 1133, 1150–53 (noting the unique R
qualities of drones and the range of technologies that they carry).
409. See also ANUJ PURI, A SURVEY OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) FOR
TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE 1, 2 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.ugpti.org/smartse/research/citations/downloads/Puri-A_Survey_of_Un
manned_Aerial_Vehicles_for_Traffic_Surveillance-2005.pdf.
410. Andrew Conte, supra note 406; Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER R
FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones. See also Surveillance
and Monitoring with UAVs, MICRODRONES.COM, https://www.microdrones.com/en/
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the battery time for most commercial drones is limited (up to 90
minutes in the air),411 custom builds can be designed to stay aloft
longer, with replacements sequenced to provide for continuous sur-
veillance.412 Not only are drones more maneuverable and in many
ways more technologically sophisticated than helicopters, but they
also require fewer resources to operate. While a police helicopter
may cost upwards of one million dollars just for the aircraft (not to
mention fuel, pilots, and other equipment), drones run in the tens
to hundreds of dollars.413
Together, these and other technologies enable industry and
government to collect massive amounts of information about indi-
viduals as they move through public space.414 Four points here de-
serve notice.
First, it appears that law enforcement is making increasing use
of locational information. For example, according to RAND, by
2014, 71% of state police departments were using license plate
readers, while 85% of police departments stated that they planned
to obtain or to expand their use of the technology.415 Vermont’s
statewide ALPR system yielded nearly nine million records between
July 2013 and December 2014.416 The Northern California Re-
gional Intelligence Center, which covers the area from Monterey
County up to Humboldt County, collected more than forty-six mil-
applications/areas-of-application/monitoring/ (noting use of “a thermal camera
payload so that living beings . . . can be more easily detected in darkness or in
dense vegetation,” and listing the range of surveillance activities that the drone can
undertake).
411. See Korey Smith, General Drone Specs and Price Chart, MYFIRSTDRONE.COM
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://myfirstdrone.com/tutorials/buying-guides/best-drones-for-
sale/; Microdrones MD4-1000: Robus and Powerful UAV/Drone Model, MICRODRONES,
https://www.microdrones.com/en/products/md4-1000/at-a-glance/ (last visited
Oct. 17, 2016).
412. Military drones can stay aloft for hours or days at a time, with coverage of
entire cities, as well as the ability to read a milk carton from 60,000 feet in the air.
Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues
/surveillance-drones (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
413. Koerner, supra note 407, at 1148–49. R
414. Transit passes, access cards, and automated toll booth systems provide
just a few of many more examples of location tracking.
415. Keith Gierlack, et al., License Plate Readers for Law Enforcement: Opportuni-
ties and Obstacles, RAND CORPORATION (2014), at 8, http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR467.html.
416. VT DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE VERMONT SENATE AND
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON JUDICIARY AND TRANSPORTATION AS REQUIRED BY 23 V.S.A.
§1607, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS (2015), http://mediad
.publicbroadcasting.net/p/vpr/files/201503/VT-2014-ALPR-Annual-Report-
VPR.pdf.
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lion images between May 2014 and April 2015.417 The impact of
even a single officer using a license reader is significant: one police-
man in Maryland was able to scan more than 48,000 vehicles over a
27-day period, in the process issuing 255 traffic citations and find-
ing 26 drivers with suspended licenses, 16 vehicle-emission viola-
tions, 4 stolen cars, and 1 expired license plate.418
Private industry has moved into the ALPR field. Digital Recog-
nition Network, for instance, claims to scan 40% of all U.S. vehicles
each year.419 They operate in conjunction with approximately 400
car repossession companies across the country, scanning up to 1800
plates per minute.420 The involvement of private industry has, in
turn, generated more government use of the technology. Vigilant
states that its ALPR database includes more than 2.8 billion plate
scans, which it expands by more than seventy million scans per
month.421 It provides the system for free to Texas law enforce-
ment.422 In return, the government gives Vigilant access to out-
standing court fees, which the company links to the license plates of
those owing the fees.423 It then alerts law enforcement when the
cars are found, giving officers the opportunity to pull over the cars
to obtain the fees, along with a 25% processing fee, which is then
given directly back to Vigilant.424 Vigilant’s privacy policy notes,
“The images stored in the system are collected from areas visible to
417. Samantha Weigel, Who’s Watching Who?: License Plate Readers Used Through-
out San Mateo County, THE DAILY JOURNAL (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.sm
dailyjournal.com/articles/lnews/2015-04-08/whos-watching-who-license-plate-
readers-used-throughout-san-mateo-county/1776425141346.html; see also NCRIC
ALPR FAQs, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (Feb. 2015),
https://ncric.org/html/ALPR-FAQ-Feb-2015.pdf.
418. Jeremy Hsu, 70 Percent of U.S. Police Departments Use License Plate Readers,
IEEE SPECTRUM  (Jul. 8, 2014), http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transpor
tation/sensors/privacy-concerns-grow-as-us-police-departments-turn-to-license-
plate-readers; Weigel, supra note 417 (noting that one patrol car, with four R
mounted ALPRs, can obtain some 10,000 images during a 12-hour shift).
419. Seth Wenig, Private License Plate Scanners Amassing Vast Databases Open to
Highest Bidders, RT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.rt.com/usa/license-scanners-pri
vate-database-046/.
420. Id.
421. Dave Maass, “No Cost” License Plate Readers Are Turning Texas Police into
Mobile Debt Collectors and Data Miners, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 26,
2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-plate-readers-are-
turning-texas-police-mobile-debt-collectors-and; see also, Vigilant Products, VIGILANT
SOLUTIONS, https://vigilantsolutions.com/products (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
422. Maass, supra note 421. R
423. Id.
424. Id.
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the public where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.”425
The company further claims a First Amendment right to collect and
disseminate the information.426 Vigilant retains the right to sell the
data to anyone for commercial purposes, as well as for market re-
search purposes.427 And it retains the information “as long as it has
commercial value.”428
Like companies, individuals also can make use of the technol-
ogy. Whether in public, commercial, or private hands, the price of
the scanners is steadily falling,429 even as they are subject to few, if
any, legal limits.
As for cell site simulators, the ACLU, has documented sixty-six
agencies in two dozen states, as well as Washington, D.C., that own
and use them.430 At the federal level, the FBI; DEA; U.S. Secret Ser-
vice; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Marshals Ser-
vice; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives;
Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Army; U.S. Navy; U.S. Marine Corps;
U.S. National Guard; U.S. Special Operations Command; and Na-
tional Security Agency all own IMSI catchers.431
Network data collected by companies similarly appears to be a
growing source of government data. Seven years ago, a Sprint/
Nextel executive claimed that over the previous thirteen months,
the company had received some eight million requests from law
enforcement for location data.432 In 2012, a Congressional inquiry
found that cell phone carriers had provided subscriber information
relating to texts, locational data, and calling records, to law enforce-
ment some 1.3 million times.433
425. LPR Usage and Privacy Policy, VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://vigilantsolu-
tions.com/lpr-usage-privacy-policy (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, New Tracking Frontier: Your Li-
cense Plates, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29. 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390443995604578004723603576296.html.
430. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
431. Id.
432. Herbert, supra note 274, at 462 (citing Kevin Bankston, Surveillance R
Shocker: Sprint Received 8 Million Law Enforcement Requests for GPS Location Data in the
Past Year, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Dec. 1, 2009, 1:45 PM), http://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/surveillance-shocker-spring-received-8-million-
law).
433. David Kravets, 1.3M Cellphone Snooping Requests Yearly? It’s Time for Privacy
and Transparency Laws, WIRED (Jul. 11, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/
mobile-data-transparency/.
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As for drones, in 2014, when a rancher refused to turn over six
cows that had wandered onto his property, North Dakota law en-
forcement enlisted the aid of a DHS Predator drone to locate and
arrest him.434 Although the state prosecutor stated that it was the
first time unmanned surveillance aircraft had been used by North
Dakota, between 2010 and 2012 Customs and Border Patrol had
already flown nearly 700 surveillance missions for federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies.435
Quite apart from the federal arsenal, Grand Forks County,
North Dakota operates its own drones.436 In 2011, the Sheriff’s De-
partment began training a Small Unmanned Aircraft Unit in collab-
oration with the University of North Dakota’s John D. Odegard
School of Aerospace Sciences.437 In March 2013, the FAA explicitly
authorized the Sheriff’s Department to use drones for law enforce-
ment purposes.438 The first use of a drone during a police mission
was in May 2013.439 Two years later, North Dakota became the first
434. Joe Wolverton, II, First Man Arrested by Aid of Drone Convicted in North Da-
kota, NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/
constitution/item/17534-first-man-arrested-by-aid-of-drone-convicted-in-north-da-
kota. See also Jason Koebler, North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail in Controversial Drone-
Arrest Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2014/01/15/north-dakota-man-sentenced-to-jail-in-controversial-
drone-arrest-case; Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail,
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/
predator-drone-sends-north-dakota-man-to-jail/#37c69afd5853.
435. Peck, supra note 434; see also Jennifer Lynch, Customs & Border Protection R
Loaned Predator Drones to Other Agencies 700 Times in Three Years According to “Newly
Discovered” Records, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 4, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/newly-discovered-drone-records-show-customs-
border-protection-flew-its-predator.
436. Kelsey D. Atherton, Inside One of the FAA’s New Drone Test Sites, POPULAR
SCIENCE (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/inside-one-
faas-new-drone-test-sites. In November 2012, the FAA issued Grand Forks county
(North Dakota) Sheriff’s Department a Certificate of Authorization, permitting
the operation of a Draganflyer X6 small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) in 16
counties in northeastern North Dakota. Press Release, Grand Forks County Sher-
iff’s Department, Small Unmanned Aircraft System (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.
draganfly.com/pdf/Grand%20Forks%20County%20-%20Press%20Release.pdf
(explaining that the drone has six rotors, weighs less than three pounds, and
streams real-time video to ground station and takes high-definition digital still
images).
437. See Press Release, supra note 436. R
438. See Atherton, supra note 436. R
439. Id.
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state to legalize the use of armed drones, pairing surveillance con-
cerns with non-lethal force.440
The number of police departments using drones continues to
expand.441 By 2015, some two dozen had been fully equipped in
their use, with sixty more requesting FAA certification.442 Only
fourteen states require a warrant prior to law enforcement using
drones for surveillance.443
The second observation to be made is that the insight provided
by such data into individuals’ private lives is profound. Locational
tracking shows where you go, what you do, and who you are with
when you do so.444 It can reveal an individual’s identity,445 race,446
440. H.R. 1328, 64th Leg. (N.D. 2015) at § 5(1) (only prohibiting the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles “armed with any lethal weapons”); see also Henry Austin,
North Dakota Becomes First U.S. State to Legalize Use of Armed Drones by Police, INDEPEN-
DENT (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
north-dakota-becomes-first-us-state-to-legalise-use-of-armed-drones-by-police-1049
2397.html; Justin Glawe, First State Legalizes Taser Drones for Cops, Thanks to a Lobbyist,
THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/
08/26/first-state-legalizes-armed-drones-for-cops-thanks-to-a-lobbyist.html.
441. Not only do police departments operate their own devices, but private
drone footage has also been used in arrests. See, e.g., Jordan Pearson, Meet the ‘Drone
Vigilante’ Who Spies on Sex Workers, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 4, 2016), http://mother
board.vice.com/read/drone-vigilante-brian-bates-johntv-oklahoma-spies-on-sex-
workers?trk_source=popular.
442. Veronique Dupont, Drone Policing in U.S. Seen as “Wild West,” YAHOO!
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/drone-policing-us-seen-wild-
west-215907770.html; Anthea Mitchell, Should America Be Worried About Police
Drones?, THE CHEATSHEET (May 15, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/
are-police-drones-a-privacy-nightmare-or-a-safety-advantage.html/?a=viewall; see
also 2011-2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, obtained via FOIA request,
available at https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants.
443. Kaveh Waddell, Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use Drones, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/
few-privacy-limitations-exist-on-how-police-use-drones/458583/.
444. See generally Andrew J. Blumberg & Peter Eckersley, On Locational Privacy,
and How to Avoid Losing it Forever, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 1–2 (Aug.
2009), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-locational-privacy.pdf (discussing how systems
have “strip[ped] away” locational privacy by allowing other people to find out per-
sonal information by “consulting location databases”).
445. A. Cecaj, M. Mamei & N. Bicocchi, The Third IEEE International Work-
shop on the Impact of Human Mobility in Pervasive Systems and Applications, Re-
Identification of Anonymized CDR Datasets Using Social Network Data, 237–42 (2014); S.
Ji, W. Li, M. Srivatsa, J. S. He, & R. Beyah, Structure Based Data De-Anonymization of
Social Networks and Mobility Traces, INFORMATION SECURITY 237, 237–54 (2014); A.
Cecaj, M. Mamei & F. Zambonelli, Re-Identification and Information Fusion Between
Anonymized CDR and Social Network Data, J. AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE & HUMANIZED
COMPUTING 83, 83 (Jul. 14, 2015); Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, et al., Unique in the
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gender,447 age,448 marital status,449 religious beliefs, medical condi-
tions, occupation,450 and intimate relationships.451 It records hob-
bies and predilections. And it can be used to predict where an
individual is likely to be and what an individual is likely to do—and
with whom—in the future.452 In 2011, the Information Systems Au-
dit and Control Association (ISACA), a non-profit, multi-national
trade organization, noted “a growing consensus that geolocation
data should be classified as sensitive.”453 The organization evinced
concern that “current law does not articulate a stance on the pri-
vacy and security aspect of geolocation.”454 More recently, a team of
researchers from Louvain University in Belgium, and Harvard and
MIT in the United States, warned that “Given the amount of infor-
mation that can be inferred from mobility data, as well as the poten-
tially large number of . . . mobility datasets available,” significant
implications for privacy are on the line.455
Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility, NATURE (Mar. 25, 2013),  http://
www.nature.com/articles/srep01376.
446. Christopher J. Riederer, Sebastian Zimmeck, Coralie Phanord, Augustin
Chaintreau & Steven M. Bellovin, “I Don’t Have a Photograph, But You Can Have My
Footprints.”—Revealing the Demographics of Location Data, COSN’ 15: PROC. 2015
ACM CONF. ON ONLINE SOC. NETWORKS 185, 192 (Nov. 2, 2015).
447. N. J. Yuan, W. Zhong, F. Zhang, & X. Xie, You Are Where You Go: Inferring
Demographic Attributes from Local Check-ins, WSDM ‘15: PROC. 8TH ANNUAL ACM
INT’L CONF. ON WEB SEARCH AND DATA MINING 295, 297 (2015); Sanja Brdar,
Dubravko Culibrk & Vladimir Crnojevic Demographic Attributes Prediction on the Real-
World Mobile Data, MOBILE DATA CHALLENGE WORKSHOP (2012), https://re-
search.nokia.com/files/public/mdc-final202-brdar.pdf, cited in Steven M. Bellovin,
Renee M. Hutchins, Tony Jebara & Sebastian Zimmeck, When Enough Is Enough:
Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 556,
559 & n.8 (2013–2014).
448. See Brdar et al., supra note 447. R
449. See Yuan et. al, supra note 447, at 297; see also Brdar et al., supra note 447. R
450. See Brdar et al., supra note 447. R
451. See generally E. Cho, S. A. Myers & J. Leskovec, Friendship and Mobility: User
Movement in Location-Based Social Networks, KDD ‘11: PROC. 17TH ACM SIGKDD
INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 1082 (2011) (using cell
phone data as evidence to advance understanding of the “basic laws governing
human movement and dynamics.”); David J. Crandall, et al., Inferring Social Ties
from Geographic Coincidences, 107 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 22436 (2010).
452. See Riederer, et al., supra note 446, at 192; Bellovin, et al., supra note 447, R
at 558 n.9.
453. ISACA, GEOLOCATION: RISK, ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 5, 9 (2011), http://
www.isaca.org/groups/professional-english/wireless/groupdocuments/
geolocation_wp.pdf.
454. Id.
455. See Montjoye, et al., supra note 445, at 4. R
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Third, the fact that industry itself is collecting this data has im-
plications for government access to the information. As a matter of
law, the Supreme Court in Kyllo cited the ubiquitous nature of tech-
nology as a consideration in whether individuals held a privacy in-
terest in it. Underlying the legal argument is the same approach
that marks the private/public distinction: if private corporations
have access to the information, then why should the government be
forced to close its eyes or cover its ears? And legal doctrine goes
further: since the 1970s, the decision by consumers to entrust this
data to third parties means that individuals no longer hold a privacy
right in the information (see discussion, infra Part IV).456
Fourth, to the extent that the Fourth Amendment analysis
hinges on an initial determination at the moment of collection, it
does not provide for a later interest to arise as the volume of infor-
mation expands. The basic argument, which Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) Judge Claire Eagan expressed with re-
gard to the NSA collection of telephony metadata under Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, is that zero plus zero still equals
zero.457 If there is no privacy interest at the front end, then increas-
ing the amount of time, or the volume of information, does not
bring a privacy interest into being ex nihilo.458
The problem with applying this approach to the collection of
locational data is that the private/public distinction on which it is
based fails to acknowledge the additional privacy interests entailed
in repeated observation. The value of aggregated information
changes when there is more of it.459
As the lower courts have confronted the questions raised by
these new technologies, a number have eschewed privacy considera-
tions. In 2012, for instance, the Sixth Circuit considered law en-
forcement’s use of subscriber information, cell site information,
456. See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS.
L. J. 1309, 1331 (2012) (exploring the relationship between public and private
surveillance).
457. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted Text], BR 13-109, at
9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/br13-09-primary-or-
der.pdf; see also Donohue, Bulk Metadata, supra note 6, at 867 (discussing Judge R
Eagan’s approach); DONOHUE, FUTURE, supra note 6, at 120–21. R
458. See Donohue, Bulk Metadata, supra note 6, at 867 (discussing Judge R
Eagan’s approach).
459. Bellovin et al., supra note 447, at 558–59. This approach also ignores the R
important role of limited resources in protecting privacy. Law enforcement only
has access to a certain amount of police time. Thus, the placement of a tail on a
suspect has to rise to a level of importance that would justify using the resources.
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GPS real-time location, and “ping” data to find the location of a
drug dealer.460 The Court considered Knotts as controlling.461
Judge Rogers began United States v. Skinner by stating, “When
criminals use modern technological devices to carry out criminal
acts and to reduce the possibility of detection, they can hardly com-
plain when the police take advantage of the inherent characteristics
of those very devices to catch them.”462 The drug runners had used
“pay as you go (and thus presumably more difficult to trace) cell
phones to communicate.”463 For the court, Skinner had no “reason-
able expectation of privacy in the data given off” by his phone.464
Collecting the data was akin to “trailing a defendant.”465 That it was
more efficient, or effective, did not make it unconstitutional.466 A
few other courts have come to a similar conclusion for historic cell
site data.467
Not all courts agree. Some state courts have come out on the
other side of the question, finding constitutional protections. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considers mobile phone lo-
cation data to be even more concerning than the use of GPS for
cars, because of the greater privacy interests at stake.468 The New
Jersey Supreme Court similarly has held that cell phone location
data, in particular, blurs the distinction between public and private
space.469 The Florida Supreme Court similarly considers the use of
cell site location information to constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment—thus triggering the need for
a prior warrant.470 The court warned, “the ease with which the gov-
ernment, armed with current and ever-expanding technology, can
now monitor and track our cellphones, and thus ourselves, with
minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, is just the type of
‘gradual and silent encroachment[ ]’ into the very details of our
460. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (2012).
461. Id. at 777.
462. Id. at 774.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 777.
465. Id. at 778.
466. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (pinging a
cell phone to make up for having lost visual contact with a suspect considered
outside Fourth Amendment protections because “the DEA agents could have ob-
tained the same information by following the car”).
467. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015) (en
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (mem.); In re Application for Cell Site
Data, 724 F. 3d 600, 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
468. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E. 3d 846, 861–62 (Mass. 2014).
469. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013).
470. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014).
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lives that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.”471 Other
courts have taken a similar approach for historic cell site data472 as
well as live tracking.473
In sum, despite Katz’s recognition that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places, the doctrine has doggedly held on to
the property assumptions that marked Olmstead. The Supreme
Court continues to rely on the curtilage of the home, and the oper-
ation of the senses as the litmus test for whether new technologies
trigger Fourth Amendment interests at the outset—placing further
privacy claims beyond constitutional reach. The Court’s logic is that
when an individual leaves the protections of the home, anything
one says or does can be seen and heard by others. Law enforcement
officers, in turn, should not be forced to close their eyes or to cover
their ears. They have a right to be in public, and to observe what
others witness.
That may be true as far as walking down the street on a particu-
lar occasion. But for all such movements to be observed, recorded,
and analyzed, another individual would have to follow us around
twenty-four hours a day, for days, even months or years on end.
There are two problems with this claim.
First, what one person could observe at a particular moment
can be considered qualitatively different from what one person
could observe at all times. There is a distinction to be drawn here
between single observation and multiple incident observations.
When driving down the street, for instance, it is not just unlikely,
but virtually impossible for a bystander to track all of our move-
ments in a car.474 Another person also could be in a car, tailing us,
but as most people who have had to follow a friend just to get to
one destination could attest, even on a limited basis, when both
drivers know that that is the pre-arranged plan and are trying to do it,
471. Id. at 522 (quoting James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Con-
vention on Control of the Military (June 16, 1788)); see also Brief for Electronic
Frontier Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at
19–20, United States v. Patrick, No. 15-2443 (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2016).
472. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2015),
reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application for Tel. Info.
Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 2015 WL 4594558 at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015),
appeal dismissed, No. 15-16760 (9th Cir. 2016).
473. See, e.g., United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 622–23 (E.D. Mich.
2014); United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 793 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
474. See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically
Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 548 (2005)
(“[M]ost drivers would not think they were conveying their entire driving route to
bystanders.”).
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tailing can be difficult to put into execution. Lights change. The
second car may miss the light. If the first car does not pull over to
wait, it can be difficult for the second car to catch them. One car
may need to stop at a train junction, or when a school bus stops to
let off children. An emergency vehicle may block the road, or a
pedestrian may enter a crosswalk. Other cars may cut between the
two vehicles, making it difficult to see the lead car. This may cause
the second car to miss a turn. One car may have car trouble and
have to pull over. Myriad hindrances may arise—even while follow-
ing one car, for a limited time, to get to one destination. Multiply
these factors for every destination over an indefinite period, and
the sheer unlikelihood of successfully observing every moment be-
comes clear. No bystander could collect this kind of information.
Second, no one reasonably expects that another person would
engage in such behavior. To the contrary, if someone did attempt
to monitor one’s every move, many people would regard it as not
just unacceptable but downright creepy. This is why we have tempo-
rary restraining orders.475 They are used to prevent others from in-
vading our private lives—even if their actions are limited to
tracking our every move in the public domain.
2. Recording and Analysis: Informants and the First Amendment
New technologies allow not just for public tracking, but also
for the recording and analysis of the data. These are two separate
steps. Yet neither operation triggers protections under the Fourth
Amendment—even though the act of recording allows for more in-
formation to be obtained, which, when analyzed, yields yet deeper
insight into an individual’s life.
a. Recording of Data
In United States v. Caceres, another case from the 1970s, the Su-
preme Court considered whether the secret recording of a private
conversation by someone privy to the communication qualified as a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.476 It con-
475. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006) (to obtain a temporary restraining order
under federal law, an individual must, inter alia, demonstrate the other person’s
intent to “harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or
intimidate another person”); Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs), AM. Bar
ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Mar. 2014) (listing all state TRO
laws, also known as civil protection orders, civil harassment restraining orders, or
stalking protective orders), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/domestic_violence1/Resources/statutorysummarycharts/2014%20
CPO%20Availability%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
476. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
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cluded that it did not: “Neither the Constitution nor any Act of
Congress requires that official approval be secured before conversa-
tions are overheard or recorded by Government agents with the
consent of one of the conversants.”477 The information merely re-
produced what the agent could have written down, so no further
privacy interest was implicated.
In its ruling, the Court relied on a series of cases, in which the
Court had considered whether the recording of the information
altered the quality of the privacy intrusion and concluded that it
had not.
The first case in the series was the 1952 case of On Lee v. United
States, in which an undercover agent, wired with a microphone, was
sent into the suspect’s laundromat to obtain incriminating evi-
dence.478 An agent from the Bureau of Narcotics, who listened to
the conversations inside the laundromat from a remote location,
later testified at trial.479 Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Jack-
son suggested that by allowing the agent onto his premises, and
divulging incriminating information, On Lee had consented to law
enforcement access to the information.480
Just over a decade later, the Court considered a similar fact
pattern in Lopez v. United States.481 This time, an agent from the
Internal Revenue Service wore a recording device.482 The Court re-
jected the argument that the defendant had a “constitutional right
to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the
agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence
that is not susceptible of impeachment.”483 To the contrary, “the
risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe . . . fairly included the
risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court,
whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”484 The de-
vice had not intercepted new information.485 It had just allowed for
the information that was conveyed to the informer to be relayed
more accurately in court.
The pattern continued. In Hoffa v. United States, the Supreme
Court determined that a government informant relaying conversa-
477. Id. at 744.
478. 343 U.S. 967, 969 (1952).
479. Id. at 970.
480. Id. at 971.
481. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
482. Id. at 430.
483. Id. at 439.
484. Id.
485. Id.
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tions to federal law enforcement agents did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, on the grounds that Jimmy Hoffa invited the inform-
ant into the room.486 In Lewis v. United States, the Court again ruled
the evidence admissible on the grounds that the defendant had in-
vited the undercover agent into his home on numerous occa-
sions.487 These cases emphasized the voluntariness of the person
confiding information in another person.
The informant cases also came down on the side of encourag-
ing, rather than discouraging, the collection of more accurate infor-
mation. That it was done with the aid of technology, and not via
ordinary recall using human capacities, mattered little. In the
Court’s view, it was not different information that was being ob-
tained, but simply information that more closely reflected what ac-
tually occurred. If it could be heard in the first place, then whether
or not the brain had the ability to recall such detailed information
was of little or no consequence.
Katz did little to alter the Court’s view of the recording of in-
formation. Justice White cited the informant cases in his concur-
rence, stating (in dicta) that they had been “undisturbed” by the
Court’s ruling.488
Subsequent cases substantiated Justice White’s claim. In 1971,
in United States v. White, law enforcement officers recorded conver-
sations between an informer and a suspect.489 When the informer
could not be located for the trial, the prosecution substituted the
electronic recording.490 The Court found no Fourth Amendment
issue: “[A] police agent who conceals his police connections may
write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and
testify concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his en-
counters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the lat-
ter’s Fourth Amendment rights.”491
For the Supreme Court, there was no difference among an in-
former (a) writing down his recollections of the conversation, (b)
recording the conversation with equipment secreted on his person,
or (c) carrying equipment that transmitted the conversation to law
enforcement officers or to recording devices.492 The Court ex-
486. 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
487. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966).
488. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 n.** (1967) (White, J.,
concurring).
489. 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971) (plurality opinion).
490. Id.
491. Id. at 751 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300–03 (1966)).
492. Id.
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plained, “If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating with-
out electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s
constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a si-
multaneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent
or by others from transmissions.”493 In undertaking criminal enter-
prises, one of the risks is that those with whom one deals are un-
trustworthy. While the informer’s unavailability at trial might raise
evidentiary problems or introduce potential questions of
prosecutorial misconduct, it was immaterial as to whether the re-
cording itself invaded the target’s Fourth Amendment rights.494
There was no appreciable difference between someone witnessing
something happen and later recording it, and documenting what
was said real-time, by, or with the consent of, individuals privy to the
conversation.
Translated into private/public space doctrine, the potential for
the government to record activity would fall outside the confines of
the Fourth Amendment. What a police officer—or, indeed, any citi-
zen—could witness in public would incur no further intrusion into
an individual’s privacy if the officer—or citizen—recorded it as it
was happening.
In 1972, the Court confronted a similar private/public scena-
rio and, in the context of the First Amendment, adopted a parallel
approach. It was an era of civil unrest. The Department of the Army
was called upon to assist local authorities in Detroit. Protesters
brought a class action suit in District Court, seeking relief for their
claim that the military’s surveillance of lawful political activity un-
dermined their First Amendment rights.495 The data-gathering sys-
tem used by the military placed the Army in a law enforcement role.
Just as the Court in the Fourth Amendment cases looked to the
ability of ordinary citizens to access the same data as a metric for
the scope of government power, so, too, did the Appellate Court
and, later, the Supreme Court, look to ordinary police powers to
assess what access to information should be provided to the mili-
tary. The Court of Appeals explained, “To quell disturbances or to
prevent further disturbances, the Army needs the same tools and,
most importantly, the same information to which local police have
493. Id.
494. White, 401 U.S. at 754.
495. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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access.” Indeed, it may have even greater need than the local po-
lice, since they may be unfamiliar with the local population.496
The Army discharged its mission by collecting information
about public meetings. It came from various sources:
[T]he principal sources of information were the news media
and publications in general circulation. Some of the informa-
tion came from Army Intelligence agents who attended meet-
ings that were open to the public and who wrote field reports
describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the
sponsoring organization, the identity of speakers, the approxi-
mate number of persons in attendance, and an indication of
whether any disorder occurred.497
Other information was derived from local police and other ci-
vilian law enforcement agencies.498
The Supreme Court considered—and rejected—the proposi-
tion that recording public meetings had any First Amendment chil-
ling effect. To the contrary, the burden lay on those who attended
the meetings to demonstrate the danger of direct injury.499
White dealt with taking notes from a recorded conversation.500
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed video recordings or pho-
tographs. But two lower decisions have.
The first was the 1975 case of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Relig-
ious Society of Friends v. Tate.501 The Philadelphia Police Department
had amassed files on about 18,000 people and organizations, in-
cluding information about their political views, personal associa-
tions, personal lives, and habits. In June 1970, officers publicly
announced the names of some of the individuals who had been
placed under surveillance. People involved brought suit, asserting
that the practice of collecting information on citizens lacked any
nexus to legitimate police purposes and deprived them of their
right to anonymity with regard to their political activities and as-
sociations. The plaintiffs argued that the collection chilled their
free exercise of speech and assembly and interfered with their abil-
496. Id. at 5 (“Since the Army is sent into territory almost invariably unfamil-
iar to most soldiers and their commanders, their need for information is likely to
be greater than that of the hometown policeman.”).
497. Id. at 6.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 14–15.
500. 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971) (plurality opinion).
501. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335,
1336–37 (1974).
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ity to form lawful political associations that represented unpopular
views.502
The District Court disagreed. Consistent with Laird v. Tatum,
the fact that the police were engaged in an investigation did not
chill the citizens’ right to free speech.503 The Court of Appeals re-
versed in part and affirmed in part, finding no additional Fourth
Amendment interest.504 “[M]ere police photographing and data
gathering at public meetings” did not create any constitutional
questions—nor did sharing it with other agencies with law enforce-
ment interests.505 Where the department went outside acceptable
bounds was by going on national television and informing the pub-
lic who they had under surveillance.506
This decision reflected the private/public distinction, and it ac-
cepted that the recording of the information itself did not change
the quality of its collection as a matter of constitutional law. What is
odd about the case is that the distinction it drew—namely with
whom the information was shared—was determined after collection.
It sidestepped whether the recording of the data in the first place
qualified as a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
In the 1970s, the Fourth Circuit considered the potential First
Amendment violation by law enforcement taking pictures at public
meetings and demonstrations.507 It was common practice at the
time for police to photograph vigils, demonstrations, protests, and
political meetings, regardless of whether they were peaceful or
threatened violent behavior.508 Judge Donald Russell, writing for
the Court, determined that there had not been any constitutional
intrusion.509 He discounted any feeling of intimidation, citing to
Laird v. Tatum, to claim that simply knowing one was under surveil-
502. Id. at 1337.
503. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 382 F.Supp.
547, 549 (1974); 408 U.S. 14 (Burger, J.), (noting that a broad-scale investigation
was underway).
504. Tate, 519 F.2d at 1339.
505. Id. at 1337–38.
506. Id. at 1339 (“It cannot be doubted that disclosure on nationwide televi-
sion that certain named persons or organizations are subjects of police intelligence
files has a potential for a substantial adverse impact on such persons and organiza-
tions even though tangible evidence of the impact may be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to obtain.”).
507. Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1972).
508. Id. at 197–98.
509. Id. at 199.
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lance was not sufficient to find a chilling effect.510 The court was
skeptical that those attending the rally really did feel intimidated by
the presence of the cameras: “They did not object to being photo-
graphed; to the contrary, they solicited publicity both for their
meetings and for themselves by inviting representatives of the news
media, including photographers, to be present.”511 By holding a
public meeting, in a public space, where ordinary citizens and news
outlets would see and hear what was being said, the targets of the
surveillance relinquished their right to prevent the government
from recording what whey said and did.
In his dissent, Judge Winter distinguished the case from Tatum,
noting that a number of individuals were photographed “without
their permission and inferably against their will, while they were
engaged in the peaceful exercise of their First Amendment right to
assemble and [in some cases] to petition their government for a
redress of their grievances.”512 In Tatum there was only knowledge
of the surveillance program; in contrast, “here there was actual ex-
posure to the challenged police methods.”513 That, in itself, pro-
vided “proof that actual harm and an actual violation of rights had
occurred.”514
The Chief of Police in Richmond, Virginia, and those who re-
ported to him, decided which meetings to attend to identify lead-
ers, to track people who may be travelling between meetings to stir
up trouble, to deter violence and vandalism, and to protect peace-
ful demonstrators from counterdemonstrations.515 Judge Winter
was not persuaded that these objectives were furthered by the prac-
tice of photographing all attendees, or that the same objective
could not be accomplished by means that did not interfere with
otherwise protected First Amendment activities.516 Law enforce-
ment already knew who the leaders were, which made the efforts to
intimidate the entire crowd concerning. He rejected the possibility
that the police would use the photographs to identify unknown
people.517
510. Id. at 201.
511. Id. at 200.
512. Id. at 204 (Winter, J., dissenting).
513. Donohoe, 465 F.2d at 205.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 206.
516. Id. at 207.
517. Id. at 206 (“I cannot suppose that every time a picture is taken of an
unknown person it is sent to the FBI in order to determine whether that person is
dangerous.”).
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Judge Winter’s words appear almost quaint in an age of
drones, big data, and biometric identification. In June 2015, the
Associated Press reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was using low-flying planes carrying video and cellphone de-
vices.518 Over a thirty-day period, the FBI flew the planes over more
than thirty cities in eleven states across the country.519 Using a
quadcopter fitted with cameras, facial recognition technologies,
and social media, it is conceivable that most people in a crowd
could be instantaneously identified. Yet, under the current doc-
trine, even if a chilling effect might result, it might well be insuffi-
cient to prevent law enforcement from collecting the information.
In the words of Justice Black in 1971:
Where a statute [or police practice] does not directly abridge
free speech, but – while regulating a subject within the State’s
power—tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First
Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute [or police
practice] can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in rela-
tion to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of
alternative means for doing so.520
The recording of the information enhances the information be-
yond normal senses, or even the human brain. The data, moreover,
can be combined with other input to construct detailed pictures of
individuals’ lives.
Far from appreciating the privacy interests entailed, the courts
are refusing to acknowledge the considerable interests at stake.521
In February 2016, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a
case in which law enforcement placed a suspect’s home under sur-
veillance for two and a half months.522 In 2012, the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had received a tip
from the local sheriff in Tennessee that Rocky Houston, a convicted
felon, had firearms at his residence. ATF, claiming that they were
unable to observe the farm for any length of time because their cars
“[stuck] out like a sore thumb,” installed a camera at the top of a
public utility pole overlooking his farm.523 For ten weeks, the cam-
518. Associated Press, FBI Using Low-Flying Spy Planes Over U.S., CBS NEWS
(June 2, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-fbi-using-low-flying-spy-planes-
over-us/.
519. Id.
520. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
521. But see United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 F. App’x 396 (6th Cir.
2012) (expressing “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term war-
rantless surveillance of a backyard via a camera mounted on a pole).
522. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2016).
523. Id. at 286.
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era broadcast its recordings via an encrypted signal to an IP address
accessed with a login and password.524 At trial, ATF showed footage
of Houston holding firearms seven times during the ten week
period.525
The Court dismissed the possibility that any constitutional in-
terest was at stake:
There is no Fourth Amendment violation, because Houston
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage re-
corded by a camera that was located on top of a public utility
pole that captured the same views enjoyed by passersby on pub-
lic roads. The ATF agents only observed what Houston made
public to any person traveling on the roads surrounding the
farm.526
The length of the surveillance had no effect, “because the Fourth
Amendment does not punish law enforcement for using technology
to more efficiently conduct their investigations.”527 That technology
made it easier and cheaper to track people for a longer time was of
no consequence. “While the ATF agents could have stationed
agents round-the-clock to observe Houston’s farm in person, the
fact that they instead used a camera to conduct the surveillance
does not make the surveillance unconstitutional.”528
If a member of the public could observe, with his/her naked
eye, what was happening on the farm, the fact that the same person
could observe it for weeks on end was unremarkable—as was the
fact that the information happened to be recorded. So why could
law enforcement not do the same? And if there was no privacy inter-
est at the outset, then the fact that the observation went on for ten
weeks at a time had little import. Zero plus zero equals zero.
This approach is disturbing in a digital age, in which the pri-
vacy interests implicated by new and emerging tracking technolo-
gies are considerable. It also sidesteps the important role that
resource limitations have previously played in protecting citizens’
privacy. Regardless of who is watching, ten weeks of surveillance im-
plicates a range of privacy interests. As more information can be
obtained from public space about the actions of individuals, incur-
sions into the privacy sphere become deeper. The failure of Fourth
Amendment doctrine lies in its inability to stem the steady constric-
tion of the right to privacy based on the private/public distinction.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 286–88.
527. Id. at 288.
528. Houston, 813 F.3d at 288.
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IV.
PERSONAL INFORMATION VERSUS THIRD-PARTY
DATA
A second distinction in Fourth Amendment doctrine centers
on the difference between private information and data entrusted
to others. So-called “third-party doctrine” finds its origins in the in-
former cases, where the Court consistently held that information
entrusted to others became divested of any privacy interest.
As aforementioned, in his concurrence in Katz, Justice White
cited to On Lee, Hoffa, and Lopez in support of the proposition that
what is exposed to other people implies an assumption of risk that
the individual in whom one confides will make public what he has
been told. As the Fourth Amendment does not protect against un-
reliable associates, “[i]t is but a logical and reasonable extension of
this principle that a man take the risk that his hearer, free to memo-
rize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead record-
ing it or transmitting it to another.”529 White distinguished the
informer cases from Katz, noting that in the case of the gambler, he
had “‘sought to exclude . . . the uninvited ear,’ and spoke under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would assume that un-
invited ears were not listening.”530
While White’s concurrence sought to preserve the informer
doctrine, it also laid the groundwork for third-party doctrine, which
came to fruition in cases from the 1970s. Miller v. United States531
and Smith v. Maryland,532 and their progeny, stand for the proposi-
tion that while an individual may have an interest in information in
her possession, as soon as it is conveyed to a third party, it no longer
enjoys the same protections under the Fourth Amendment.
The concept of secrecy lies at the heart of the doctrine: what
one keeps secret is private, while what one voluntarily exposes to
others is no longer so. Relatedly, the most trenchant criticism of the
private information/third-party data distinction revolves around
the claim of voluntariness. In the contemporary world, it is impossi-
ble to live one’s daily life without entrusting a significant amount of
information to third parties.533 To say that we therefore voluntarily
529. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 n.** (1967) (White, J.,
concurring).
530. Id. (quoting id. at 351 (majority opinion)).
531. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1976).
532. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
533. See Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age
of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH.
153, 154 (2011) (arguing that citizens are increasingly dependent on third party
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assume the risk that such information will be made public denies
the role that technology plays. This phenomenon can be thought of
as “digital dependence.”
A. Information Entrusted to Others
In 1976, the Court took up a critical question raised by Katz,
which was whether the terrestrial distinction drawn at the border of
the home would break down with regard to information held by a
bank. In Miller v. United States, ATF suspected that Mitch Miller had
failed to pay a liquor tax on whiskey and distilling equipment in his
possession.534 ATF agents served subpoenas on the Citizens and
Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron
to obtain Miller’s financial records.535 The banks subsequently pro-
vided all checks, deposit slips, financial statements, and monthly
statements for grand jury deliberations.536
Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the Court, cited back
to Hoffa in support of the idea that an actual intrusion into a private
sphere had to occur for a Fourth Amendment interest to be impli-
cated.537 He rejected any privacy interest in the records on the
grounds that “checks are not confidential communications but ne-
gotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”538
Powell underscored the voluntary nature of the relationship be-
tween Miller and the bank: “All of the documents obtained, includ-
ing financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business.”539 Referencing the informer
cases, Powell asserted, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that per-
son to the Government.”540 He concluded, “Since no Fourth
Amendment interests of the depositor are implicated here, this case
is governed by the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a
third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the
service providers for their daily lives and suggesting that companies, in turn, are
becoming increasingly intermingled with government agencies); Brenner, supra
note 78, at 52–59 (underscoring the danger of failing to recognize any privacy R
interest in the rapidly expanding amount of information entrusted to third
parties).
534. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
535. Id. at 437.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 440.
538. Id. at 442.
539. Id.
540. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing White, Lopez, and Hoffa).
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rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is contem-
plated at the time the subpoena is issued.”541
Justice Brennan strenuously objected to the Court’s decision.
He noted that the Supreme Court of California, which had a clause
virtually in haec verba as the Fourth Amendment, had come to pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion. In Burrows v. Superior Court, a bank
had voluntarily turned over an accused’s financial records to the
government.542 The California Supreme Court had determined
that individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
bank records, and Brennan agreed: “That the bank alters the form
in which it records the information transmitted to it by the deposi-
tor to show the receipt and disbursement of money on a bank state-
ment does not diminish the depositor’s anticipation of privacy in
matters which he confides to the bank.”543 The reasonable expecta-
tion was that, absent compulsion via legal process, whatever a cus-
tomer reveals to a bank would only be used for internal banking
purposes.544 For the Supreme Court of California, whether or not a
bank voluntarily turned its customer’s records over to the police was
irrelevant. Brennan agreed.
Justice Marshall also dissented in Miller, arguing, like Brennan,
that the Bank Secrecy Act, which required banks to maintain cus-
tomers’ records, was unconstitutional on its face.545 He also pointed
out an apparent irony: while the majority in California Bankers Asso-
ciation v. Shultz had deemed the Fourth Amendment claims to be
too premature to challenge the mandatory recordkeeping provi-
sions in the statute, the Court now concluded that once the banks
had been forced to keep customer records, any effort by the cus-
tomer to assert a Fourth Amendment interest was too late.546
Three years later, the Court again considered third-party infor-
mation in Smith v. Maryland.547 In that case, Patricia McDonough
had been robbed.548 She provided a description of a 1975 Monte
541. Id. at 444.
542. Id. at 447–48 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Burrows v. Superior Court,
529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974)).
543. Id. at 448–49.
544. Id. at 449.
545. Id. at 455–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
546. Miller, 425 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting California
Bankers Ass’n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 97 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
547. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); see also DONOHUE, FU-
TURE, supra note 6, at 119–21; Donohue, Bulk Metadata, supra note 6, at 868–69 R
(summarizing Smith).
548. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
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Carlo parked at the scene of the crime to the police.549 When she
returned home, a man telephoned her repeatedly, identifying him-
self as the person who had robbed her, and threatening her.550 At
one point, he directed that she come out onto her porch, where
she saw the Monte Carlo drive slowly past her home.551 McDon-
ough telephoned the police, who saw the vehicle and ran the plates,
determining that it belonged to Michael Lee Smith.552 They ap-
proached the telephone company and asked if it would be possible
to put a pen register and trap and trace device on Smith’s tele-
phone line to see whether he was the person calling McDon-
ough.553 The telephone company agreed.554 Within hours, Smith
again telephoned McDonough. The police used the information to
obtain a search warrant of Smith’s home which, when executed,
yielded a phone book, with a page turned down to McDonough’s
name.555
Citing New York Telephone Company,556 the Court noted that the
collection of the numbers dialed from the landline had not inter-
cepted any content.557 “Given a pen register’s limited capabilities,
therefore,” Justice Blackmun wrote, the argument that the installa-
tion and use of a pen register constituted a search rested upon
whether petitioner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
numbers dialed from his phone.558 The Court determined that he
did not.559
For the Court, telephone subscribers knew, when dialing, that
they were conveying the numbers to the company, since the infor-
mation was required to connect the call.560 They further realized
that the company would make records of the numbers dialed.561
This is what allowed customers to be billed for long-distance
calls.562 Similarly, even if most people were oblivious as to how tele-
phone companies operated, they would nevertheless have some
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
555. Id.
556. See discussion, infra.
557. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
558. Id. at 742.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id.
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awareness that a pen register might be employed to identify individ-
uals “making annoying or obscene calls.”563 The site of the call—in
this case, inside the home—was immaterial:
Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was
not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy
of the number he dialed. Regardless of his location, petitioner
had to convey that number to the telephone company in pre-
cisely the same way if he wished to complete his call.564
Even if the petitioner did have an expectation of privacy, the
Court determined that he did not have one that society was willing
to recognize as reasonable. Citing to Miller, as well as a string of
informer cases (Lopez, Hoffa, and White), Justice Blackmun noted
that the Court had consistently “held that a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.”565
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, as did Jus-
tice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan.566 Stewart began by noting
that in the years that had elapsed since Katz, telephones had be-
come even more embedded in contemporary culture.567 The fact
that the telephone company used the numbers dialed for billing
purposes said nothing about the underlying privacy interests. To
place a call, individuals had to contract with the company. Yet the
Court had recognized a privacy interest in the conversation con-
ducted over the wires—even though the telephone company had
the capacity to record it. Just because individuals also confided the
number dialed to the telephone company, it did not follow that
they necessarily had no interest in the information.568 “I think,”
Stewart wrote, “that the numbers dialed from a private telephone—
like the conversations that occur during a call—are within the con-
stitutional protection recognized in Katz.”569 The numbers might
be more prosaic than the actual conversation, but they were “not
without ‘content.’”570 They could reveal the identities of those with
563. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
564. Id. at 743.
565. Id. at 743–44.
566. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
567. Id., 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
568. Id. at 746–47.
569. Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
570. Id. at 748.
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whom an individual was in contact, divulging “the most intimate
details of a person’s life.”571
Justice Marshall, in turn, attacked the Court’s surmise that sub-
scribers have no subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed. Even assuming that they know that the company may moni-
tor communications for internal reasons, it did not follow that they
expected the company to turn the numbers dialed over to the pub-
lic or to the government. “Privacy,” he wrote, “is not a discrete com-
modity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose
certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes.”572
Marshall raised further concerns that the Court’s holding
meant that those who contract with third parties assume the risk
that the third party might disclose the information to the govern-
ment. He laid forth two objections. First, “[i]mplicit in the concept
of assumption of risk is some notion of choice.”573 In the informant
cases, this was how the Court had considered the information later
related during court proceedings. But in the case of a pen register,
“unless a person is prepared to forego use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance.”574 It made no sense to talk about
“assuming the risk,” as if it were a choice, when, in order to live in
the contemporary world, one in effect had no choice but to use a
telephone.
Marshall’s second objection was that risk analysis was an inap-
propriate tool. It allowed the government to set the contours of the
Fourth Amendment. Under the Court’s logic, “law enforcement of-
ficials, simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of
random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations,
could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter
assume in such communications.”575 The question ought not to be
what risks an individual presumably accepts by providing informa-
tion to third parties, but what risks an individual “should be forced
to assume in a free and open society.”576
571. Id.
572. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing his own dissent in California
Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95–96 (1974)).
573. Id.
574. Id. at 750.
575. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
576. Id.
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Marshall’s words proved prescient. He noted that the use of
pen registers constituted “an extensive intrusion. To hold otherwise
ignores the vital role telephonic communication plays in our per-
sonal and professional relationships.”577 Marshall’s words hear-
kened back to the majority in Katz, which had acknowledged the
“vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication[s].”578 Increasing dependence on the telephone
meant that Fourth Amendment protections needed to come into
play. For Marshall, the privacy rights of all citizens were at stake:
“The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will un-
doubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to
hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political
organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legiti-
mately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.”579 The
costs of allowing the government access to such data are borne in
freedom of association and freedom of the press—both hallmarks
“of a truly free society.”580 The government, moreover, was prone to
abuse such powers: “Particularly given the Government’s previous
reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace reporters’
sources and monitor protected political activity, I am unwilling to
insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial review.”581
B. Digital Dependence
In an era of increasing digital dependence, the arguments that
Justices Stewart and Marshall put forth in Smith v. Maryland have
become even more poignant.582 To say that every time individuals
577. Id. at 751.
578. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
579. Smith, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
580. Id.
581. Id. (footnote omitted). Following Miller and Smith, Congress passed two
pieces of legislation that sought to create greater protections of privacy. See gener-
ally 12 U.S.C. §3401 (2013); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA), Pub L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 (1986)). Further legislation has focused on cable subscriber and video store
customer privacy. See, e.g., Cable Communications Privacy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.
§ 551 (2006); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 USC § 2710. But these mea-
sures only provide limited protections—and they have quickly become obsolete.
ECPA, for instance, does not apply to the transmission of video. And stored con-
tent is only protected for six months.
582. Some scholars have argued, for similar reasons, for limits on subpoena
powers. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 279, 309–10 (2005) (suggesting that “[t]he increase in the amount
and importance of information stored with third parties in a network environment
creates the need for new limits on the subpoena power,” and arguing that “new
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use their mobile phone they assume the risk that their data will be
turned over to the government implies that people have no privacy
interest in their communications, regardless of their substance and
any effort to keep the information confidential.583 But unlike the
informer cases, where one has the capacity to mediate one’s inti-
mate relations, there is no meaningful choice in today’s world as to
whether or not a digital footprint is created as we go about our daily
lives. Every time we make a call, drive our car, send an email, con-
duct an online search, or even walk down the street carrying a mo-
bile device, we leave a trail.
For more than a decade, scholars have written about the
changing world in which we live, raising the alarm that our increas-
ing digital dependence is leading to a loss of privacy.584 Neverthe-
less, the judiciary has failed to provide a backstop on the steadily
diminishing zone of privacy that results from third party doc-
trine.585 The Court’s view, however, may be evolving.
In United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested in her con-
currence that in light of the deep privacy interests implicated by
data entrusted to third parties, she might jettison third party doc-
rules should respond to the new privacy threats raised by third-party possession of
private information made commonplace by computer networks and the
Internet”).
583. See Brenner, supra note 78, at 68 (“[T]he ‘assumption of risk’ calculus is R
an unreasonable methodology for a non-spatial world. It assumes . . . that I have a
choice: to reveal information by leaving it unprotected or to shield it from ‘public’
view. In the real, physical world, these options make sense . . . . But how can I do
this in a world of pervasive technology, a world in which I am necessarily sur-
rounded by devices that collect data and share it with external entities?”).
584. See e.g., Patricia L. Belia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for
Stored E-Email, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 123–24 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084
(2002); see also Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Com-
munications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 619 (2011); Christopher R. Orr, Note, Your Digital
Leash: The Interaction Between Cell Phone-Based GPS Technology and Privacy Rights in
United States v. Skinner, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 377, 377–78 (2014); see generally Bag-
ley, supra note 534; Bellovin et al., supra note 447 at 559, n.8; Marc Jonathan Blitz, R
The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches
in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 26 (2013); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveil-
lance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that
Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2004); Brenner, supra note
78; Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. R
83, 83 (2006).
585. Lower courts continue to hold the doctrinal line. See, e.g., United States
v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012).
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 52 Side B      04/17/2017   15:12:38
38853-nys_71-4 Sheet No. 52 Side B      04/17/2017   15:12:38
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYS\71-4\NYS401.txt unknown Seq: 96 17-APR-17 14:27
648 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 71:553
trine altogether.586 As aforementioned, in Jones, law enforcement
had placed a GPS chip on a car without a warrant and tracked it for
twenty-eight days.587 Although the Court ruled on grounds of tres-
pass, Sotomayor raised concern about the extent to which surveil-
lance techniques that did not require physical intrusion impacted
significant privacy interests. In light of the ubiquitous nature of dig-
ital technologies, she wrote, “it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”588 Citing to
Smith and Miller, she recognized, “[t]his approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mun-
dane tasks.”589 Sotomayor explained:
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to
their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they
purchase to online retailers.590
Warrantless disclosures of, for instance, every web site visited
over the past year surely held an implication for individual privacy.
“[W]hatever the societal expectations,” Sotomayor contemplated,
“they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite
for privacy.”591 Not to put the point too bluntly, “I would not as-
sume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled
to Fourth Amendment protection.”592
586. This view has been supported by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Dono-
hue, supra note 6, at 12; Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment R
Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 211,
265 (2006). Others favor setting limits to keep it within the confines of the prevail-
ing conditions in Miller and Smith. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law
Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1407 (2004); Susan Freiwald,
First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 ¶ 41 (2007);
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557,
1578 (2004). Other scholars note that even if we jettison third party doctrine, sig-
nificant difficulties remain. See generally Ohm, supra note 456, at 1330–32. R
587. 132 S.Ct. at 948 (Scalia, J.).
588. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id.
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The Supreme Court’s continued emphasis on voluntary disclo-
sure, and not on the government’s requirement that the third party
turn over the information in question, departs from the facts of
Smith with lasting implications for individual rights. In that case,
recall that the telephone company voluntarily relinquished the in-
formation to the government. Had the subscriber contracted with
the company specifically to prevent the information from being for-
warded to others, the individual would have had at least a contrac-
tually-protected right to prevent the information from being made
available. The mere evidence rule, until 1967, would have pre-
vented the forced disclosure of similar information by a warrant.
The Court has, at times, been at pains to distinguish the war-
rant process from the subpoena process. In the 1911 case of Wilson
v. United States, the Court distinguished Boyd v. United States, in
which the production “‘of the private books and papers’ of the
owner of the goods sought to be forfeited” compelled him to be a
witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment and
also amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.593 By contrast, the use of a “suitably specific
and properly limited” writ, calling “for the production of docu-
ments which, as against their lawful owner to whom the writ is di-
rected, the party procuring its issuance is entitled to have
produced.”594
It is important to recall here that the context for the subpoena
power was the actual workings of either the grand jury or the
court.595 The difference between this context, and an investigation
conducted by any law enforcement officer who obtains a warrant to
obtain private information about individuals, is significant, indeed.
By emphasizing the voluntariness of to whom the information is
given, instead of the compulsion then exercised by the government
on the entity providing the information, the Court misses an impor-
tant way in which individual rights would otherwise have been
guarded.
593. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 375 (1911) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35 (1886)).
594. Id. at 376.
595. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59–60 (1906) (allowing a grand jury
to proceed to issue a subpoena absent a formal charge having been entered and
relying on the oath given to the grand jury—that “you shall diligently inquire and
true presentments make of all such matters, articles, and things as shall be given to
you in charge, as of all other matters, and things as shall come to your own knowl-
edge touching this present service,” etc.—as demonstrating that “the grand jury
was competent to act solely on its own volition”).
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At the same time, Sotomayor has it right, at least insofar as
modern technology impacts the rights of individual actors.596 Indi-
viduals do have a clear privacy interest in a range of data entrusted
to corporate entities. But even where information may not appear
to entail a privacy interest at the outset, when accumulated, much
less when analyzed, possibly even in conjunction with other infor-
mation, staggering insight into individuals’ private lives may result.
V.
CONTENT VERSUS NON-CONTENT
As was discussed in Part II(B), prior to Katz, the Court deter-
mined that the contents of a letter deserved higher protection than
the address on the outside of the envelope. This general framing
(content versus non-content) gained ground after Katz. Technol-
ogy, however, is now blurring the doctrinal distinction.
On the one hand, new forms of electronic communication
(such as email, IMs, and text messages), which for all intents and
purposes ought to be considered content, do not fall within the
protections of the Fourth Amendment to the same degree that let-
ters traditionally would—despite the fact that much of the same infor-
mation is at stake.
On the other hand, data traditionally considered to be non-
content, such as pen register and trap and trace data, or envelope
information, in light of digital dependence and the growth of social
network analytics, generates a tremendous amount of information
about individuals’ relationships, beliefs, and predilections—pre-
cisely the interests that the distinction was meant to protect. The
continued reliance on the content/noncontent distinction thus
fails to capture the privacy interests at stake.
A. Electronic Communications
In Katz, the Court confronted whether an individual had a pri-
vacy interest in the contents of an individual’s communications over
596. An argument could be mounted that “secrecy” is to an organization what
“privacy” is to a natural person: namely, the right and the ability to keep individu-
als not part of the entity or privy to the relationship from knowing things. In some
sense, “secrecy” and “privacy” thus represent the same interest expressed by differ-
ent actors. Justice Sotomayor’s formulation, however, considers third party doc-
trine to stand for the proposition that “secrecy” serves “as a prerequisite for
privacy.” The author understands her point as not being to confuse the two, but
rather to suggest that the Constitutional right to individual privacy should not be
premised upon the complete bar of anyone having access to the information in
question.
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a telephone line. In extending protections to the phone booth, the
Court acknowledged the central role that telephones had come to
play in the modern era.597 Congress followed Katz with introduc-
tion of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.598
Title III laid out the rules that would henceforward govern the elec-
tronic intercepts. The law focused on the content of aural or wire
communications.
While the Court has taken steps to protect the content of tele-
phone communications, it has been slow to recognize a Fourth
Amendment interest in digital communications.599 The Supreme
Court has not held, for instance, that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail. Instead, this realm is largely
governed by statute.600 Where the e-mail is located in the chain of
communication alters how much statutory protection it receives. If
an e-mail is sitting on a server and has not yet been read, for in-
stance, it is subject to a different set of procedures than one that
has been read. Similarly, if the e-mail is actually in transit, as op-
posed to just waiting to be read (or having been read), then it re-
ceives different protections. The complex statutes further take into
account considerations such as the type of communications pro-
vider in possession of the information, and the length of time the
communication has been stored.601
What makes the Court’s failure to recognize a privacy interest
in e-mail remarkable is not only the fact that e-mail conveys a signif-
icant amount of content, but that it lies at the very heart of early
597. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); see also Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
598. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63–64 (1967) (holding the New
York wiretap law to be unconstitutional, precipitating federal legislation on the
acceptable limits of wiretap authorities).
599. But see City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762–63 (2010) (suggesting
that “a search of [someone’s] personal email account” would be as intrusive as “a
wiretap on his home phone line”).
600. Within the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Wiretap
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 governs the interception of e-mail communications en
route while the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012) regu-
lates e-mails stored by certain entities.
601. For a good discussion of the different aspects of ECPA as applied to elec-
tronic communications, see generally CLANCY, supra note 79, at § 1.5. These nuances R
run counter to the Court’s approach in Ex parte Jackson, discussed infra, in which
the mere fact that a letter had left the home did little to alter the privacy interests
entailed. An effort to amend the SCA failed in December 2012, when the Senate
removed from proposed legislation a measure that would have stopped federal law
enforcement from warrantless acquisition of e-mail. Adrian Fontecilla, The Ascen-
dance of Social Media as Evidence, 28 CRIM. JUSTICE 1, 2 (2013).
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21st century communications. By 2011, ninety percent of those us-
ing the Internet had sent or received e-mail, with half of the U.S.
population using it daily.602 E-mail has essentially replaced the pa-
per correspondence at issue in Ex parte Jackson.
In the meantime, the lower courts remain divided. Some have
come out in support of the proposition that e-mail falls within the
remit of the Fourth Amendment. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Forrester recognized that “[t]he privacy interests in
[letters sent through the post and email] are identical.”603 Two
years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals catapulted the con-
versation forward in United States v. Warshak, finding that individuals
do, indeed, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-
mail.604
Steven Warshak owned a company that sold an enormously
popular product.605 Its auto-ship program, however, failed to warn
consumers that by requesting a free sample, they were being en-
rolled in a delivery schedule from which they would have to opt out
to avoid being charged.606 As complaints mounted, a grand jury re-
turned a 112-count indictment against Warshak, ranging from mail,
wire, and bank fraud, to money laundering.607 In the course of its
investigation, the government obtained 27,000 e-mails from War-
shak’s Internet Service Providers.608 On appeal, Warshak argued
that the warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.609
The Court ultimately agreed, although it determined that, in this
case, the government had relied in good faith on the Stored Com-
munications Act, leaving the judgment undisturbed.610
In finding a Fourth Amendment interest, the Court observed,
“[E]-mail was a critical form of communication among Berkeley
602. KRISTEN PURCELL, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SEARCH AND EMAIL STILL TOP
THE LIST OF MOST POPULAR ONLINE ACTIVITIES (Aug. 9, 2011), http://pewinternet
.org/Reports/2011/Search-and-email.aspx; Matthew A. Piekarski, E-mail Content’s
Brush with the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The Warshak Decision, 47 U. LOUIS-
VILLE L. REV. 771, 795 (2009).
603. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
604. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010).
605. Id. at 276. The product, Enzyte was “purported to increase the size of a
man’s erection.” As the court noted, “[t]he product proved tremendously popular,
and business rose sharply.” By 2004, the company was making around $250 million
per year.
606. Id. at 278.
607. Id. at 278, 281.
608. Id. at 282.
609. Id.
610. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, at 282.
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personnel.”611 Warshak, in particular, expected “that his emails
would be shielded from outside scrutiny.”612 The Court continued,
“given the often sensitive and sometimes damning substance of his
e-mails, we think it highly unlikely that Warshak expected them to
be made public, for people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in
plain view.”613
The court underscored the relationship between written
materials, telephone calls, and Internet communications. The
growth of society’s dependence on e-mail had shrunk the role of
telephone calls and letters:
People are now able to send sensitive and intimate informa-
tion, instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a
world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen
swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button.
Commerce has also taken hold in email. Online purchases are
often documented in email accounts, and email is frequently
used to remind patients and clients of imminent appoint-
ments. . . . By obtaining access to someone’s email, govern-
ment agents gain the ability to peer deeply into his activities.614
The Fourth Amendment had to “keep pace with the inexorable
march of technological progress, or its guarantees” would “wither
and perish.”615
“Over the last decade,” the Sixth Circuit explained, “email has
become ‘so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be
[an] essential means or necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression,
even self-identification.’”616 It required strong protections, without
which the Fourth Amendment would not prove an effective guard-
ian of private communication. It was not so much that e-mail had
become an additional type of communication, as that it appeared to
be replacing the traditional modes of communication, which in-
creased the need for it to be protected.
The fact that the e-mail passed through an ISP was irrelevant.
“If we accept that an e-mail is analogous to a letter or phone call, it
is manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a com-
mercial ISP to turn over the contents of an e-mail without trigger-
611. Id. at 283.
612. Id. at 284.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 285.
616. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
760 (2010)).
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ing the Fourth Amendment.”617 The ISP was an intermediary—the
functional equivalent of a post office or telephone company. Just as
law enforcement could not walk into a post office or a telephone
company to demand the contents of letters or phone calls, neither
could it demand that an ISP turn over e-mails absent a warrant.
Even as Sixth Circuit extended its protections to e-mail, it re-
lied on the traditional content/non-content distinction. The court
hastened to distinguish Miller, which involved “simple business
records” used “in the ordinary course of business.”618 In contrast,
the e-mails sent and received by Warshak were not directed to the
ISP as an “intended recipient.”619
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF)
reached a similar conclusion with regard to the content of e-mails.
In United States v. Long, it held that Lance Corporal Long had both
an objective and a subjective expectation of privacy in e-mails re-
trieved from a government server.620 The e-mails indicated that she
had been afraid that “her drug use would be detected by urinalysis
testing,” and documented the steps she had taken to try to avoid
discovery.621
USCAAF looked to O’Connor v. Ortega, in which the Supreme
Court had recognized that government employees may have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.622 In Long, USCAAF acknowledged
that the military workplace was not exactly the type of environment
pictured in O’Connor (which had involved a physician at a state hos-
pital).623 Nevertheless, military personnel could, under some cir-
cumstances, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-
mail.624 Long had used a password (one that the network adminis-
617. Id.
618. Id. at 288 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
619. Id.
620. United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 59 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
621. Id.
622. Id. at 61 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (plurality
opinion)). In O’Connor, the Court acknowledged that the reasonable expectation
could be reduced with regard to the employee’s office, desk, or filing cabinet in
accordance with the “efficient and proper operation of the agency.” It also recog-
nized a lesser expectation where the search by the employer was related to work-
place misconduct. O’Connor 480 U.S. at 720–22 (plurality opinion).
623. Long, 64 M.J. at 62; O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 712.
624. Long, 64 M.J. at 64. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417
(C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that Maxwell possessed a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in an America Online e-mail account). But see United States v. Monroe, 52
M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (finding that because the e-mail system in question
was owned by the government, Monroe had no contractual agreement guarantee-
ing privacy from those maintaining the e-mail system).
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trator did not know) to access her account, establishing an expecta-
tion of privacy in her communications.625 The fact that the e-mails
were originally prepared in an office in Marine Corps’ headquar-
ters (HQMC), on a computer owned by the Marine Corps, and that
the e-mails had been transmitted over the HQMC network, stored
on the HQMC server, and retrieved by the HQMC network admin-
istrator, did not erode Long’s Fourth Amendment rights.626
Although the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, and USCAAF, have ex-
tended an expectation of privacy to e-mail, others, looking at the
“totality of the circumstances” have come to a different conclusion.
In United States v. Simons, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the CIA’s
Foreign Bureau of Information Services’s Internet policy, which re-
stricted employees’ use of the system to official government busi-
ness and informed them of ongoing audits, to find that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply.627 The policy provided fair warning to
employees and contractors that their use of the system might be
monitored, even as it established the limits of how the system could
be used. As a result, a government contractor who used the network
to access and download photos from pornographic web sites could
not claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.628
The Fourth Circuit again determined in United States v. Richard-
son that AOL e-mail scans to detect child pornography, and the pro-
vision of that information to law enforcement, did not raise the
specter of the Fourth Amendment.629 AOL initiated its own pro-
cess, outside of any government direction or control. As federal law
enforcement neither required AOL to place e-mails under surveil-
lance, nor directed how such searches should be conducted, no
constitutional right came into being. The Fourth Amendment did
not restrain private industry.
Similarly, in United States v. Angevine, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered Oklahoma State University’s log-on banner, which expressly
disclaimed any right of privacy or confidentiality.630 Together with
“a computer policy that explains the appropriate computer use,
warns employees about the consequences of misuse, and describes
how officials monitor the University network,” the banner provided
625. Long, 64 M.J. at 64–65.
626. Id. at 64.
627. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 396 (2000).
628. Id.
629. U.S. v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364, 367 (4th Cir. 2010).
630. 281 F.3d at 1130, 1133 (2002).
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sufficient notice to users that Fourth Amendment protections did
not apply.631
As for text messages, as a doctrinal matter, it is far from clear
whether they fall within Fourth Amendment protections. In 2010,
the Supreme Court heard City of Ontario v. Quon, a case that cen-
tered on whether a government employer could read text messages
sent and received on a pager owned by the government and issued
to an employee.632 In considering the reasonableness of the search
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, recognized, “[C]ell phone
and text message communications are so pervasive that some per-
sons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instru-
ments for self-expression, even self-identification.”633 He
acknowledged, “[T]hat might strengthen the case for an expecta-
tion of privacy.” But the very fact that the technology was so com-
mon and inexpensive meant that “employees who might need cell
phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and
pay for their own.”634 Employer policies, in turn, would shape the
reasonableness of any expectations of privacy. The SWAT officer,
whose messages had been read, had been told that he did not have
any privacy rights in the pager system provided by the City of Onta-
rio, California.635 The Court did not address whether the content of
text messages was protected.
At least one state supreme court has come to the conclusion
that text messages do not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
In 2012, a lower Rhode Island state court held in State v. Patino that
the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
text messages sent and received.636 In June 2014, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s opinion.637
In Patino, police responded to a 911 call for a child who had
stopped breathing.638 Once the child was in the ambulance on the
way to the hospital, the police looked through the mother’s cell
phone, which was laying on a kitchen countertop, and found texts
631. Id.
632. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
633. Id. at 760.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 762 (“Even if he could assume some level of privacy would inhere
in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his
messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny. Quon was told that his
messages were subject to auditing.”).
636. State v. Patino, No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 WL 3886269 (R.I. Super. Sept. 4,
2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014).
637. State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014).
638. Id. at 43.
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that incriminated the mother’s boyfriend, Michael Patino.639 The
question before the court was whether individuals have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in texts stored on others’ cell phones.640
The court found that the reasonableness prong turned on
whose phone was accessed.641 Control mattered. “[W]hen the recip-
ient receives the message,” the court explained, “the sender relin-
quishes control over what becomes of that message on the
recipient’s phone.”642 Once the content of the message was re-
vealed to another person, the sender lost any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. In this case, the police had accessed the owner’s
phone without her consent, although she had later signed a form
allowing the police to search the device.643 But for the Court, the
sender had already relinquished any privacy interest and thus lacked
standing to challenge the search and seizure of his messages.644
The Supreme Court has not affirmatively identified a Fourth
Amendment interest in e-mail or text messages—to say nothing of
instant messaging, or the myriad other ways that messages may be
conveyed through apps, games, and other digital means.
In the 2014 case of Riley v. California, the Supreme Court was
willing to acknowledge that a generalized privacy interest attached
to a mobile phone in a search incident to arrest.645 The case did
not distinguish between the text messages on a phone and other
functions, such as emails, address books, social media, or gaming
applications.646 Instead, it made a general argument that an im-
mense amount of private information could be carried on a mobile
device.647 Several consequences for individual privacy followed:
First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of
information that reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record. Second, the phone’s capacity allows even just
one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible. Third, data on the phone can date back for years. In
639. Id. at 45.
640. Id. at 55.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Patino, 93 A.3d at 56.
644. Id. at 57.
645. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014).
646. Id.
647. Id. (“[M]odern cell phones have an immense storage capacity . . . .
[They] can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of
videos.”)
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addition, an element of pervasiveness characterizes cell phones
but not physical records.648
A generalized interest in cell phones, however, does not clearly
establish the privacy interests that reside in the communication of
digital content as transferred through e-mail, text messaging, and
other means.
B. Pen Register/Trap and Trace Devices
Even as Supreme Court jurisprudence has, to date, failed to
protect digital communications that look like traditional content,
the growth of new technologies challenges the definition of certain
types of non-content, because of the amount of content that they
now convey. Perhaps the most ready example of this are pen regis-
ter and trap and trace devices which the Court, in the aftermath of
Katz, placed on the non-content side of the dichotomy. With the
advance of technology and new algorithmic analyses, this type of
information increasingly reveals intimate details about individuals’
lives.
The first case directly on point arose in 1977, when the Court
looked at whether a district court could direct a telephone com-
pany to assist in placing a pen register on a telephone line.649 The
Southern District of New York had issued an order authorizing the
FBI to direct the telephone company to monitor two telephone
lines, compensating the company for any assistance it was thereby
forced to provide.650 In United States v. New York Telephone Co., the
Court noted that the language of Title III did not cover the use of
pen registers.651 To the contrary, it was concerned only with orders
“authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral commu-
nication.”652 Pen registers, the Court reasoned, “do not ‘intercept,’
because they do not acquire the ‘contents’ of communications.”653
The Court borrowed its understanding of “contents” from the stat-
ute itself, which understood it to include “any information concern-
ing the identity of the parties to [the] communication or the
existence, substance, purport, or meaning of [the] communica-
tion.”654 The Court cited the Senate Report, which explicitly dis-
648. Id. at 2478–79.
649. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 (1977).
650. Id.
651. Id. at 166.
652. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(1998) (emphasis added)).
653. Id. at 167.
654. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(1998)).
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cussed that the law was meant to exclude pen registers.655 The
action in question was consistent with the All Writs Act.656
Justice White, writing for the Court, outlined a number of con-
siderations that made the use of the All Writs Act acceptable under
the circumstances. First, the telephone company was not “a third
party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its assis-
tance could not be permissibly compelled.”657 Second, the Court
had found probable cause that the facilities were being used to fa-
cilitate criminal activity on an ongoing basis.658 Third, the assis-
tance requested was “meager.”659 Fourth, the company was already
“a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public.”660
Fifth, “the use of pen registers” was “by no means offensive” to the
telephone company.661 Sixth, the company itself regularly used pen
registers to check its billing operations, detect fraud, and prevent
illegal activities.662 Seventh, the order was not in any way burden-
some, as it “provided that the Company be fully reimbursed at pre-
vailing rates, and compliance with it required minimal effort on the
part of the company and no disruption to its operations.”663 Eighth,
without the company’s assistance, the FBI could not have carried
out its wishes.664
Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart all dissented
in part from the Court’s opinion.665 Justice Stevens raised particular
concern about jumping from the omission of pen registers and trap
and trace devices in Title III to the conclusion that they were consti-
655. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167–68 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (“Paragraph 4 defines ‘intercept’ to include the aural acqui-
sition of the contents of any wire or oral communication by any electronic,
mechanical, or other device. Other forms of surveillance are not within the pro-
posed legislation. . . . The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the trac-
ing of phone calls. The use of a ‘pen register,’ for example, would be permissible.
But see United States v. Dote, 371 F.3d 176 (7th 1966). The proposed legislation is
intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself, and not the means of
communication.”)).
656. Id. at 172 (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic-
tions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”) (quoting the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012)).
657. Id. at 174.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174.
662. Id. at 174–75.
663. Id. at 175.
664. Id. at 174–75.
665. Id. at 178.
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tutionally authorized.666 He pointed to dicta in Katz, which under-
scored that Rule 41 was not tied to tangible property.667
The content/non-content distinction highlighted in New York
Telephone Co. persisted. The following year, in Smith v. Maryland, the
Court returned to the function of pen registers as representing
non-content, quoting New York Telephone Co. in support:
[A] law enforcement official could not even determine from
the use of a pen register whether a communication existed.
These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the tele-
phone numbers that have been dialed—a means of establish-
ing communication. Neither the purport of any
communication between the caller and the recipient of the
call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed
is disclosed by pen registers.668
Pen registers, and by inference trap and trace devices, represented
non-content.
In an age of metadata and social network analytics, however, it
simply is not true that data obtained via pen registers or trap and
trace devices do not represent content.669 A tremendous amount of
information can be gleaned just from the numbers dialed and re-
ceived by one’s telephone. At the most obvious level, the numbers
one dials reveal hobbies, interests, relationships, and beliefs. Con-
tacting a drone manufacturer, or a 3D printer sales line shows an
interest in drones and 3D printing. Calling a local political repre-
sentative and members of the planning commission may show con-
cern about development plans in the works. Repeated calls to a
priest, rabbi, or imam—or to a church, synagogue, or mosque—
may suggest religious conviction.
Communication patterns also reveal degrees of intimacy. Fre-
quent contact with an individual denotes a closer relationship than
those with whom one rarely interacts. Mapping the strength of
these relationships, in turn, help to elucidate broader social net-
666. Id. at 179.
667. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 182–86.
668. 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167).
669. Professor Orin Kerr has argued that while “the contents of online com-
munications . . . should receive Fourth Amendment protection . . . non-content
information should not be protected.” Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment
to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007–08 (2010). The au-
thor disagrees with this argument on the grounds that the line between content
and non-content, in a digital age, is often indiscernible. See, e.g., Laura K. Dono-
hue, The Dawn of Social Intelligence (SOCINT), 63 DRAKE L. REV.1061, 1065 (2015).
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works and an individual’s relationship to others in the network.670
From this, leaders can be identified. By mapping social networks,
critical connections between different groups also can be
identified.671
In June 2013, an associate professor of sociology at Duke Uni-
versity posted a provocative article, Using Metadata to Find Paul Re-
vere, to illustrate the power of social network analytics.672 Basing his
analysis on the organizations to which the American Revolutionists
belonged, Professor Kieran Healy identified shared membership of
key organizations, in this manner uncovering the strength of rela-
tionships between key revolutionary groups. Breaking down his
analysis further into the strength of individuals within and among
organizations, Paul Revere emerges as the linchpin.673 And Healy
went further, calculating the eigenvector centrality number to eval-
uate the power of the various revolutionists, composing a short list
of individuals who would be “persons of interest” to the Crown.674 It
neatly captured the most important members of the Revolution.
Numerous studies similarly highlight that metadata reveals a tre-
mendous amount of content, making Fourth Amendment doctrine
appear almost quaint in a digital age.675
C. Envelope Information
Envelope information historically has not been considered
within the gamut of the Fourth Amendment. Following Katz, the
Court reiterated its protection of letters and packages.676 Like com-
munications placed inside envelopes, sealed packages provided to
private carriers constitute “effects” within the meaning of the
670. See generally Greg Statell, How the NSA Uses Social Network Analysis to Map
Terrorist Networks, DIGITAL TONTO (June 12, 2013), http://www.digitaltonto.com/
2013/how-the-nsa-uses-social-network-analysis-to-map-terrorist-networks/.
671. Ronald L. Breiger, The Duality of Persons and Groups, 53 SOCIAL FORCES
181, 181–82 (1974).
672. Kieran Healy, Using Metadata to Find Paul Revere, KIERAN HEALY BLOG
(June 9, 2013), https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-
metadata-to-find-paul-revere/.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. See, e.g., Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, ACLU v. Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (2013) (no. 13-cv-03994); Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler,
MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, WEB POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http:/
/webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/;
see also Clifton B. Parker, Stanford Students Show that Phone Record Surveillance Can
Yield Vast Amounts of Information, STANFORD REPORT (Mar. 12, 2014), http://
news.stanford.edu/news/2014/march/nsa-phone-surveillance-031214.html.
676. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980).
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Fourth Amendment.677 What is written on the outside of the envel-
ope or the package, though, does not enjoy a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Underlying this approach is the basic concept that
what one exposes to others who can simply observe the object, per-
son, or behavior in question, does not fall within the Fourth
Amendment. It is bolstered by the assumption that the address
merely conveys to/from data—not content itself.
In an age of Internet communications, however, the argument
that envelope information does not involve content breaks down. E-
mail subject lines may carry significant details about the content of
the messages themselves. Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) re-
veal the content of the pages for which one searches—and, there-
fore, what one reads. URLs reflect both the specific page being
read and the website in general. Website IP addresses similarly re-
veal content. Yet the courts have yet to recognize the content con-
veyed through these digital resources, leaving electronic data
unprotected from private or government intrusion.678 In the in-
terim, the government is seeking access to Internet browser history
without a warrant.679
In United States v. Hambrick, the Fourth Circuit concluded that,
under Smith, subscriber information conveyed to an ISP to set up
an e-mail account was not protected.680 The Ninth Circuit similarly
held that the “to” or “from” addresses on e-mail, IP addresses of
websites, or the total volume of file transfers linked to an Internet
account, did not fall within the Fourth Amendment.681 In United
States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit focused on the distinction in
Smith between content and non-content, concluding that the re-
cording of IP addresses functioned as the constitutional equivalent
of the pen registers in Smith.682 The Court did acknowledge that
the collection of not just website IP addresses but also URLs of
677. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
678. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2015, 2110–11 (2009).
679. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, FBI Wants Access to Internet Browser History With-
out a Warrant in Terrorism and Spy Cases, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-wants-access-to-internet-
browser-history-without-a-warrant-in-terrorism-and-spy-cases/2016/06/06/2d2573
28-2c0d-11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_story.html.
680. United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
681. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2007).
682. Id.
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pages visited “might be more constitutionally problematic,” but it
did not directly address the question.683
The Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United
States v. Caira, finding that the government was not required to first
get a search warrant before obtaining a suspect’s IP address and
login history from a third party provider.684 Caira’s efforts to draw a
parallel to the GPS chip in Jones fell short: “The government re-
ceived no information about how he got from home to work, how
long he stayed at either place, or where he was when he was not at
home or work. On days when he did not log in, the government
had no idea where he was.”685 The cCourt acknowledged Justice
Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, and her willingness to dispense
with Third Party Doctrine altogether, but it also noted that the Su-
preme Court had yet to embrace her position.686 Nevertheless, just
as the GPS chip in Jones conveyed a significant amount of private
information, so, too, do IP addresses and login histories.
One response to the privacy implications of collecting all of
this data may be to simply assume that all digital information is con-
tent—driving the discussion to whether the information is public or
private. Another response might be to say that no digital informa-
tion is content. But this, too, ignores the deep privacy interests con-
veyed through bits and bytes. The current approach seeks to sort
out the massive gray area between these two extremes. But simply
re-entrenching the content/non-content distinction will not ad-
dress the longer-term concern: how to protect the privacy interests
at stake.
VI.
DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL
A final distinction that is breaking down in light of new and
emerging technologies centers on the line between domestic and
international. Until the mid-20th century, it was generally assumed
that the Bill of Rights did not apply outside the United States, even
when law enforcement sought to prosecute citizens for criminal ac-
tivity overseas.687 As the country expanded, only the territories that
683. Id. at 1049.
684. United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016).
685. Id. at 808.
686. Id. at 809
687. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment was limited to domestic bounds); see also Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Terri-
toriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326, 336 (2015); Caitlin T. Street, Note, Streaming the
International Silver Platter Doctrine: Coordinating Transnational Law Enforcement in the
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were destined for statehood enjoyed the full protection of the Bill
of Rights. Those that would remain unincorporated territories only
enjoyed the protection of fundamental rights—understood in 1901
as including those “inherent, although unexpressed, principles
which are the basis of all free government.”688 In 1957, the Su-
preme Court shifted its position, suggesting that the Bill of Rights
applied to U.S. citizens abroad.689
In the decades after Katz, scholars began debating the univer-
sal application of the Bill of Rights.690 Some lower courts began
moving in this direction as well.691 But the optimism proved short-
lived. In 1990, the Supreme Court issued an opinion limiting the
application of the Fourth Amendment overseas.692
There were good reasons for drawing a line. The uncertainties
of investigations overseas, the delicacy involved in diplomatic ex-
changes, the risk of tipping off criminals with political and other
ties to foreign governments, questions of jurisdiction, and other
concerns suggested that the same standards that marked the do-
mestic realm should not apply outside U.S. bounds. Resultantly, the
Court eschewed a warrant requirement, falling back upon the rea-
sonableness standard for U.S. persons abroad. For non-U.S. persons
abroad lacking a significant connection to the United States, the
Age of Global Terrorism and Technology, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 411, 429
(2010–2011). Thus, while the Fourth Amendment applied within the United
States—regardless of whether the individual targeted was a U.S. citizen or not—it
did not apply outside U.S. borders. See, e.g., Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The Government’s [argument] that ‘The Con-
stitution of the United States confers no rights on non-resident aliens’ is so pa-
tently erroneous in a case involving property in the United States that we are
surprised it was made.”), cited in Daskal, supra at 336 n.22.
688. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
689. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (“The United States is entirely a
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When
the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provided to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land.”).
690. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 690, at 337–38; Louis Henkin, The Constitution R
as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985); Jules Lobel, Here and There: The Constitution Abroad, 83
AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 879 (1989); Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on the
Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19
CONN. L. REV. 831 (1987).
691. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361–62 (9th Cir. 1978).
692. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
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Fourth Amendment did not apply at all.693 This, too, made sense,
not just because of practical considerations, but also because a plau-
sible reading of the Fourth Amendment understands “the people”
to refer to citizens of the United States (see discussion, infra).
In the realm of national security, looser Fourth Amendment
standards framed the collection of foreign intelligence within U.S.
bounds.694 Nevertheless, as in criminal law, the courts drew a line at
the border, with no Fourth Amendment protections extended to
U.S. persons located overseas.695 In 2008, Congress took the first
steps to acknowledge citizens’ privacy interests outside the country.
However, weaker standards apply than those that mark domestic
collection.696
The problem is that persistent reliance on the borders of the
country to protect citizens’ constitutional rights fails to recognize
that global communications systems run rampant over the domes-
tic/international distinction. Where, previously, individuals would
have to physically travel internationally, or deliberately put in tele-
phone calls to other countries, thus entailing some level of knowl-
edge that what one said or did was leaving the United States, today
bits and bytes simply follow the most efficient route—without any
deliberate action on the part of the individual generating the infor-
mation. Much of the information generated internationally, moreo-
ver, is ultimately held in the United States or by U.S. entities—
rather undermining the arguments that it is unpractical to obtain
the same information, or that it would somehow alert foreign gov-
ernments or criminals, by first requiring a warrant. Similarly, the
implications for the jurisdictional argument fall away.
Nevertheless, because of the nature of global communications,
and where the information is generated, the same types of commu-
nications that previously would have been protected are now more
vulnerable to monitoring, interception, and collection by the gov-
ernment—simply because we live in a digital age.
693. Id. at 271.
694. Compare Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (standards for
surveillance in the United States), with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (standards for
surveillance outside of the United States). See also discussion, infra pp. 86–88.
695. The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act purely addressed the col-
lection of information on U.S. soil. Collection overseas fell within the broader
framing of Executive Order 12,333.
696. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, July 10, 2008.
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A. Law Enforcement
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez that non-U.S. citizens, who lack a substantial connection to
the United States, do not enjoy the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.697 The DEA had conducted a warrantless search of
Mexicali and San Felipe residences of a Mexican citizen.698 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, suggested that the right of
“the people” meant those who made up the political community of
the United States—not non-citizens abroad, lacking a “substantial
connection” to the country.699
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, pointed to the 1901 Insu-
lar Cases, a series of opinions addressing the status of Puerto Rico,
the Philippines, and other overseas possessions, in which the Court
had held that the Constitution does not apply in all its force to
every territory under U.S. control.700 While searches within the
United States fell subject to the Fourth Amendment, practical barri-
ers could prevent the same overseas.701 Kennedy pointed to “[t]he
absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants,
the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasona-
bleness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate
with foreign officials” as reasons why “the warrant requirement
should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.”702
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.703 How
could the United States expand its extraterritorial criminal provi-
sions without correspondingly allowing the Fourth Amendment to
travel abroad? The fact that a foreign national was being investi-
gated for a violation of U.S. law, for which he could conceivably
“spend the rest of his life in a United States prison,” was sufficient
697. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271, 274–75. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (stating that the “shield” that the Bill of Rights
provides “should not be stripped away just because [a U.S. citizen] happens to be
in another land”).
698. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
699. Id. at 271, 274–75.
700. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)) (stating that the cases
“stand for the proposition that we must interpret constitutional protections in light
of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate
power and authority abroad”).
701. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to bring the Fourth Amendment to bear.704 As soon as U.S. law
applied, the foreign national became, “quite literally, one of the
governed.”705 Fundamental fairness required that if individuals
were obliged to comply with U.S. law, then the government, in turn,
was “obliged to respect certain correlative rights, among them the
Fourth Amendment.”706
Under Verdugo-Urquidez, non-U.S. citizens based overseas, who
lack a significant connection to the country, do not enjoy the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment.707 Lower court decisions ap-
pear to come down on different sides of what, precisely, constitutes
a “substantial connection.”708 For U.S. citizens outside the country,
the Fourth Amendment does apply—albeit under different stan-
dards than those extended within the United States.709
The Supreme Court has not spelled out precisely what is re-
quired, although some lower courts have considered this question.
In United States v. Barona, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
Fourth Amendment only applies insofar as the search in question
meets the reasonableness standard.710 It does not demand that offi-
cials first obtain a warrant.711 That case dealt with a DEA search
conducted at the apex of the so-called “war on drugs,”
1985–1987.712 As the DEA had used electronic intercepts in accor-
dance with Danish law, the court looked to whether the search was
reasonable within the context of Denmark’s legal framework, as
704. Id. at 283–84.
705. Id. at 284.
706. Id.
707. For discussion of this point and how the courts have subsequently an-
swered the question of what constitutes a sufficient connection to the United
States, see Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone
and Internet Content, 38(1) HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2015), http://scholar-
ship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1355/ [Hereinafter Donohue, Section 702].
708. Compare, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir.
2006) (finding substantial connections on the grounds that “regular and lawful
entry . . . and [ ] acquiescence in the U.S. system of immigration constitute [ ]
voluntary acceptance of societal obligations”), with United States v. Esparza-Men-
doza, 265 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir.
2004) (holding that “previously deported alien felons [who illegally re-enter the
country] are not covered” under the sufficient connections on the grounds that he
is “a trespasser in this country.”); see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708; R
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285,
291–93 (2015).
709. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987).
710. 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
711. Id.
712. Id. at 1089–90. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 707, at 231-
232.
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well as whether U.S. officials had relied in good faith upon the for-
eign officials’ representations that the wiretapping complied with
Danish law.713
B. Foreign Intelligence Collection
Verdugo-Urquidez and Barona addressed ordinary law enforce-
ment activity. For foreign intelligence collection, different stan-
dards apply, but they are still premised on a distinction between
domestic and international searches. As with many of the authori-
ties and cases addressed in this Article, the framing developed in a
post-Katz world that no longer reflects the realities of a digital age.
In footnote 23 of Katz, the Court went out of its way to note
that the decision did not reach national security cases.714 Neverthe-
less, three justices took the opportunity to postulate what might be
the appropriate standard for foreign intelligence collection. Justice
White came down on the side of giving the Executive Branch more
leeway.715 Justice Douglas, in contrast, with whom Justice Brennan
joined, distanced himself from White’s view, which he considered
“a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to re-
sort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which
the Executive Branch itself labels ‘national security’ matters.”716
Douglas recognized the potential conflict of interest in having the
President or the Attorney General ultimately decide the limits of
713. Id. at 1094. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 707, at 232. The
Second Circuit also found that the search of U.S. citizens overseas is only subject to
the reasonableness requirement, and not the warrant clause. In re Terrorist Bomb-
ings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). In In re
Terrorist Bombings, American intelligence agencies had identified five telephone
numbers used by individuals suspected of association with al Qaeda. Id. at 159
(citing United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). For a
year, they monitored the lines, including ones used by an American citizen, El-
Hage. In 1997, the Attorney General authorized intelligence officials to target El-
Hage, placing his telephone line in his home in Nairobi, as well as his cell phone,
under surveillance. U.S. officials later searched his home without a warrant. Id. at
160.
714. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) (“Whether safe-
guards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not
presented by this case.”).
715. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (“We should not require the warrant
procedure and the magistrate’s judgment if the President of the United States or
his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.”); see also
Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708. R
716. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring); Donohue, Section 702,
supra note 708. R
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their own powers.717 The fact that the crimes in question were the
most serious that could be alleged did little to alter his calculus.718
Congress responded to Katz by passing Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.719 The legislation
originally covered just wire and oral communications, but in 1986
Congress expanded it to include electronic communications. The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 included two addi-
tional titles focused on stored communications, as well as pen regis-
ter and trap and trace devices.720 Title III exempted matters
involving national security:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or poten-
tial attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the secur-
ity of the United States, or to protect national security informa-
tion against foreign intelligence activities.721
Congress was careful to draft the law in a way that left the Presi-
dent’s authority in the realm of foreign affairs intact.722 Foreign in-
717. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359–60 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Neither the Presi-
dent nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe na-
tional security may be involved, they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral
as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the
Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinter-
ested. Rather it should vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national se-
curity and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President
and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary,
in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive
action.”).
718. Id. at 360 (“Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that,
where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment
rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the posi-
tion of ‘adversary and prosecutor’ and disinterested, neutral magistrate.”).
719. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3711.
720. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848, 1860, 1868 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 3121 (1986)).
721. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197, 214 (1968).
722. 114 Cong. Rec. 14751 (1968) (Senators Holland, McClellan, and Hart
stating that the legislation neither expanded nor contracted the President’s for-
eign affairs powers); S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 65 (1968) (stating that the power of
the president “is not to be deemed disturbed” by the legislation). See also Dono-
hue, Section 702, supra note 708, at 208. R
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telligence collection would be subject to different standards.
Precisely what had yet to be decided.
In 1972, the Court weighed in on the question. In United States
v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the
Court suggested that in cases of domestic security, while some sort
of judicial process was required for domestic interception, the stan-
dard could differ from criminal law.723 The government had con-
ducted a warrantless wiretap on three people suspected of bombing
a Central Intelligence Agency office.724 The Court agreed 8-0 that
under the circumstances, the Government first had to obtain a war-
rant.725 The Court cited the “inherent vagueness of the domestic
security concept” as well as the risk of government abuse of power
as reasons why the Fourth Amendment prevailed.726 While the Gov-
ernment had to use what technological means it had at its disposal
to protect citizens, giving the Executive Branch carte blanche un-
dermined citizens’ rights.727
Just as Justice Douglas in Katz had argued about the conflict of
interest that marked giving the Executive the latitude to set the con-
tours of its own power, Powell argued in Keith that, “Fourth Amend-
ment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security
surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the
Executive Branch.”728 Some sort of judicial process was neces-
sary.729 The precise contours lay in the domain of the legislature.
“Different standards,” Powell wrote, “may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and
the protected rights of our citizens.”730 In criminal law, probable
cause was the standard against which reasonableness was weighed;
for foreign intelligence, the probable cause requirements may re-
flect “other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security
723. 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972) [hereinafter Keith]; see also Donohue, Section
702, supra note 708, at 209. R
724. Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.
725. Id. at 298, 320.
726. Id. at 320; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708. R
727. Keith, 407 U.S. at 312; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708. R
728. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316–17; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at R
210.
729. Keith, 407 U.S. at 318; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at R
210.
730. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322–23; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at R
210.
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cases.”731 It may require a special court, different timing and report-
ing requirements than those outlined in Title III, and other special
considerations.732
The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) served
as Congress’s riposte.733 The legislation was to be the only way the
Executive branch could engage in domestic electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes.734 It later expanded FISA to gov-
ern physical searches, pen register and trap and trace devices, and
tangible goods.735
For each of these areas, FISA incorporated standards more le-
nient than those that mark criminal law. Instead of requiring proba-
ble cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be
committed, for instance, before electronic surveillance could com-
mence, it required only probable cause that an individual was a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power, and probable cause that
they would use the facilities to be placed under surveillance, before
a special order from the FISC would issue.736 The courts repeatedly
upheld FISA as compatible with the Fourth Amendment.737
731. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at R
210.
732. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
733. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783, codified at §§ 1801–1812, 1821–1829, 1841–1846.
734. See generally Donohue, Bulk Metadata, supra note 6, at 776–93 (discussing R
the historical background, structure, and purpose of the FISA); DONOHUE, FU-
TURE, supra note 6, at 11. R
735. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359,
§ 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423, 3445 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829) (physi-
cal searches); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
272, § 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–2410 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846)
(pen register and trap and trace devices); Id. § 602 (codified at 50 U.S.C
§§ 1861–1862); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L.107-56, U.S.C. § 1861, 115 Stat. at 287 (2001) (evolution of business records
to tangible goods).
736. Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–22 (2012)), with 50 U.S.C. §1805(b).
737. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074–76 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Abu-Jihaad,
531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304 (D. Conn. 2008); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp.
2d 125, 136 (D. Mass 2007); United States v. Megahey, 553 F.Supp. 1180, 1185–93
(E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1982), and aff’d sub nom United States v.
Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
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FISA stopped at the border of the United States. All foreign
intelligence surveillance involving electronic intercepts (and later,
physical searches, pen register and trap and trace, or tangible
goods), could only be undertaken on domestic soil consistent with
the requirements in the statute. Internationally, intelligence collec-
tion fell outside the statutory regime and stemmed from the Presi-
dent’s Article II authorities. From 1981 until 2008, such acquisitions
only had to comport with the guidelines laid out in Executive Or-
der 12,333.738 In 2008, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Amendments Act (FAA), bringing electronic surveil-
lance of U.S. persons overseas within the contours of FISA.739
Prior to enactment of the FAA, the Southern District of New
York (S.D.N.Y.) considered in a counter-terrorism context whether
a U.S. citizen placed under surveillance overseas was entitled to the
full protections of the Fourth Amendment and determined that he
was not.740 In United States v. Bin Laden, the Court rejected the ne-
cessity of law enforcement first obtaining a warrant before placing
either a landline or a mobile telephone under surveillance.741 The
Court concluded that because of the undue burden that it would
place on the Executive Branch, foreign intelligence collection over-
seas fell into the “special needs” exception.742 Because of the “intri-
cacies” involved, courts were “ill-suited to the task of overseeing
foreign intelligence collection.”743 It was difficult to predict the in-
ternational consequences of wiretapping on foreign soil; other
countries might not want to be seen as complicit with actions taken
by the United States, and enemies might be alerted to investigations
underway—not least by foreign officials sympathetic to their
cause.744 The potential for security breaches to occur was
significant.745
738. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 app. at 44–51 (1982); see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708; DONO- R
HUE, FUTURE, supra note 6, at 12. R
739. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (2008); see also Pro-
tect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (temporarily bringing
the collection of foreign intelligence targeting U.S. persons within the bounds of
FISA); Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708. R
740. See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 264. See Donohue, Section 702, supra
note 708. R
741. Bin Laden, F. Supp. 2d at 275–76.
742. Id. at 274. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 707, at 233.
743. Bin Laden, F. Supp. 2d at 274.
744. Id. at 275. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708. R
745. Bin Laden, F. Supp. 2d at 275.
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The S.D.N.Y. was careful to note the absence of any legislative
framing.746 The political branches, which were responsible for for-
eign affairs, had yet to create a warrant requirement for collection
of intelligence abroad, making any judicial effort to do so some-
what suspect.747 It was therefore up to the other two branches to
work out the extent to which a warrant would be required and the
specific procedures that would have to be followed for overseas col-
lection. Deference, however, extended only insofar as collection
centered on foreign intelligence.748 As soon as the primary purpose
of the search shifted to criminal law, ordinary Fourth Amendment
standards for searches conducted overseas applied.749
In 2008, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(FISCR) also considered whether a foreign intelligence exception
to the warrant requirement existed for intelligence collected
abroad.750 FISCR pointed to its earlier opinion, which had assumed
that regardless of whether a foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant requirement existed, FISA met the Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness.751 It then turned to the question of
whether, by a special needs analogy, there was a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement.
FISCR emphasized the exceptional nature of national security,
stating that the purpose behind foreign intelligence collection
“goes well beyond any garden-variety law enforcement objective. It
involves the acquisition from overseas foreign agents of foreign in-
telligence to help protect national security.”752 The court neverthe-
less rejected the proposition that the primary purpose of the
investigation had to be related to foreign intelligence for the spe-
cial needs exception to apply:
[I]n our view the more appropriate consideration is the
programmatic purpose of the surveillances and whether – as in
746. Bin Laden, F. Supp. 2d at 275–77. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra
note 708, at 233-234. R
747. Bin Laden, F. Supp. 2d at 275–77.
748. Id. at 277.
749. Id. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at 234. R
750. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 , 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008); see also Donohue,
Section 702, supra note 708, at 234-235. R
751. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 744
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708, at 235. R
752. In re Directives, 551 F.3d  at 1011. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note
708, at 235. R
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the special needs cases – that programmatic purpose involves
some legitimate objective beyond ordinary crime control.753
Forcing the government to obtain a warrant would hurt its abil-
ity “to collect time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede
the vital national security interests that are at stake.”754 For foreign
intelligence collection, then, a different standard marks searches
conducted overseas than those within domestic bounds.
The problem, as with criminal law, is that the distinction be-
tween domestic and international communications breaks down in
light of new technologies.755
C. Technological Challenges to the Domestic/International Distinction
Global communications are, well, just that: global. They do not
recognize terrestrial borders. Why conform Fourth Amendment re-
quirements to geographic borders, when packets of information
freely flow across them, and, for the most part, outside the control
of users? The same information that would be protected under one
framing falls subject to lesser protections under the other, despite
the fact that the same communications are at stake—making Consti-
tutional rights not so dependent on actual privacy needs, but on an
accident of how the Internet works at any given time.
Consider, for instance, electronic mail communications. If I e-
mail a colleague in the office next to mine, it may—or may not—be
routed to a server in Singapore, where it awaits retrieval. Pari passu,
foreign to foreign communications may be brought within the
United States simply by being sent by the Internet across a U.S.
frontier. In days of old, when telephone communications were car-
ried on wires draped across land and water, one could intercept
conversations entirely outside U.S. borders. But today, one scholar
sitting in Dublin could e-mail a colleague in Bonn. And just as my e-
753. In re Directives, 551 F.3d  at 1011. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note
708, at 236. R
754. In re Directives, 551 F.3d  at 1011. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note
708, at 237. R
755. Although I focus on the physical characteristics (or lack thereof) of digi-
tal technologies, commentators also have focused on other ways in which technol-
ogy has undermined Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to searches outside
the United States. See, e.g., Street, supra note 688, at 429 n.72 (arguing that in the R
21st century, “technology and the pervasive transnational terrorist threat have
broadened the scope of the international silver platter doctrine, reduced the im-
pact of its joint venture exception, and consequently rendered the Fourth Amend-
ment, in practice, virtually inapplicable to most transnational terrorism
investigations.” The result is that more evidence obtained in unreasonable
searches can be used in U.S. federal court.).
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mail to a domestic colleague could go to Singapore, the e-mail from
Dublin may be routed through Palo Alto, California. Does that
mean that those communications now fall subject to higher levels
of protection—either in the criminal law realm or in the foreign
intelligence arena?
In 2008, Congress addressed the second part of the concern by
enacting the FAA.756 The government argued against extending
higher Fourth Amendment protections to non-U.S. persons abroad
simply because they chose to use a U.S. Internet service provider.757
It was a sound argument. For one, it made little sense to have con-
stitutional protections rest on the particular ISP involved, and not
the status of the individual or the nature of the communication at
stake. For another, if by simply using an American ISP, a foreign
terrorist could gain greater protections, it would allow individuals
to game U.S. law to evade detection.758
The problem that global communications present to Fourth
Amendment law, however, works both ways. Even as communica-
tions overseas might be routed through the U.S., entirely domestic
communications might now be routed overseas. If I email or text
my colleague at Georgetown, the message may be routed through a
server in Singapore before my colleague receives it. Through no
action of my own, an entirely domestic message has traveled
abroad. Yet it may be precisely the same message that, historically, if
sent through regular mail, would have received full Fourth Amend-
ment protections. So drawing a line at the border of the country,
and extending fewer protections to the international communica-
tions, results in greater surveillance of U.S. citizens than has tradi-
tionally occurred.759 The intense controversy surrounding Section
756. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, July 10, 2008; see also Donohue, Section 702, supra
note 708; DONOHUE, FUTURE, supra note 6, at 33. R
757. Open/Closed Hearing: FISA Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of John M. McConnell, Director of National Intelli-
gence); see also 154 CONG. REC. H5756–57 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (letter from
Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, and J.M. McConnell, Director of National In-
telligence, to Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives (June 19,
2008)); 154 CONG. REC. S6400–01 (July 8, 2008) (letter from Michael Mukasey,
Attorney General, and J.M. McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, to Hon.
Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Senate (July 7, 2008)); Donohue, Section 702, supra
note 708. R
758. See also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708 (arguing that this was the R
strongest point put forward by the government in support of the FAA).
759. For discussion of this point, see Donohue, Section 702, supra note 708; see R
also Spencer Ackerman, FBI Quietly Changes its Privacy Rules for Accessing NSA Data
on Americans, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2016) (reporting PCLOB’s confirmation that
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702 of the FISA Amendments Act centered in no small measure on
the government’s inability to actually calculate the number of
Americans whose privacy interests had been compromised even
through upstream collection, directed at non-U.S. citizens abroad,
and subsequent query of the database.760
It is more than just communications data at stake. Cloud com-
puting, for instance, has altered where documents are not just
stored but also analyzed.761 There are increasingly difficult ques-
tions that center on whether and under what conditions the U.S.
government can demand access to information held outside the
United States. The Second Circuit confronted this question in re-
gard to information linked to a Microsoft user’s web-based e-mail
account located in a data center in Dublin, Ireland.762 A District
Court determined that because the information could be obtained
from Microsoft employees inside the United States, the warrant was
not extraterritorial and thus valid.763 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, overruled this decision, stating that “to require a
service provider to retrieve material from beyond the borders of the
United States—would require us to disregard the presumption
against extraterritoriality that the Supreme Court emphasized in
“the FBI is allowed direct access to the NSA’s massive collections of international
emails, texts and phone calls – which often include Americans on one end of the
conversation”); see generally DONOHUE, FUTURE, supra note 6.
760. See, e.g., PRIVATE & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD. REPORT ON THE SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 147 (2014) (“[L]awmakers and the public do not have
even a rough estimate of how many communications of U.S. persons are acquired
under Section 702.”); James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows War-
rantless Search for U.S. Citizens’ E-mails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrant-
less-searches-email-calls; Elizabeth Goitein, The NSA’s Backdoor Search Loophole,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/nsas-backdoor-search-loophole; Civil Society to FBI: Show Us How Section 702
Affects Americans, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT (Oct. 29, 2015), http://
www.pogo.org/our-work/letters/2015/civil-society-to-fbi-show-us.html.
761. See Jessica Scarpati, Big Data Analysis in the Cloud: Storage, Network and
Server Challenges, TECH TARGET, http://searchtelecom.techtarget.com/feature/Big-
data-analysis-in-the-cloud-Storage-network-and-server-challenges (discussing the
challenges of big data analytics in the cloud, including whether to move petabytes
of data, as opposed to moving analytics to the data, to most effectively provide
cloud-based services).
762. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Main-
tained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
763. Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476; see also Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territorial-
ity of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2016).
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Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).”764 As Profes-
sor Jennifer Daskal, who has written thoughtfully about digital
(un)territoriality, observed, “The dispute lays bare the extent to
which modern technology challenges basic assumptions about what
is ‘here’ and ‘there.’”765
The problem with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that it
assumes that one can draw a line at the border, and that the draw-
ing of this line can be used in some meaningful way to determine
the extent of constitutional protections. But, as Daskal notes, two
aspects of the digital world make this impossible: first, data flows
across borders at the speed of light and in unpredictable ways. Sec-
ond, there is no necessary connection between where the data is
located and where the individual that either “owns” the data, or to
whom the data relates, is located, undermining the significance of
where the data is at any moment in time.766 Whether the individual
to whom the data relates is a U.S. person, or a non-U.S. person
lacking a significant connection to the United States (as framed in
Verdugo-Urquidez), may be impossible to ascertain. No clearer is such
a connection between bits and bytes flowing over the Internet and
the citizenship or location of the foreign power at issue in FISA—
even as amended.
Even if one had the IP address of a particular user, it is not at
all clear from that information where a user is located—or even
whether it is accurate. IP addresses are numerical sequences that
can identify specific computers when they go online. They are used
to route information to and from websites. But web anonymizers
can hide IP addresses by creating a proxy, contacting the website on
your behalf and forwarding the relevant information to you, so that
no direct connection between your computer and the website is
ever formed.767
With global communications, and the lack of digital technolo-
gies’ territorial tie in mind, the concern is that the end result will be
one in which the weaker standards previously adopted in regard to
information obtained outside the United States become applied to
an increasing amount of citizens’ private data that happens to ei-
ther flow across international borders, or to be held in foreign
countries. This is the de facto standard already applied to foreign
764. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-
mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 97, 201
(2d Cir. 2016).
765. The Un-Territoriality of Data, supra note 764.
766. Id.
767. See e.g., WEB ANONYMIZER, http://www.webanonymizer.org.
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intelligence collection and raises concerns about how the informa-
tion is being used in a criminal law context—to say nothing about
how the courts should consider criminal investigations when inter-
national data is involved.
VII.
CONFRONTING THE DIGITAL WORLD
The time is ripe to revisit the post-Katz distinctions—private vs.
public; personal information vs. third party data; content vs. non-
content; and domestic vs. international. They fail to capture the pri-
vacy interests affected by the digital sphere.
As this Article has argued, the ubiquitous nature of tracking
technologies undermines the claim that what one does in public
does not generate insight into private lives. Similarly, the rule that
individuals lose their right to protect data when it is entrusted to
others ignores the extent to which, as a society, we have become
dependent on commercial entities to conduct our daily lives. If all
information entrusted to third parties loses its constitutional pro-
tections, then the right to privacy itself will gradually cease to exist.
Individuals cannot live in the modern world without creating a digi-
tal doppelganger that yields insight into our most intimate affairs.
Denying the substantive interests involved in e-mail, texting, instant
messages, and other forms of communication, moreover, subverts
the purpose of distinguishing between content and non-content—
even as technology has transmuted traditional areas of non-content
to content. Global communications and cloud computing, in turn,
collapse the line between what occurs inside the United States and
that which transpires abroad.
The Court’s continued reliance on these distinctions is leading
to a narrowing of rights, with detrimental consequences for individ-
ual liberty.
There are a number of possible responses that the Court could
make to the current situation in which we find ourselves. Prior to
Katz, for instance, judicial doctrine reflected a textual approach,
protecting “houses” and “papers” from the intrusive eyes of the
government.
Accordingly, some scholars have suggested that digital informa-
tion similarly should be considered “papers” and within the protec-
tion of the home, such that the type of information that would have
been located behind closed doors falls within the ambit of the
Fourth Amendment. The analogy runs: in a digital world, we no
longer keep our papers in the den. Instead, we place them on the
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cloud, encrypted. Whether the data is physical or digital should
have little bearing on whether or not it is considered private. Either
way, it is the same information in question.
A parallel approach centers on whether digital data ought to
be considered within the domain of “effects.”768 As Professor Mau-
reen Brady points out, compared to “houses” and “papers,” “effects”
has captured rather less of the Supreme Court’s attention.769 When
it has, property considerations loom large.770 In crafting a deeper
understanding, Brady proposes that the Court look to the context,
considering whether the subject of the inquiry is personal property,
and whether the individual in question retains possession over it,
rendering the property “presumptively entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.”771 This means looking beyond the actual location
of the item—be it in a filing cabinet or on the cloud—and consid-
ering, instead, the nature of the item, its relationship to other
items, and whether the owner has taken steps to shield the informa-
tion from public scrutiny.772
A similar response centers on the Court’s understanding of
“persons.” Much has been written about the “digital self”—dopple-
gangers that exist as a byproduct of living in the modern world.773
As an extension of personhood, the digital self provides insight into
one’s intimate sphere. Under this approach, the collection of
uniquely identifiable information, i.e., data that relates, and could
be traced back, to unique individuals, may constitute a search per
se, requiring a warrant for collection.
768. See Bagley, supra note 534, at 158 (looking at “the evolution of papers R
and effects increasingly stored by third party Internet giants”).
769. Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Per-
sonal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L. J. 946,  980 (2016).
770. Id. at 981.
771. Id. at 951.
772. Id. at 952.
773. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3; Jeremy N. Bailenson, Doppelgangers: A New R
Form of Self, 25 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 36, 36–39 (2012); Russell W. Belk, Extended Self in
a Digital World, J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 477–500 (Oct. 2013); Hope Jensen Schau &
Mary C. Gilly, We Are What We Post? Self-presentation in Personal Web Space, 30 J. CON-
SUMER RESEARCH 385 (2003); Nick Yee et al., The Expression of Personality in Virtual
Worlds, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 5, 5–12 (2011); Nick Yee & Jeremy N.
Bailenson, The Difference Between Being and Seeing: The Relative Contribution of Self-
Perception and Priming to Behavioral Changes via Digital Self-Representation, 12 MEDIA
PSYCHOLOGY 195 (2012); Nick Yee et al., The Proteus Effect: Implications of Transformed
Digital Self-Representation on Online and Offline Behavior, 33 COMMUNICATION RE-
SEARCH 271 (2009); Shanyang Zhao, The Digital Self: Through the Looking Glass of
Telecopresent Others, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 387 (Aug. 2005).
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The problem with these approaches is twofold: first, they do
not directly confront the problems raised by the Katz reasonable-
ness standard, discussed, at length, above.  Second, more pro-
foundly, they neither confront the theoretical framing of the
Fourth Amendment, which presupposes a pre-political self, nor do
they question the contemporary assumption that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy.
In 2013, Professor Julie Cohen attacked the concept of a lib-
eral self.774 She argued that the real object of privacy law is a so-
cially-constructed being, “emerging gradually from a preexisting
cultural and relational substrate.”775 For Cohen, liberal political
theory’s commitment to definitions of absolute rights and core
principles is the problem. It fails to acknowledge the types of pri-
vacy expectations that mark the real world.776 “The self,” Cohen
writes, “has no autonomous, precultural core, nor could it, because
we are born and remain situated within social and cultural con-
texts.”777 Pari passu, “privacy is not a fixed condition, nor could it
be, because the individual’s relationship to social and cultural con-
texts is dynamic.”778
Cohen’s insight illuminates Professor Anita Allen’s observation
that society’s expectation of privacy appears to be changing.779
“Neither individuals, institutions, nor government consistently de-
mand or respect physical, informational, and proprietary privacy,”
Allen writes.780 Thus, while polling data may show high levels of
concern about privacy, “Certain legal and policy trends; certain
modes of market, consumer, and political behavior; and certain
dimensions of popular culture . . . suggest low levels of concern.”781
Allen cites to the “avalanche of technologies” that make informa-
tion available to industry and the government.782 She concludes,
“Liberals may need to rethink the claims they have always made
about the value of privacy.”783
Cohen’s approach offers a way out of Allen’s conundrum. In-
stead of beginning from the point of political theory or philosophy,
774. Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013).
775. Id. at 1905.
776. Id. at 1907.
777. Id. at 1908.
778. Id.
779. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 727–28
(1999).
780. Id. at 728.
781. Id. at 729.
782. Id. at 730.
783. Id. at 728.
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Cohen proposes that one must look to cognitive science, sociology,
and social psychology to find the empirical foundations for under-
standing socially-constructed subjectivity.784 In this framing, privacy
plays a critical role, incubating subjectivity and independence, and
wrenching individuals and communities from the clutches of gov-
ernments and commercial actors that would relegate them to fixed,
transparent, and predictable beings.785 Perceived in this way, pri-
vacy “protects the situated practices of boundary management
through which the capacity for self-determination develops.”786 The
problem with a digitized, networked world, as it is currently con-
structed, is that it allows constant access to the boundary and there-
fore prevents the evolution of the socially-constructed self, outside
of external influence.787
Cohen’s conception of social construction as a theory of sub-
jectivity differs in subtle but important way from other scholars who
see privacy as socially constructed.788 Professors Joshua Fairfield
and Christoph Engel, for instance, try to turn the lens away from
individuals in measuring harm. Instead, they draw attention to the
negative externalities on non-consenting outsiders that are caused
by the revelation of personal data.789 Eschewing individualism, they
argue, “it makes sense to examine privacy as a social construct, sub-
ject to the problems of social production.”790 They continue, “with-
out measured intervention, individuals’ fully informed privacy
784. Cohen, supra note 774, at 1908. R
785. Id. at 1905.
786. Id.
787. Id. at 1916. (“In the contemporary information economy, private-sector
firms like Google, Facebook, and data broker Acxiom use flows of information
about consumer behavior to target advertisements, search results, and other con-
tent. . . . Information from and about consumers feeds into sophisticated systems
of predictive analytics so that surveillant attention can be personalized more pre-
cisely and seamlessly. Government is an important secondary beneficiary of infor-
mational capitalism, routinely accessing and using flows of behavioral and
communications data for its own purposes. . . . In the modulated society, surveil-
lance is not heavy-handed; it is ordinary, and its ordinariness lends it extraordinary
power.”).
788. Professor Valerie Steeves highlights privacy as a social value, emphasizing
its role in identity, dignity, autonomy, social freedom, and democracy. She consid-
ers the relationship between privacy and social equality, with particular emphasis
on online social behavior. See, e.g., Ian Kerr & Valerie Steeves, Virtual Playgrounds
and Buddybots: A Data-Minefield for Tinys and Tweeneys, PANOPTICON, COMPUTERS,
FREEDOM AND PRIVACY CONFERENCE (Apr. 12, 2005), http://idtrail.org/content/
view/128/42/index.html.
789. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65
DUKE L. J. 385 (2015).
790. Id. at 423.
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decisions tend to reduce overall privacy, even if everyone cherishes
privacy equally and intensely.”791 Applying a law and economics
model, the scholars map the social and systemic harms that result
from “the collection, aggregation, and exploitation of data.”792 Un-
like Courts, which “tend to focus on specific harm to specific com-
plaining individuals, not undivided losses to social welfare,”
economists conceive of harm differently.793 A critical question is
whether group harms “can be sufficiently theorized to be legally
cognizable.”794
If the approach to the liberal self that is built into Fourth
Amendment doctrine is at least assailable, the object of the amend-
ment is even more vulnerable to question, with profound implica-
tions for evolution of the doctrine.
Specifically, some scholars argue that the underlying value of
the Fourth Amendment rests not on the right to privacy (either a
liberal incarnation or one premised on social construction), but on
liberty from undue government power.795 Looked at in light of the his-
tory of the Fourth Amendment at the time of the Founding, this
approach is extremely persuasive.796 There is little question that
Coke, Hale, and Hawkins, and other prominent English jurists and
Parliamentarians, worried about limiting the power of the
Crown.797 It was to avoid the assumption and concentration of
power that the common law came to restrict powers of search and
seizure.798 To place a limit on such powers, outside of hot pursuit of
a known felon, the Crown could not enter into any home without a
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 425.
794. Id. Other scholars similarly consider group privacy. See, e.g., GROUP PRI-
VACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES (Luciano Floridi, Linnet Taylor &
Blair van der Sloot, eds. 2017). These theories, much like those posited by the
Court in Katz, recognize that some aspect of privacy is socially constructed.
795. See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BE-
TWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY, 1154 (Yale Univ. Press 2011) (focusing on the risks of
government collection of information and centering the analysis on the type and
extent of judicial oversight, limits on government actions, and guarding against
abuse of power); Thomas Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 351 (1998); Morgan Cloud, The
Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitu-
tional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 618–19 (1996) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment “exists to enhance individual liberty by constraining government
power”).
796. See Donohue, Original, supra note 14. R
797. Id.
798. Id.
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warrant.799 Neither a general warrant, nor one lacking the requisite
particularity, would suffice.800 The common law standard, of great
importance to the founding generation, became codified in the
U.S. Constitution.
In light of this history, it is perhaps unsurprising that in 2008,
Professor Jed Rubenfeld observed an “oddity” in the Fourth
Amendment: that privacy, “the ‘touchstone’ of modern Fourth
Amendment law[,] fails to touch one of the paradigmatic abuses—
arrests lacking probable cause made under a general warrant—that
the Fourth Amendment was enacted to forbid.”801 The doctrine
should simply give up “trying to protect privacy.”802 Instead, it
should turn to what the real purpose was behind the amendment,
which is a right of security.803
Rubenfeld’s approach turns a cold shoulder to privacy as the
determinant of Fourth Amendment protections. Other scholars
take a similar line but are not quite as willing to throw the prover-
bial baby out with the bath water. Professor Paul Ohm, for instance,
has argued that just as privacy replaced property, the Court should
now consider power as the “constitutional lodestar” of the Fourth
Amendment.804 It is not that privacy is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment enterprise—but rather that power ought to become a
new interpretative lens for giving substance to privacy
guarantees.805
Ohm is right to the extent that power ought to be considered
the constitutional lodestar of the Fourth Amendment.  But he is
wrong in suggesting that it is a new interpretive lens. It is, instead, a
return to the original values of the Fourth Amendment.  And it of-
fers a promising way forward for the Court to confront the signifi-
cant threats posed by digitization, which carries with it the ability to
record vast amounts of information, to combine information to
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008); see
also Donohue, Original, supra note 14, at 1188–93 (discussing the original prohibi- R
tion on general warrants).
802. Rubenfeld, supra note 802, at 104. R
803. Id. at 104–05.
804. Ohm, supra note 456, at 1338. R
805. Various efforts have been made to put alternative approaches into prac-
tice. See generally, e.g., Kerr, supra note 35 (arguing that the rules ought to create a R
level playing field between criminals and law enforcement in light of technological
advancement); Ohm, supra note 796 (building on Kerr by considering dual-assis- R
tance technologies that help both law breakers and law enforcement).
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generate new knowledge, and to do so for many people over exten-
sive periods of time, with minimal resource constraints.
In Riley, the Court alluded to these concerns.806 It acknowl-
edged four consequences that flowed from the government’s col-
lection of data, which helped to clarify why the search of a mobile
phone was more invasive than finding a packet of cigarettes in
someone’s pocket. The former had “several interrelated privacy
consequences.”807
First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of
information that reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record. Second, the phone’s capacity allows even just
one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible. Third, data on the phone can date back for years. In
addition, an element of pervasiveness characterizes cell phones
but not physical records. A decade ago officers might have oc-
casionally stumbled across a highly personal item such as a di-
ary, but today many in the more than 90% of American adults
who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives.808
Similar issues haunted the shadow majority in Jones. Justice Al-
ito recognized, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigation of
most offenses impinges on expectation of privacy.”809
Justice Sotomayor explained, “In cases involving even short-
term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance rele-
vant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention.”810 That it
was precise and reflected a “wealth of detail about” one’s “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” was
relevant.811
Sotomayor went on to note that the length of time the records
could be kept, and mined, for more information, raised further
concerns: “And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds sur-
806. See also Susan Friewald, A First Principles Approach to Communications’ Pri-
vacy, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (2007) (arguing electronic surveillance that is intrusive
continuous, indiscriminate, and hidden should be subject to Fourth Amendment
restrictions). Friewald’s principles align with the direction the Court took in Riley
and Jones.
807. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478.
808. Id.
809. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
810. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
811. Id.
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reptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices.”812
Justice Sotomayor tried to fold her broader concerns into the
Katz framework: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”813 But in
relying on Katz, Sotomayor’s approach fell short of challenging the
dichotomies and bringing attention to the underlying issue, which
is the steady expansion of government power over the people. By
acknowledging that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
protect against the accumulation of power, the Court will be better
equipped to confront the dangers of the digital age.
812. Id. at 956.
813. Id.
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